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This dissertation uses economic theory, in tandem with experiments and other empirical 
methods, to better understand the role of information – for instance, missing information, 
conflicting information, and information overload – in determining outcomes in decision settings 
characterized by risk and uncertainty. In my first chapter, I use theory and experiments to compare 
market outcomes in a setting where the seller has better information on product quality than the 
buyer, and examine the effects of introducing a third-party who can credibly relay information on 
product quality. Under a range of conditions, I find market efficiency is higher when the 
information intermediaries interact with buyers instead of sellers. Moreover, market outcomes 
depend on many other factors, including the accuracy of the certification process and the level of 
competition in the certification market.  
My other dissertation chapters examine decision making in settings characterized by 
ambiguity, where agents may not form unique beliefs about the probabilities associated with 
potential outcomes either because there is too little information, or too much conflicting 
information is provided. In the second chapter, I design a novel experiment that takes advantage 
of information updating to test the predictive power of two popular classes of ambiguity aversion 
models, and the experimental results suggest that the “kinked” rather than “smooth” specification 
better predict subjects’ behavior. In the third chapter, I conduct MATLAB simulations to study the 
timing of technology adoption in response to climate change when predictions from multiple 
climate models are available. Using the data from California’s Central Valley, my simulation 
results show that an increase in the confliction between projections accelerates the adaption speed 
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CHAPTER I: PRODUCT QUALITY AND THIRD-PARTY 







This paper examines a seller’s incentives for investing in product quality when buyers have 
incomplete information on quality, and either the seller or the buyer can purchase quality 
certification from a credible third party. When the seller invests in quality before the certifier sets 
a price, we find that both seller effort and social welfare are higher in a setting where certification 
is available to the buyer relative to one where it is available to the seller. When the certifier instead 
moves first in the game, buyer certification continues to incentivize relatively more seller effort, 
although social welfare is not necessarily higher. In a complementary lab experiment, we find 
empirical support for some basic implications of the theory: certification improves market 
outcomes relative to when certification is not available, decreasing the price of certification 
increases its uptake, and making the certification process error-prone decreases seller effort and 
social welfare. Comparisons of seller and buyer certification settings suggest that differences are 
smaller than predicted by theory. Our results also suggest that seller certification is a more robust 
tool for improving market efficiency. 
 
JEL Classifications: C91, D82, L15, G24 
Keywords:  Market transparency, Certification, Information and product quality, Asymmetric 




1.1  Introduction  
An extensive literature has explored consequences, such as adverse selection, that arise in 
markets characterized by asymmetric information between parties engaged in potential 
transactions. One way to mitigate the information problem is for a certifier to enter the market and 
provide credible information to the less knowledgeable agent. That both buyers and sellers demand 
certification is evident from existing markets. For instance, in product markets where sellers have 
better information on product quality than buyers do, food companies certify their products as 
organic, consumers pay a business such as Lemon Busters to inspect a used car prior to purchase, 
and firms engage with credit rating agencies to attract buyers for their bonds. In this paper we 
focus on the seller’s incentives to invest in product quality when a certification service is available, 
and are specifically interested in comparing markets where the seller has the option to purchase 
certification, a setting we will refer to as seller certification, with otherwise identical markets where 
instead buyer certification is available. We use theory and experiments to provide new insight on 
this topic.  
As discussed by Stahl and Strausz (2017), there are fundamental differences between seller 
and buyer certification settings that, in a model where product quality is exogenously determined, 
lead to a higher market transparency and social welfare in the seller certification case. Seller 
certification acts as a signaling device, and leads to transparency as it conveys information to the 
buyer about quality even when it is not used. In fact, certification is the only credible signal of 
quality, as the price set by the seller contains no meaningful information absent certification. In 
the buyer certification case, certification acts as an inspection tool. Here, the seller’s price does 
provide a quality signal, albeit an imperfect one, as the seller is exposed to the possibility that the 
buyer will pay for certification and then forego the purchase if the product is not high quality. The 
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certifier is incentivized to price the service in a way that minimizes market transparency, as this 
decreases the value of the seller’s price signal and, in turn, maximizes the demand for certification.  
In this study we show theoretically that, despite the decrease in market transparency, buyer 
certification provides a stronger motivation for sellers to invest in product quality. In fact, for the 
seller-certification case, product quality is fully revealed in the market, but the certifier captures 
the value of effort expended toward increased quality, leaving the seller with little incentive to 
create value through higher quality. Conversely, in the buyer-certification setting where the 
certifier provides the service at a lower cost to decrease transparency and increase demand, the 
seller invests more in quality improvement since he captures a higher return on quality investment.  
Our analysis complements prior work on seller certification, which also demonstrates that 
introducing a certifier can improve upon market outcomes, but that the seller’s incentive to invest 
in product quality is nevertheless below the first-best case. This literature dates back to Biglaiser 
(1993), who demonstrates how an information intermediary (e.g., a certifier) affects market 
efficiency. Albano and Lizzeri (2001) generalize the model of Lizzeri (1999) to allow for 
endogenous effort, and find that seller certification increases market efficiency; however, an 
inefficiency still remains as the certifier will always charge a positive price for the information and 
reduce the seller’s incentive to invest in quality improvement. As another example, Biglaiser and 
Li (2018) show that when the seller certification process is perfectly revealing, this information 
mechanism crowds out any imperfect signal, and yields the certifier significant market power. In 
the extreme case, buyers have perfect information on quality, but sellers have absolutely no 
incentive to invest in quality. Marinovic, Skrzypacz, and Varas (2017) and Board and Meyer-ter-
Vehn (2013) focus on the relationship between certification and reputation. In their model, they 
assume the firm can both build a reputation and use certification to signal product quality. A 
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certification trap occurs in that environment as low reputation firms have no incentive to invest in 
quality as the certifier will take all their surplus. 
Our research also contributes to the understanding of tradeoffs between seller and buyer 
certification. On this note, while there is a sizable literature focused on seller certification (see 
Dranove and Jin, 2010), only a few papers have compared the two types of processes. Importantly, 
these studies abstract from the seller’s quality investment choice. Durbin (1999) first illustrates 
that the role of certification depends on the trading party and focuses on how a certifier can 
maximize profit through the choice of whether to engage with the buyer or seller. Fasten and 
Hofmann (2010) allow the certifier to trade with both parties, but the focus is on the profit-
maximization problem of the certifier. Stahl and Strauz (2017), as described above, allow for 
strategic interaction between the certifier and engagement party but assume product quality is 
exogenously determined. In their model, seller certification is more beneficial as it leads to a higher 
market transparency and social welfare.  
Our model considers the case with one potential buyer, one seller, and one certifier. In our 
baseline model, the seller first makes a costly choice of effort to probabilistically determine the 
quality of the product, and then presents a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. Using a similar 
structure, we consider cases where the seller or buyer has the option to purchase certification. In 
the seller certification scenario, consistent with Biglaiser and Li (2018), the certifier sets the price 
of her service after quality is determined (that is, the certifier cannot commit to a price prior to the 
seller choosing effort). In this case, a profit-maximizing certifier will set the price of the service 
equal to the price gap between the high quality and low-quality item, leaving the seller no better 
off in the case where they have a high-quality item to sell. In the buyer certification scenario, 
knowing that the low-quality seller has an incentive to mislead the buyer, a buyer will purchase 
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certification with a probability less than one. With a lower certification price, the buyer's random 
inspection mechanism yields the seller an expected positive benefit for producing a high-quality 
product, thus motivating effort to increase quality.  
We further consider a setting where the certifier moves first by committing to a price. While 
this has no effect on buyer certification, in the case of seller certification changing the order of the 
game does motivate the certifier to lower her price to incentivize seller effort which in turn 
increases demand for certification. Nevertheless, buyer certification continues to better motivate 
investment into product quality. From a social welfare perspective, the advantage of buyer 
certification is the additional effort towards quality improvement, while the disadvantage is the 
loss that occurs when a misleading low-type seller is caught and the product goes unsold. We show 
that buyer certification unambiguously increases social welfare when the certifier moves second 
in the game. Whether this is true in the case where the certifier moves first depends on the value 
of a low-quality product to buyers.  
We consider two additional extensions. First, we assume the certification price is set 
competitively, rather than by a monopolistic certifier. In this case, seller certification leads to 
relatively higher product quality, as the certifier’s rent-seeking behavior becomes limited while 
the advantage of transparency still exists. Second, we allow errors in the certification process in 
the sense that the certifier has some probability of classifying a low-quality item as high-quality 
and vice versa. The presence of errors in the certification process lowers both the price of 
certification and the seller’s effort choice. However, we find the magnitudes of these effects differ 
across buyer and seller certification, leading to ambiguity in terms of which leads to more desirable 
market outcomes.   
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The theoretical model yields several testable hypotheses regarding investment in quality 
under varying market and institutional conditions, some of which we test in a complementary 
laboratory experiment. The experimental investigation contributes to an experimental literature on 
information provision in markets. Cason and Gangadharan (2002) examine whether certification 
improves market efficiency in a food labelling setting, and find that when compared to cheap talk 
and reputation building mechanisms, the certification system is a more reliable approach for 
improving market efficiency. Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004) study a related setting where firms 
and workers enter into contracts, and the workers can choose effort levels that deviate from what 
was contracted. They find that introducing third-party enforcement leads to near-competitive 
contract terms. As no prior experiment has focused on comparing outcomes from parallel seller 
and buyer certification settings, we concentrate on this in the experiment. We compare settings 
where seller certification is predicted to be superior in terms of product quality and/or social 
welfare with others where buyer certification carries these potential advantages. We further 
investigate the effects of introducing errors in the certification process, which has not been 
examined in the prior experimental literature.  
The experimental results serve to both confirm and challenge the theoretical model. We 
find support for some primary hypotheses, including that certification improves market outcomes 
relative to when certification is not available, decreasing the price of certification increases its 
uptake, and introducing errors decreases both seller effort and social welfare. However, 
comparisons of the parallel seller and buyer certification settings suggest that differences are 
smaller than predicted by theory. Other interesting findings include differences in how market 
surplus is divided between buyers and sellers across certification settings, and changes in 
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certification uptake when the inspection process is error prone. Additional details of our results are 
described later. 
1.2  Theoretical model 
In our model, there are three players in the market: one seller, one buyer and one certifier. 
We define player roles below. 
Seller: the seller produces one unit of a product at some cost. The quality of the output 𝜃 
is determined by the seller’s effort, and is either high or low (discrete), 𝜃 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻}. Define 𝑒 as the 
probability that the item is high quality, and 𝑐(𝑒) as the cost function. We assume 𝑐(𝑒) is twice 
differentiable, strictly increasing and convex on the unit interval, 𝑒ϵ[0,1] . Also, we assume 
𝑐′(0) = 0, which guarantees an interior solution. Absent any certification cost, if the seller exerts 
effort 𝑒 and the good is sold at price 𝑃, firm profits equal 𝑃 − 𝑐(𝑒). 
Buyer: the buyer neither observes the seller’s effort nor the quality of the good prior to 
purchasing the item. However, the buyer has a prior belief about the seller’s effort level, ?̃?, and 
updates his belief based on the price, and any information provided by a certifier. The buyer’s 
utility depends on the quality of the product. Define 𝑣 = 𝑣ℎ if the product is high quality and 𝑣 =
𝑣𝑙 if the product is low quality. Then, absent any certification cost, the buyer’s expected payoff 
from purchasing the item is 𝐸(𝑣|𝑃, ?̃?) − 𝑃. If a purchase is made, the buyer knows with certainty 
the quality of the good. 
Certifier: the certifier only benefits from selling its services. The certifier has an inspection 
technology, which is costless and possibly prone to errors. The certifier makes a “take-it-or-leave-
it” price offer, 𝑃𝑐, for the service and provides a product certification only when the quality is 
determined to be high. The certifier either offers the service directly to the buyer or the seller, 
depending on the setting. 
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In the analysis that follows, we first define the benchmark model as the case without any 
certifier. Next, under the assumption that the certification service is perfectly-revealing, we will 
compare seller certification and buyer certification when the certifier moves after the seller to 
illustrate the difference between the two mechanisms. We then consider the case where certifier 
moves first and demonstrate that the advantage of buyer certification remains. In addition, we 
extend our model in two ways. First, we examine the case where the certification market is 
competitive, and then, we consider the case of an error-prone certification process. 
1.2.1 Benchmark case 
In his classic article, Akerlof (1970) argues that – when the product quality is unknown to 
potential buyers – this can result in a market where only low-quality products (“lemons”) are sold, 
and eventually all high-quality products are priced out of the market. As it is not obvious that a 
similar result will hold in a setting where sellers can expend costly effort to improve product quality, 
we first analyze a simple product market without a certifier. The game has three stages: 
1. The seller chooses effort 𝑒 and then learns product quality 𝜃.  
2. The seller makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to the buyer at price 𝑃. 
3. Observing price 𝑃, the buyer updates his belief about product quality and decides 
whether to purchase the product.  
Our model is of a dynamic game with incomplete information, and we rely on the Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) equilibrium concept. Allowing for a mixed strategy, let 𝜎𝜃(𝑃) denote 





= 1, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜃 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻}, 
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where we assume the reasonable range of prices to be between the buyer’s valuations of the high- 
and low-quality product. 
The buyer updates his belief after observing the price signal using Bayes’ rule. Since the 
only signal that a buyer has is the price, we define 𝜇(𝑃) as the buyer’s belief that the item is high 





In other words, when facing price 𝑃, the buyer will form her belief based on the prior and the 
chance that a seller will offer a low (high) quality product at a price 𝑃. With the updated belief, the 
buyer will take the offer if 𝑃 ≤ 𝜇(𝑃)𝑣ℎ + (1 − 𝜇(𝑃))𝑣𝑙 , and reject it if 𝑃 > 𝜇(𝑃)𝑣ℎ + (1 −
𝜇(𝑃))𝑣𝑙.  
Knowing that the buyer has a belief about the expected value based on the price signal, the 
seller decides the optimal price based on the actual quality. Though we allow the seller to use a 
mixed strategy, however, it turns out that offering the good at 𝑃∗ = 𝐸(𝑣) = 𝜇(𝑃)𝑣ℎ + (1 −
𝜇(𝑃))𝑣𝑙 dominants any other price for a high-quality seller. Any price higher than this will deter 
the buyer while any price lower than this will not maximize profit. For a low-type seller, he follows 
the same strategy as the high type seller, and offers the item at 𝑃∗ = 𝐸(𝑣), since a different action 
will reveal his type to the buyer. Thus, we have 𝜎ℎ(𝑃
∗) =  𝜎𝑙(𝑃
∗) = 1, 𝜇(𝑃∗) = ?̃?, and 𝐸(𝑣) =
?̃?𝑣ℎ + (1 − ?̃?)𝑣𝑙 . Notice here the optimal selling price does not depend on the effort choice of 
seller. Thus, the seller will set the price just equal to ?̃?𝑣ℎ + (1 − ?̃?)𝑣𝑙 and then choose effort in 
order to maximize profit 
(3) max
𝑒∈[0,1]
𝑃∗ − 𝑐(𝑒). 





?̃?𝑣ℎ + (1 − ?̃?)𝑣𝑙 − 𝑐(𝑒). 
Clearly, the solution to this problem is for the seller to exert minimal effort, which in turn 
minimizes cost. In equilibrium, the buyer’s belief ?̃? is correct and  ?̃? = 0. No high-quality item is 
produced in the market. Conditional on the assumptions made, the solution for the problem is 
unique. 
Lemma 1 When there is no certifier in the market, the optimal effort choice by the seller is 𝑒∗  =
 0, i.e. the seller chooses minimum effort, and all items are traded as the value of low-quality. 
1.2.2 Seller certification 
Now we allow the certifier to enter the market and interact with the seller. The existence 
of the certifier gives the seller a chance to signal product quality. We assume that certification 
perfectly reveals quality. If certification is a purchased, a high-quality item will be certified 
whereas a low-quality item will not. With this additional interaction, the seller certification game 
has five stages: 
1. The seller decides his effort level 𝑒, and then learns the quality 𝜃. 
2. The certifier determines the certification price 𝑃𝑐. 
3. The seller decides whether to purchase certification. If the service is purchased, an item 
with high quality will convey a certification as a perfect quality signal to the buyer.  
4. The seller sets the price 𝑃 and makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to the buyer. 
5. Observing price 𝑃 and whether the product is certified, the buyer updates his belief 
about product quality and decides whether to purchase the product.  
Based on the certification condition, let us define 𝜎𝜃
𝑐(𝑃) as the probability a seller with 𝜃 
type item offers a certified item at price 𝑃, and 𝜎𝜃
𝑢(𝑃) as the probability a seller with 𝜃 type item 
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offers an uncertified item at price 𝑃. Again, the seller’s strategy must satisfy the condition that for 
each type of seller, the joint probability between choosing a selling price and taking certification 
equals to one. Since we assume certification provides a perfect signal, after observing the seller’s 
action, the buyer will treat any item with certification as high quality, and thus the maximum 
acceptable price is 𝑃𝐻 = 𝐸
𝑐(𝑣) = 𝑣ℎ. For any item without certification, the buyer will form the 








which implies 𝑃𝐿 = 𝐸
𝑢(𝑣) = 𝜇(𝑃)𝑣ℎ + (1 − 𝜇(𝑃))𝑣𝑙. We first assume the price of certification, 
𝑃𝑐, is exogenously given and define the equilibrium as follows: 
Lemma 2 With 𝑃𝑐 exogenously determined, under seller certification we have that 
1. For any 𝑃𝑐 ≤ 𝑃𝐻 − 𝑃𝐿, a high type seller will always purchase certification, and a low type 
seller will not. A PBE exists for which the expected profit for the certifier is 𝑃𝑐𝑒 and the 
product will be purchased with certainty.  
2. For any 𝑃𝑐 > 𝑃𝐻 − 𝑃𝐿 neither the high type nor low type seller will purchase certification. 
The equilibrium will be the same as in the benchmark case. 
Knowing the buyer takes the certification as a perfect signal and high type seller will 
always purchase certification when 𝑃𝑐 ≤ 𝑃𝐻 − 𝑃𝐿 , the certifier needs to solve their profit 
maximization problem. To maximize profit while incentivizing the seller to purchase certification, 
the certifier will set the price 𝑃𝑐 such that the profit of the seller is the same regardless of the quality 
of the item, which implies 𝑃𝑐 = 𝑃𝐻 − 𝑃𝐿. Under this price we have 𝜎ℎ
𝑢(𝑃) = 0, since it is always 
optimal for the high type seller to purchase the certification. We also know that a low-type seller 
will never purchase certification since the inspection is perfect,  𝜎𝑙










(5) 𝑃𝐿 = 𝐸
𝑢(𝑞) = 𝜇(𝑃)𝑣ℎ + (1 − 𝜇(𝑃))𝑣𝑙 = 𝑣𝑙, 
and 
(6) 𝑃𝑐 = 𝑃𝐻 − 𝑃𝐿 = 𝑣ℎ − 𝑣𝑙. 
With these conditions, the profit-maximizing problem for the seller becomes 
(7) max
𝑒∈[0,1]
𝑒(𝑃𝐻 − 𝑃𝑐) + (1 − 𝑒)𝑃𝐿 − 𝑐(𝑒). 
After substituting in the optimal 𝑃𝑐, the problem above is equivalent to 
(7’) max
𝑒∈[0,1]
𝑣𝑙 − 𝑐(𝑒). 
Based on our assumptions, the unique solution for this problem is 𝑒∗ = 0, as in the benchmark 
case. We summarize our first result in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 The market with available seller certification has a unique equilibrium. The high-
quality seller certifies with certainty, and the low-quality seller does not certify. The buyer 
purchases a certified product at price 𝑣ℎ and an uncertified item at price 𝑣𝑙.  The certifier sets the 
price of certification to be 𝑃𝑐 = 𝑣ℎ − 𝑣𝑙, and the seller devotes minimal effort to improving the 
quality. The product is traded with certainty. 
Intuitively, although the existence of the certifier provides perfect information into the 
market, the rent seeking nature of the certifier will also reduce the incentive for the seller to devote 
additional effort. Note here that the equilibrium for the seller certification case is fundamentally 
different from the benchmark case in the sense that the equilibrium is a perfect sorting equilibrium 
and a high-quality product is recognized by the market. While this distinction may seem trivial, 
consider a slight modification where we instead assume that expending minimal effort, 𝑒 = 0, 
yields a high-quality item with a probability greater than zero. Thus, a high-quality product can 
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arise, and when produced the seller will purchase certification. This, in turn, will increase social 
welfare relative to the benchmark case. 
1.2.3 Buyer certification 
As with the case of seller certification, the buyer certification has five stages: 
1. The seller decides his effort level 𝑒 and learns the quality 𝜃 following production. 
2. The certifier determines the certification price 𝑃𝑐. 
3. The seller sets a product price 𝑃 and makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to the buyer. 
4. Based on the price of certification and the product price, the buyer decides whether to 
purchase a certification service. If certification is purchased, the buyer knows the 
quality for sure.  
5. The buyer decides whether to purchase the product.  
Allowing for a mixed strategy, we define 𝜎𝜃(𝑃) as the probability that a seller with quality 




= 1, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜃 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻}. 
In the absence of certification, the only signal available to the buyer is the offered price. 
We define 𝜇(𝑃) as the buyer’s belief that the quality of the item is high based on the price signal. 
Using Bayes’ rule, faced with 𝑃, the buyer will first consider the probability that a seller with type 





With the price and belief, the buyer has three possible actions: 
1. Action 𝑠𝑏: the buyer does not purchase certification, and buys the item directly. The 
expected payoff is 𝑈(𝑠𝑏|𝑃, 𝜇)= 𝜇(𝑃)𝑣ℎ + (1 − 𝜇(𝑃))𝑣𝑙 − 𝑃. 
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2. Action 𝑠𝑛: the buyer does not purchase certification, and does not buy the item. This 
action yields the buyer zero payoff. 
3. Action 𝑠ℎ: the buyer purchases certification and purchases the product only if it is high 
quality. The expected payoff is (𝑠ℎ|𝑃, 𝜇)= 𝜇(𝑃)(𝑣ℎ − 𝑃) − 𝑃𝑐  
There are three other possible actions, including to pay for the certification service and 
purchase the item if the quality is low, buy certification but never purchase the item, and pay for 
certification and always buy the item. Since these actions are payoff dominated, we can safely 
exclude them from consideration. We can calculate the range of values for 𝑃, 𝜇, and 𝑃𝑐 that allows 
one action to yield a higher payoff than the others. The action 𝑠𝑛 is optimal when 
(10) P > 𝜇(𝑃)𝑣ℎ + (1 − 𝜇(𝑃))𝑣𝑙     and     𝑃𝑐 >  𝜇(𝑃)(𝑣ℎ − 𝑃). 
Following the same logic, 𝑠𝑏 is optimal when 
(11) P ≤ 𝜇(𝑃)𝑣ℎ + (1 − 𝜇(𝑃))𝑣𝑙     and      𝑃𝑐 ≥ (1 − 𝜇)(𝑃 − 𝑣𝑙). 
And last, 𝑠ℎ is optimal when  
(12)  𝑃𝑐 ≤ 𝜇(𝑃)(𝑣ℎ − 𝑃)     and     𝑃𝑐 ≤ (1 − 𝜇)(𝑃 − 𝑣𝑙). 
To fully characterize the equilibrium, we will divide the discussion into three parts. First, 
assuming a mixed strategy equilibrium, we identify the optimal action set for each player in the 
PBE. Second, conditional on consistency in beliefs we identify the probability of each action. Last, 
given the mixed strategy PBE, we will show that there is no meaningful pure strategy PBE in this 
game.1 These three steps are sufficient to demonstrate that the equilibrium satisfies the requirement 
for a PBE.  
 
1 There is a pure strategy equilibrium in which the seller choses e = 0 and buyer buys as the low-quality price. We 
ignore this self-fulfilling case in the following analysis. 
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In a mixed strategy equilibrium, a buyer must be indifferent among 𝑠𝑛, 𝑠𝑏 and 𝑠ℎ, which 
implies: 
(13) 𝑃𝑐 = 𝜇(𝑃)(𝑣ℎ − 𝑃), 
(14) 𝑃𝑐 = (1 − 𝜇)(𝑃 − 𝑣𝑙), and 
(15) 𝑃 = 𝜇(𝑃)𝑣ℎ + (1 − 𝜇(𝑃))𝑣𝑙. 








where ∆𝑣 is the difference in buyer valuations for high and low-quality items. If the seller sets the 
price at ?̃? and the buyer has the belief  𝜇, then the buyer will be indifferent among these three 
actions. Since the certifier wants to maximize profit, they will always set the price of certification 
such that the buyer purchases it. As long as 𝑃𝑐 ≤ ∆𝑣/4 , the buyer will have a demand for 
certification.   
To fully characterize the equilibrium, we need to calculate the optimal strategy of the seller 
conditional on the realized quality. When 𝑃 = ?̃? and 𝜇 = 𝜇, a high type seller will set 𝑃 = ?̃?, since 
any higher price will result in the buyer not purchasing the item. Any lower price is not optimal 
since it would only decrease profit while not changing the purchase probability. For a low-type 
seller, he will face a semi-inspection game. If he offers a price other than ?̃?, he will be recognized 
as a low type under an updated belief from the buyer. Thus, if he does not ask for ?̃?, the maximum 
price he can ask is 𝑣𝑙 . If he asks for ?̃? and then he will receive 0 when the buyer chooses 
certification, or ?̃? if the buyer chooses not to. Defining 𝜎∗(𝑠ℎ) as the probability a buyer will check 
the quality when facing ?̃?, and 𝜎𝑙
∗(?̃?) as the probability that a low type seller wants to mislead the 
buyer into thinking his product is high quality, we state Lemma 2 as follows:  
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Lemma 2 For a given 𝑃𝑐, under buyer certification we have that  
1) For any 𝑃𝑐 ≤ ∆𝑣/4, a high type seller will always sell the product at ?̃?. A low type seller 
will sell the product at ?̃?  with probability 𝜎𝑙
∗(?̃?) , and 𝑃𝐿  with probability 1 − 𝜎𝑙
∗(?̃?) . 
Faced with 𝑃 = ?̃? , the buyer will purchase certification with probability 𝜎∗(𝑠ℎ), and the 
buyer will never purchase certification when 𝑃 = 𝑃𝐿.  
2) For any 𝑃𝑐 > ∆𝑣/4, the buyer will never purchase certification. The equilibrium will be the 
same as the lemon market described in the benchmark model. 
For the buyer, 𝜎∗(𝑠ℎ)  makes the low type seller indifferent between offering to sell at ?̃? 














We also have  
(19) 𝜇(?̃?) = 𝜇. 







∗(?̃?) is the probability that a low type seller offers the item at ?̃?.  
Based on the derivations above, the seller’s profit-maximization problem is 
(21) max
𝑒∈[0,1]
𝑒?̃? + (1 − 𝑒)𝜎𝑙
∗(?̃?)(1 − 𝜎∗(𝑠ℎ))?̃? + (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝜎𝑙
∗(?̃?))𝑞𝑙 − 𝑐(𝑒), 
which can be simplified by substituting in the expression of 𝜎𝑙
∗(?̃?) and 𝜎∗(𝑠ℎ) to yield 
(21’) max
𝑒∈[0,1]
𝑒?̃? + (1 − 𝑒)𝑣𝑙 − 𝑐(𝑒). 
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This maximization problem makes intuitive sense. In equilibrium, a high-type seller will always 
claim ?̃? and successfully sell the product, while the expected profit for a low-type seller is always 
𝑣𝑙 as the buyer will adjust the chance of certification to make a low-type seller indifferent between 
attempting to mislead the buyer or not.  
Taking the derivative of the revenue and cost functions with respect to 𝑒 separately, we 
have  
(22) 𝑀𝐵 = ?̃? − 𝑣𝑙     and 𝑀𝐶 =  𝑐′(𝑒). 
Combining this result with our assumptions about the cost function, we can easily show that there 
exists an optimal effort 𝑒∗ that is strictly positive and solves the maximization problem above. The 
intuition here is that, when a seller knows that the buyer might purchase certification, he will put 
more effort into product development since quality has a higher chance of being recognized. 
Compared with the result of seller certification, clearly a market with available buyer certification 
leads to a higher quality improvement.  
Though this result may seem counterintuitive, there is a clear story here. For the seller 
certification case, the only incentive compatible way to reveal quality is through certification. At 
the same time, any price claim without the reinforcement of certification is not credible. Such a 
mechanism provides the certifier with significant market power and allows the certifier to obtain 
extra rent from their service. On the other hand, for the buyer certification case, the action to claim 
a price of ?̃? also serves as an information device. When a seller self-claims to be a high type, he 
sends the market a signal, because he incurs an opportunity cost in expectation if his product is, in 
fact, low quality. The existence of the second source of information limits the rent-seeking ability 
of the certifier, thus in turn increasing the seller’s incentive to invest in quality improvement. 
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Stahl and Strausz (2017) find that a market with available seller certification yields a higher 
social welfare as the product is always sold. With endogenous effort, we find seller certification is 
still trade promoting compared with buyer certification, but the overall social welfare may become 
ambiguous as the effort level decreases. Here we show the social welfare is always higher under 
buyer certification when the seller moves first in the game. The advantage of buyer certification is 
the additional effort towards quality improvement, while the loss is the untraded item when a 
misleading low-type seller is caught. We can express the comparison as follows 
(23) 𝑒𝑏∆𝑣 − 𝜎𝑙
∗(?̃?)𝜎∗(𝑠ℎ)𝑣𝑙, 
where 𝑒𝑏 is the equilibrium effort level in the case of buyer certification. Substitute in the value of 





which is strictly positive as ?̃? > 𝑣𝑙  and 𝜇 < 1. 
Proposition 2: If the certification price is set after the seller observes product quality, a market 
with a certification service available to the buyer leads to a higher seller effort level and higher 
social welfare when compared with a market where instead certification is available to the seller. 
The probability a product is traded is strictly less than 1.  
1.2.4 Certification when the certifier moves first 
In this section, we focus on a case where the certifier sets their price prior to when the seller 
chooses effort. With seller certification available, knowing that the seller will make his effort 
choice after observing the certification price, the certifier has the incentive to reduce the 
certification price to incentivize the seller to expend effort, which increases the chance of 
purchasing certification. On the other hand, the buyer’s optimization problem when buyer 
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certification is available is unaltered by the order of the game; therefore, the certification price and 
seller’s optimal effort are the same as before.   
To facilitate a cardinal comparison across certification mechanisms, we assume a flexible 
form for the cost of effort function; in particular, we assume this has the exponential form,  𝑐(𝑒) =
𝑒𝜆, where 𝜆 > 1 is a parameter that characterizes the convexity of the cost function. For the seller 
certification case, using backward induction, the optimal certification price and marginal benefit 
of effort are as follows 
 (25) 𝑃𝑐 =
(𝜆−1)Δ𝑣
𝜆




With buyer certification, based on the discussion in section 2.3, we can write the certifier’s 
profit maximization problem as  
(26) max
𝑃𝑐
 [𝑒𝑏(𝑃𝑐) + (1 − 𝑒𝑏(𝑃𝑐))𝜎𝑙
∗(?̃?(𝑃𝑐))]𝜎
∗(𝑠ℎ(𝑃𝑐))𝑃𝑐. 
By choosing 𝑃𝑐, the certifier simultaneously influences many aspects of behavior. A higher price 
of certification makes the certification less favorable for the seller. However, if the chance the 
buyer purchases certification falls, this also increases the chance that a low-type seller may distort 















, represents the relative value of a low-quality product. The difference between the 
marginal benefit of effort in the buyer and seller certification cases is equal to 











which is always positive, and increases with 𝑛. Intuitively, when the relative value of the low-
quality item increases, the value of the price signal in the buyer certification case increases as well, 
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which in turn leads to a lower certification cost and higher seller effort. Here, we provide our third 
proposition, a detailed proof of which is provided in the appendix.   
Proposition 3: With the cost function 𝑐(𝑒) = 𝑒𝜆 and 𝜆 > 1, the seller’s effort is higher in a market 
with available buyer certification relative to a market with available seller certification. The 





Whether buyer or seller certification leads to higher social welfare is ambiguous. As 
discussed in Section 2.3, the social welfare differences depend on whether the expected value of 
the additional effort induced by buyer certification outweighs the expected loss that occurs when 
a misleading low-type seller is caught, and the product is not sold. When the value of a low-quality 
product is sufficiently low, the additional effort induced by buyer certification is no longer large 
enough to offset the expected losses from misleading sellers.  
1.2.5 Extension 1: Competitive certification market 
In the previous sections we focused on a monopolistic certifier. At the other extreme, the 
certification market may be either competitive or under some regulation, and be one where the 
certifier charges the same price regardless of the engaging party. In this case, we can easily show 
that seller certification leads to higher seller effort.  As the cost function and the price of the low-
quality item are the same in the two cases, we compare the two mechanisms based on the expected 
price of the high-quality item. To set up the comparison we have  




which equals to zero when 𝑃𝐶 = 0, and is strictly increasing in 𝑃𝐶. Intuitively, the constraint on 
the certification price limits the certifier’s ability to obtain rents in both cases. However, the 
22 
 
transparency advantage of seller certification provides the seller a higher incentive to devote effort, 
as a seller of a high-quality item can extract all available surplus without providing the buyer any 
compensation for potentially misleading behavior.  
1.2.6 Extension 2: Imperfect certification process 
Last, we focus on the case where the certification process is error prone. Let τ denote the 
accuracy rate, or the probability that a high (low) quality product will be correctly deemed by the 
certifier to be of high (low) quality. We assume that errors are symmetric, in the sense there is a 1-
τ probability that a low-quality item is certified to be high quality, and a 1-τ probability that a high-
quality is determined to be low quality. We assume the probability is common knowledge to all 
parties. When the certifier sets the price after the seller chooses effort, regardless of whether the 
inspection is perfect or not, the certifier will always price so that they capture all seller surplus, 
leaving the seller with zero incentive to improve the quality. Therefore, Proposition 2 applies. 
When the certifier sets her price before the seller chooses effort, it turns out that when the 
error rate, 1 − 𝜏, together with value of the low-quality item becomes large, the seller certification 
mechanism will lead to higher effort. This is because under buyer certification, when a high-quality 
product is certified to be low quality, the seller faces an additional opportunity cost, as he is not 
able to sell the item. On the other hand, under seller certification, when the high-quality product is 
certified to be low quality, the seller can still sell it at the price of a low-quality item. Support for 
these claims can be found in the Appendix. 
1.3   Experimental design 
The theory models provide several testable hypotheses. As a starting point for 
understanding whether the models are good approximations for actual behavior, we use a lab 
experiment with human subjects to test a subset of them. While mathematically tractable, a 
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sophisticated game with three players introduces considerable complexities. To reduce this 
complexity, we streamline the experimental design by automating the role of the certifier. 
Specifically, we hold fixed certification prices within treatments. As such, the experimental game 
conceptually captures a setting where either the certifier moves first, or otherwise one where the 
certification market is competitive or regulated. One additional advantage of this design choice is 
that it allows us to compare otherwise identical buyer and seller certification markets while holding 
the price of certification fixed, a case described in Section 2.5 
The experimental treatments are summarized in Table 1.1, and Table 1.2 presents 
theoretical predictions for outcomes of interest.2 The experimental design varies as between-
subject treatment variables whether seller or buyer certification is available, and whether the 
certification process perfectly or imperfectly reveals product quality. As a within-subject treatment 
variable we vary whether the certification price, 𝑃𝑐, is the theoretically optimal certification price 
derived from the model in Section 2.4 or instead an alternative price. This alternative price in the 
case of seller (buyer) certification is the optimal price for the parallel buyer (seller) certification 
treatment. We introduce as a control a standard lemons market, a market where certification is not 
available. We now provide details of the experimental game.  
The experimental game involves a single seller and a single buyer. The seller makes an 
effort choice, 𝑒, by selecting an integer from 0 and 10, and this choice translates linearly into the 
probability the product will be of high quality – each additional unit of effort increases this chance 
by 10 percentage points and 10 units of effort guarantees the product is high quality. The cost of 
effort function is 𝑐(𝑒) = 𝑒2, and costs range from 0 to 100 lab dollars. The buyer has valuations 
of 𝑣𝑙 = 250 and 𝑣ℎ = 500 lab dollars, respectively, for a low-quality and a high-quality item. The 
 
2 All tables and figures are located in the appendix. 
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seller makes a take-it-or-leave it price offer to the buyer, and there is no outside opportunity to sell 
the product.  
When seller certification is available, the seller has the option to purchase certification, at 
a known price, after product quality is revealed. The outcome from the certification process is 
known to the seller prior to making a price offer. When buyer certification is available, the buyer 
has the option to purchase certification, at a known price, after receiving the seller’s price offer. In 
either certification setting, when a product is certified to be of high quality, this information is 
revealed to the buyer before he is asked to make a purchase decision.  
The certification process can be perfect or imperfect. Under perfect certification, there is a 
100% chance that a high-quality product, and a 0% chance that a low-quality product, will be 
certified as high quality to the buyer. Under imperfect certification, we set 𝜏 = 0.7 , and these 
percentages change to 70% and 30% respectively; i.e., there is now a 30% error rate. With seller 
certification, unless the product is certified to be of high quality, no information about quality is 
made explicit to the buyer. To be clear, the buyer does not know for sure whether the seller simply 
elected not to purchase certification or instead whether certification was purchased but the outcome 
was unfavorable. Under buyer certification, the buyer learns the outcome from the certification 
process. In any case, the error rates are known to both buyers and sellers. 
A seller’s earnings are equal to the sales price (if any) minus production cost and any 
certification cost. A buyer’s earnings are the difference between the product’s valuation and sales 
price (if a purchase is made), less any certification cost. In addition, both the buyer and the seller 
receive 100 lab dollars in fixed income in each decision period. This fixed income helps to make 
earnings positive over the course of the experiment, given that losses are possible; e.g., a buyer 
may mistakenly overpay for a low quality product.  
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1.3.1 Testable hypotheses and power analysis 
Our experimental design allows for tests of several hypotheses related to seller effort, the 
probability certification is purchased, and social welfare. For ease of interpretation we express 
social welfare (i.e., the sum of seller, buyer, and certifier profits) in terms of the percentage of 
possible welfare achieved; i.e., as an efficiency measure. Maximum social welfare equals 400, and 
is attained when the seller chooses the maximal effort of 10 (which guarantees a high-quality 
product, and costs 100), and the product is successfully sold to the buyer (who values it at 500). 
Note that any revenue collected by the (simulated) certifier does not alter welfare calculations, as 
this represents a transfer between parties. Below we summarize as hypotheses key predictions from 
the theory: 
Hypothesis 1: With the exception of buyer certification under the alternative certification 
price, both effort and social welfare are higher when certification is available relative to 
the no certification setting. 
Hypothesis 2: Under perfect inspection and the monopolistic certification price, buyer 
certification leads to higher seller effort relative to the seller certification case. 
Hypothesis 3: Under imperfect inspection and the monopolistic certification price, seller 
certification leads to higher seller effort relative to the buyer certification case. 
Hypothesis 4: Under perfect inspection and holding constant the certification price, seller 
certification will lead to higher seller effort relative to the buyer certification case.   
Hypothesis 5: Seller effort and social welfare are lower when the certification process is 
imperfect (i.e., subject to error).  
Hypothesis 1 is the key prediction that certification induces higher seller effort and leads 
to a higher social welfare relative to the standard lemons market. As we have devised scenarios, 
for comparison purposes, that price the certifier out of the market, in a few treatments the 
expectation is instead that the market with certification does no better than our control setting. 
Hypothesis 2 compares the two treatments with perfect inspection and a monopolistic certification 
price, and this prediction follows directly from Proposition 3. Hypothesis 3 and 5 follow from the 
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analysis in Section 2.6, where we consider imperfect inspection. Hypothesis 4 compares buyer and 
seller certification while holding fixed the certification price. Based on our model, when applying 
the alternative price into the seller certification model, the seller will maximize profit by choosing 
the highest effort level since the marginal profit is always higher than the marginal cost. On the 
other hand, when faced with the alternative price, the buyer will never purchase certification as the 
price is higher than the potential loss from overpaying for a low-quality product. With the 
exception of Hypothesis 3, these predictions are not specific to the parameters chosen in the 
experiment.  
To determine sample sizes, we conducted a paid pilot experiment with 22 participants. 
During the pilot, participants first encountered the control condition for ten rounds and then 
switched to the buyer certification with perfect inspection treatment for another ten rounds. Each 
set of 10 rounds was preceded by two practice rounds. Aside from the fact that two between-
subjects treatments were included in the same session, the procedures followed those described in 
Section 3.2. In our power calculations, we assume that the estimated within and between-subject 
variances from the pilot session are representative of all treatments.3 Moreover, we assume that 
tests are based on a linear regression model with standard errors clustered at the participant-level. 
With these assumptions in mind, we settled on sample sizes of 34 for each of the five between-
subject treatments. This allows us to detect a minimum effect size of 1.4 effort units for a between-
subjects test at 80% power, using a 5% significance level. To place this into perspective, 
considering all cases where treatment effects are expected to arise, the smallest predicted treatment 
 
3 Interestingly, both the within and between-subjects variances of the effort and market efficiency variables were 
virtually identical across the two treatments. This suggest that estimated variances from the pilot serve as a reasonable 
proxy for the remaining treatments, as assumed in the power calculations.   
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effect is 2 units of effort. The minimum detectable effect sizes are 15% and 22% percentage points, 
respectively, for the certification purchase and social welfare (efficiency) measures.  
1.3.2 Participants and procedures 
One hundred and seventy-six undergraduate students participated in experiment sessions 
conducted in the UT Experimental Economics Laboratory during the Summer and Fall of 2019. 
Participants were drawn from a large pool of University of Tennessee students registered as 
potential participants in economics experiments. The pool resembles the general population of 
students with respect to gender, age, and academic college. Overall, there are 10 sessions, and 
between 16 and 22 participants in each. Experiment sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes and 
individual earnings averaged $23.  
Decisions were made via networked computers using a program coded with the software 
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The software collected all decisions and made all earnings calculations. 
Written instructions were provided to each participant, which were read aloud by the same 
moderator in each session. Prior to the certification experiment, participants faced a risk elicitation 
procedure modelled after Holt and Laury (2002). In the certification experiment, there were two 
practice rounds that gave participants experience in both the buyer and seller roles. This was 
followed by 20 rounds, and participants were paid based on the outcomes in each round. Earnings 
from the certification experiment were converted at the rate of 200 lab dollars to 1 US dollar. At 
the conclusion of the experiment, participants completed a short questionnaire which elicited basic 
demographics and further included the 10-item Big-Five personality instrument of Gosling, 
Rentfrow, and Swann (2003). Participants were paid privately and in cash at the end of the session. 
Representative instructions and computer screenshots are provided in the Appendix.  
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In each decision round, players are anonymously and randomly matched into groups of 
two, with one player in a group assuming the seller role and the other player the buyer role. 
Participants are re-matched in each period; i.e., we use a “strangers” design. To facilitate learning 
and to minimize cognitive burden, a player maintains a particular role (buyer or seller) for five 
consecutive rounds before switching to the alternative role.4 In treatments with certification, there 
are two possible certification prices which vary within session. Specifically, at the beginning of 
the experiment half of the participants are assigned the monopolistic price, and the other half are 
assigned the alternative price. These prices stay in effect for ten rounds, and then prices are 
switched for the remaining ten rounds. This way, when a participant assumes the role of seller 
(buyer), he faces each of the two certification prices exactly half of the time.  
1.4   Results 
Table 1.3 provides descriptive statistics for variables used in the data analysis. In terms of 
participant characteristics, the risk elicitation task suggests that 67.5% can be classified as risk-
averse, 42% are female, 62% have participated in a prior (unrelated) experiment, and about 39% 
of participants have experience in sales. On average, across all treatment settings and decision 
rounds, the seller chooses 3.7 units of effort and sells the product with a 66.3% chance. Conditional 
on the certification service being available, certification is purchased 39.3% of the time. The 
average efficiency is 50.6%. 
Table 1.4 presents estimates from a set of linear regression models associated with several 
outcome measures of interest: seller effort, whether certification was purchased, whether the 
product was sold, and social welfare. The included explanatory variables are the set of treatment 
 
4 To help reduce order effects due to the within-session price variation, within a session, half of the participants first 
face the monopolistic certification price while the other face the alternative certification price.  
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indicators, the coefficients on which measure (unconditional) mean differences in the outcome 
relative to the control condition. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level. In the 
Appendix, we extend these models to include control variables, which does not alter the main 
conclusions drawn.  
Overall, a casual examination of the regression results in comparison to the theoretical 
point predictions in Table 1.2 suggests that differences in experimental outcomes are not as 
dramatic as theory predicts. In general, differences in effort are less stark across treatments, 
certification is not purchased often enough, too many products go unsold, and efficiency is less 
than predicted. Many of the basic, directional hypotheses are nevertheless supported by the 
experimental data. 
1.4.1 Effort 
Based on the parameters of the experimental design, point predictions of seller effort span 
the full range of the choice set. Theory predicts zero effort in the control and some certification 
treatments with alternative prices, and high levels of effort in the monopolistic certifier treatments 
with a perfect certification process. As illustrated in model (1) in Table 1.4, mean effort in the 
control lemons market is 2.7 units, which is much higher than predicted. This higher than expected 
effort could stem from other-regarding preferences, or otherwise attempts to produce a high-
quality product mostly by “luck” in the hopes of being able to sell it for a reasonable profit. 
Consistent with theory, effort in the BPA and BIA treatments are not statistically different from 
the control. Also, in support of Hypothesis 1, for the six treatments where certification is predicted 
to increase, effort is in fact statistically higher relative to the control. The rank-ordering of the 
treatments in terms of mean effort is also roughly consistent with theoretical predictions.  
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Tests of the other hypotheses are presented in Table 1.5, based on t-tests of the estimated 
coefficients presented in Table 1.4. Hypothesis 2 claims that under prefect certification and 
monopolistic certifier pricing, buyer certification markets yield higher effort than markets with 
available seller certification. The direction of the estimated effect is consistent with theory, but is 
small in magnitude and not statistically significant. Hypothesis 3 claims that under imperfect 
certification, seller certification will lead to a higher effort level under the selected parameter 
values due to the additional opportunity cost of delivering the high-quality item in the buyer-side 
mechanism. However, again we fail to find a significant effect, and our point prediction of the 
difference is also small in magnitude. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that if we hold the certification price fixed, seller certification leads 
to a higher effort relative to buyer certification. The experiment reveals that the seller side 
mechanism motivates an extra 1.5 units of effort under the higher certification price, and an extra 
0.8 units under the low certification price. While the former effect is statistically significant, the 
latter effect is in the right direction but is not statistically different than zero. Under Hypothesis 5, 
making the certification process error prone reduces seller effort. This hypothesis is confirmed for 
both buyer and seller certification markets. In particular, the change in certification quality 
decreases effort by 1.5 units under seller certification and 1.4 units for buyer certification markets. 
The regressions also show that the market responds to a change in certification price, and 
in the expected direction. We find a significant decrease in effort for the perfect certification 
comparisons when the higher certification price is in effect. For the imperfect certification 
treatment, though the direction of change is consistent with theory, we fail to find a significant 
difference.   
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1.4.2 Certification uptake 
A treatment effects regression of the certification purchase decision is presented as model 
(2) in Table 1.4. As certification is not available in the control, the intercept is excluded from the 
regression such that the coefficients measure the mean purchase frequencies for each treatment. 
The rank-ordering of observed certification purchase probabilities is consistent with theoretical 
predictions, with the exception that the SIM treatment leads to the highest certification usage. As 
theory predicts that certification purchases should be based on other information available, in 
Table 1.6 we summarize conditional purchase frequencies. In markets where certification is 
available to the seller, we display the purchase frequencies conditional on the quality of the item. 
Theory predicts that the seller always certifies a high-quality item and never certifies a low-quality 
one. Although there are some differences from these stark predictions, the experimental results are 
rather close to predictions in the perfect inspection cases. When certification is perfectly-revealing 
and the product is high quality, the service is purchased 92% and 98% of the time, respectively, 
under monopolistic and alternative pricing. When the product is low quality, certification is 
purchased just 1% and 7% of the time with these prices, respectively.  
When the certification becomes error-prone, we see a significant drop in the usage of the 
certification service when product quality is high, and an increase in uptake when quality is low. 
Under monopolistic pricing, the usage is 74% (high quality) and 18% (low quality). Under 
alternative pricing, these figures are 90% and 60%. Especially in the latter case, where the 
certification price is rather low, there is clear evidence that sellers with a low-quality product 
attempt to mispresent their product quality by purchasing the service and hoping that there is an 
error in their favor. Albano and Lizzeri (2001) argue that a monopolistic certifier might have the 
incentive to increase the certification error rate in order to attract more consumers for their service, 
which is supported by our lab result.  
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In Table 1.6, we present buyer certification purchase frequencies conditional on the product 
price offered by the seller. According to the theory, the buyer checks quality only if the price is 
higher than the value of the low-quality item. Though some participants still purchase certification 
when the price is lower than 250, generally speaking, the data are consistent with theoretical 
predictions. We also notice that the frequency of certification purchases significantly decreases 
when the price of the service is high, which also aligns with theory. From the data, we notice that 
buyers underutilize certification when the process is error prone and the seller’s price offer exceeds 
250, which might explain our earlier findings with respect to seller effort under monopolistic 
certification pricing. A lower chance of certification means a lower chance that a high-quality 
product is misclassified as low, and thus, the opportunity cost of effort in the buyer certification 
setting is much lower than what theory predicts. We also notice that buyers overuse the certification 
service when the process is perfectly revealing, which contrasts the finding in the imperfect 
inspection case. One explanation is that some participants select certification only in cases where 
it maximizes their lowest possible earnings. With a perfect certification process, purchasing 
certification serves as insurance, which increases the potential lowest payoff to the price of 
certification. On the other hand, under imperfect inspection, purchasing certification lowers the 
potential lowest possible payoff as the chance of being misled is still positive after inspection. 
Thus, a participant may not purchase certification as it reduces the payoff under the worst-case 
scenario.  
1.4.3 Transactions and efficiency 
Model (3) and (4) in Table 1.4 coincide with the product sold and social welfare measures, 
respectively. Our model, as well as Stahl and Strausz (2017), predicts that seller certification is 
trade-promoting relative to the buyer certification setting. This claim is largely supported by the 
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data. The transactions frequency is statistically equal to the control for each of the buyer 
certification treatments. Three of the four seller certification treatments yield statistically different, 
and higher transaction frequencies.   
In support of Hypothesis 1, we find empirical evidence of a higher social welfare in all 
certification treatments where theory predicts this to be true. In the control group, though the 
seller’s effort is higher than what is predicted theoretically, with only a 60% chance that a 
transaction occurs, efficiency is 41.1%. The two perfect seller certification treatments yield the 
highest efficiency, and these figures are significantly higher than the buyer perfect certification 
with monopolistic pricing. For the two buyer certification treatments with alternative pricing, we 
fail to find any significant changes compared with the control group, which is consistent with 
theory.  
We find no statistical difference in the transaction rate when comparing the control with 
buyer perfect certification. Thus, the social welfare improvement of buyer perfect certification is 
driven by the improvement in quality. Also, together with the fact that we fail to detect a significant 
difference in effort between the seller and buyer perfect certification under monopolistic pricing, 
the higher social welfare in seller certification treatments is driven by the higher chance that a 
product is sold.  
1.4.4 Seller misrepresentation 
To gain additional insight into market behavior, we further analyze seller quality 
misrepresentation, which we define as any case where the seller offers a low-quality item at a price 
higher than 250 (i.e., the buyer’s induced valuation for a low-quality item). It is logical to interpret 
such behavior as an attempt to mislead the buyer into thinking the product is high quality. Table 
1.7 summarizes the misrepresentation probability and average offering price according to product 
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quality and treatment. Certification treatments have lower misrepresentation frequencies when 
compared to the control, even for treatments where theory predicts certification will never actually 
be purchased. When certification perfectly reveals quality, seller certification significantly reduces 
the misrepresentation behavior compared with the buyer certification treatments, and this result is 
consistent with the theoretical prediction. However, we fail to find a similar difference when 
certification is error prone. In addition, we fail to reject the hypothesis that the misrepresentation 
probability is the same across all buyer certification treatments.  
Our results also indicate that making certification error prone reduces the mean offer price 
for the high-quality item in all cases. We further find that imperfect certification increases the price 
of the low-quality item in the seller certification case, and fail to find a similar effect among all 
buyer certification treatments. Based on our data, under seller certification with imperfect 
inspection, a lower certification price will significantly increase the price of the low-quality item 
together with the misrepresentation probability. This finding is consistent with the result of effort 
input and usage of certification for the changes of seller imperfect certification treatment. 
1.4.5 Additional findings 
To further explore welfare implications, we include model (5) in Table 1.4, using as the 
outcome variable an alternative measure of market efficiency. In particular, this measure is 
identical to our social welfare measure but excludes any certifier profits. This measure thus 
provides insight into the question of whether the introduction of a certifier to an existing lemons 
market actually makes buyers and sellers better off. The answer to this question is that “it depends”. 
Only in the case of available seller certification and perfect inspection technology is market 
efficiency higher relative to the control.    
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The models in Table 1.7 add demographic characteristics to the treatment effect models. 
Prior conclusions drawn are robust to the presence/absence of these controls. Moreover, we find 
that some characteristics are correlated with observed outcomes. Females purchase the 
certification service more frequently. Subjects who have previously participated in an economics 
lab experiment, and those with sales experience (from outside the lab) invest less in product quality. 
Using results from the Big-5 personality survey, people with a higher “openness” measure devote 
more effort when in the seller role and are more likely to use certification.  
To study possible behavioral dynamics, in Table 1.7 we further extend the model 
specification to include treatment-specific time trends, and further allow the mean outcomes to 
differ across the first and second half of the experiment. The latter set of interactions are motivated 
by the fact that in certification treatments participants face two certification prices, with the price 
switching after the tenth period. In the regression models, the indicator "Lasthalf" equals 1 for 
observations tied to the last half of the experiment. The variable “Period” is the period number (1 
to 20). In terms of seller effort, we find that effort decreases in the control as well as for the two 
buyer certification treatments when an alternative certification price is in effect. In these three 
treatments, our theory predicts zero effort. Thus, this decrease in effort indicates that participants 
may be learning to play the theoretically optimal strategy as they become more experienced. In 
contrast, the effort levels in the seller certification treatments do not present any significant change 
over periods, which potentially indicates subjects determine what they feel is their best strategy 
more quickly. Further, we find that after transitioning to the second half of the session (i.e., after 
experiencing a certification price change), the seller's effort level in the BPM treatment 
significantly falls, and by a large magnitude. In contrast, the effort level in the BPA treatment 
significantly increases. This result suggests that subjects' experience in the first half of the 
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experiment spills over to impact behavior after certification prices change. The drop in effort in 
the BPM treatment potentially explains the failure to reject Hypothesis 2 from the prior analysis 
based on averaging across all periods of the experiment.  
In terms of certification uptake, we find that in the BIPM treatment, the usage decreases 
over time together with a significant restart effect in the last ten rounds.  For the likelihood of 
purchase, we find that over time the number of transactions decreases for the control group, and 
there is a positive restart effect in the last ten rounds. In the two buyer certification treatments 
under monopolistic certifier pricing, we find the chance of transaction significantly decreases in 
the last half of the experiment, while transactions increase over time in the buyer perfect 
certification treatments.      
1.5   Conclusion 
In this study, we use theory and experiments to examine a seller’s incentives for investing 
in product quality when buyers have incomplete information on quality, and either the seller or the 
buyer can purchase quality certification from a credible third party. While prior work examines 
investment in product quality in the case of seller certification, ours is the first paper to focus on 
the buyer certification case, and to make comparisons between otherwise equivalent buyer and 
seller certification markets. When the certification process perfectly-reveals quality, and the 
certification market is monopolistic, the buyer certification mechanism leads to a higher quality. 
Under the seller mechanism, where the seller has the option to purchase quality certification from 
a third party, the existence of a perfect certification service crowds out the value of information 
provided by the seller’s imperfect quality signal (i.e., price), thus yielding the certifier significant 
bargaining power (Biglaiser and Li, 2018). In contrast, under buyer certification, where the buyer 
has the option to purchase certification, there is no information crowding-out effect. Due to this 
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difference, the seller mechanism leads to a much higher price for the certification service, which 
in turn decreases the seller’s incentive to devote resources to quality improvement. Similar to Stahl 
and Strausz (2017), our model also shows that buyer certification brings less transparency to the 
market. However, with the advantage in quality improvement, we identify many cases where the 
buyer mechanism leads to higher social welfare, which contradicts the prior finding in the literature 
when quality is instead assumed to be exogenous. 
We conduct a complementary lab experiment to check the validity of the theory. For both 
buyer and seller certification, we confirm that increasing the certification price decreases product 
quality, as does making the certification process error prone. However, when comparing buyer and 
seller certification mechanisms, empirical differences are smaller than theory predicts, and are 
statistically insignificant in three of four comparisons. A difference in complexity may explain this 
result as, with available buyer certification, buyers have to form beliefs about the probability the 
product is high quality based on the seller’s price offer. We also find some evidence of behavioral 
dynamics that differ across the buyer and seller certification settings, with some dynamics tied to 
the fact that participants face a relatively high and a relatively low certification price within the 
same session. It is possible that when participants first engage in markets with available buyer 
certification where the certification price is high, buyers become overly pessimistic and, relative 
to what theory predicts, associate a seller’s price offer with a relatively low probability the item is 
high quality. Based on our theory, a lower belief about seller effort reduces the buyer’s incentive 
to purchase and in turn reduces seller’s future effort choices even after the certification price is 
lowered. The data provides some suggestive evidence that this pessimism does not appear to wane 
with additional experience, and spills over to the lower certification price setting. This same 
38 
 
behavioral pattern does not arise under seller certification, suggesting that introducing seller 
certification is more likely to be effective when the existing market conveys little transparency.  
Although our theory also predicts that the imperfect seller certification mechanism brings 
a higher effort level when the product of the error rate and the value of low-quality item becomes 
larger, our lab results fail to detect significant differences under the parameter values of experiment 
design. Compared with the theoretical prediction, our data shows that the usage of certification is 
much lower. The lower usage of certification decreases the chance that a high-quality item is 
misclassified as low, thus reducing the expected cost of effort under buyer certification. Without 
any further exploration, we think the under-use of certification is driven by an objective to 
maximize the lowest payoff. Under imperfect inspection, purchasing certification lowers the 
potential lowest possible payoff as the chance of being misled is still positive after inspection. 
Thus, a participant may not purchase certification as it reduces the payoff under the worst-case 
scenario. 
In the experiment, in order to compare buyer and seller certification mechanisms while 
holding prices fixed, we simplified the decision setting by exogenously setting certification prices. 
Extending the design to have participants play the role of certifiers may lead to interesting 
behavioral insights. For instance, the collapse of AAA-rated structured financial products during 
the years 2007 and 2008 has brought attention again to the certifier moral hazard issue. Bolton, 
Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) show the problems of the current credit rating system not only include 
the agency’s conflict of understating risk to attract business, but also the fact that firms can 
“window shop” for the most favorable rating. Our design can easily include (multiple) certifiers to 
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We formulate new hypotheses that take advantage of information updating in order to 
discriminate between the two major specifications of multi-prior ambiguity models: “kinked” and 
“smooth”. In particular, across comparable decision settings, we examine the effects of adding or 
trimming out certain priors, updating the weight on particular beliefs, changing the payoff for a 
single potential state, and modifying the distribution within certain priors. Our results show that 
the kinked specification does well in consistently predicting choices from 68% of participants, and 
the smooth specification predicts well for just 10%. We find evidence that people may use a 
compound lottery as one of their priors, subjects are insensitive to information that the best prior 
is more likely, and people place lower values on ambiguous lotteries that are relatively more 
complex. Our experimental methods are likely to be useful in other contexts, as they allow for 
simple tests of decision-making under ambiguity without placing restrictions on the weights 
participants place on priors, or reliance on comparisons to decision-making under risk.  
 
JEL Classifications: C91, D81, D83 
Keywords:  Uncertainty, ambiguity aversion, risk aversion, updating, maxmin expected utility, 





2.1   Introduction 
With the subjective expected utility (SEU) model, Savage (1954) argues that, under 
uncertainty, a decision maker maximizes utility by attaching a subjective probability distribution 
(i.e., priors) to all potential states of the world. With several inventive experiments, Ellsberg (1961) 
shows that people hold a non-neutral attitude between risk (known probability) and uncertainty 
(unknown probability), and labels this phenomenon “ambiguity aversion”. Ambiguity aversion 
models have been applied to a wide range of settings, including participation in financial markets 
(Easley and O’Hara 2009), medical treatment decisions (Berger, Bleichrodt, and Eeckhoudt 2013), 
the take-up of genetic tests (Hoy, Peter, and Richter 2013), and climate change policy (Millner, 
Dietz, and Heal 2013). Even though experimental and theoretical research has been informative, 
it remains an open question as to which theoretical model, if any, adequately characterizes behavior 
under ambiguity. The importance of this issue is exemplified by several theoretical analyses that 
find conclusions are sensitive to the assumed ambiguity aversion model (e.g., Chambers and 
Melkonyan 2017), and overall mixed results from experiments.  
In this study, we design novel experimental tests that allow us to discriminate better 
between the two main classes of multi-prior ambiguity models, commonly referred to as “kinked” 
and “smooth”. The new tests take advantage of the fact that the two classes of models make stark 
predictions on how preferences change in response to new information. Under the kinked 
specification, people adjust utility based on the changes in best and worst priors, while smooth 
ambiguity assumes that people take every potential prior into consideration. Across decision tasks, 
we add or trim out certain priors, manipulate the weight placed on a particular prior, change the 




differences in valuations across related tasks are used to test theoretical predictions, giving rise to 
powerful tests while minimizing auxiliary theoretical and statistical assumptions.  
Our research contributes to two different streams of literature. First, we complement the 
handful of recent experiments that provide insight on the ability of ambiguity theories to predict 
actual behavior. Halevy (2007) and Adellaoui et al. (2011) use an Ellsberg-type experiment to 
distinguish among several theories by comparing valuations across four lotteries characterized 
either by objective risk, ambiguity, or two-stage lotteries involving objective risk. Halevy (2007) 
finds that the choice patterns of about 70% of participants can be explained by one of two smooth 
model specifications. He further finds that most participants able to reduce compound lotteries are 
highly likely to be ambiguity neutral, which is a prediction consistent with the SEU model. With 
a more general design that varies the probabilities of the winning event, Adellaoui et al. (2011) 
instead find only weak associations between ambiguity attitudes and compound risk attitudes.   
Hey, Lotito, and Maffilletti (2010) and Hey and Pace (2014) use a Bingo Blower that 
contains many balls of three colors that are visible to participants but constantly moving. Across 
between-subject treatments, the number of balls increases (although their proportions did not), 
which the authors argue increases the level of ambiguity. Participants complete a large number of 
decision tasks, distinguished by the payouts associated with the ball colors. Findings from both 
studies suggest that simple models such as SEU and α-maximin expected utility (α-MEU; a kinked 
specification) are better at predicting behavior than more sophisticated ones, such as Choquet 
expected utility (CEU). Ahn et. al. (2014) ask participants to make financial allocation decisions 
over risky and ambiguous assets, and analyze the data based on parametric representations of the 




find that they are unable to reject the SEU model for 60% of participants, while the behavior of 
others may be explained by models of ambiguity or pessimism/optimism.  
Our paper also contributes to recent research that focuses on how new information alters 
decision making under ambiguity. Liang (2020), in a setting where participants bet on a horse in a 
virtual horserace, exogenously varies the credibility of information on the likely winner, and 
focuses on how valuations change in response to the information. In contrast, in our design the 
information provided to participants is always accurate. Epstein and Halevy (2019) also focus on 
how people interpret information. In particular, they conduct an experiment where they allow 
participants to draw a ball before they bet on the Ellsberg urn. However, the value of this draw is 
ambiguous as the total number of balls is unclear. In our study, information provided relates to a 
specific element of an Anscomb-Aumann act, and has a limited effect on estimating the possibility 
of each state; in contrast, the information in Epstein and Halevy (2019) provides a basis of updating 
the probability of each state. 
Relative to prior work, our experimental design has several advantages. First, our design 
is flexible in that we can carefully vary the number of priors, the payoffs associated with states, 
the distribution of a single prior, and the weight over priors. In contrast, the Bingo Blower approach 
for instance only allows one to change payoffs. The design of Cubitt et al. (2020) bears similarity 
to our own as the authors also use a combination of cards and balls to create an environment with 
ambiguous weight over priors. However, they only use two colors of balls and do not associate 
colors with different payoffs. Within our design, we can create a situation where the expected 
value of two lotteries is the same across two lottery tasks. However, people characterized by 




maximizers will prefer the other lottery since the best prior is more likely to occur.5 In the Cubbitt 
et al. (2020) design, it is not possible to make one prior more credible without changing the 
expected value of the lottery. Second, relative to Halevy (2007), Ahn et al. (2014) and Cubitt et al. 
(2020), our identification strategy does not rely on within subject comparisons with risky but 
unambiguous lotteries. The presence of unambiguous lotteries is likely to introduce context and 
reference points, with the potential to alter preferences for ambiguous lotteries. Thus, our design 
is likely to enhance external validity. Third, as the contents of all of the urns in our experiment are 
hidden, there is no potential for participants to form reasonable, objective estimates over the 
probabilities of outcomes. Fourth, there is a direct connection between the underlying theories we 
are testing and experimental treatments, giving rise to simple comparisons of valuations across 
related tasks, and avoiding the need for sophisticated econometric methods. Last, similar to Halevy 
(2007), we elicit valuations for different lotteries using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) 
mechanism (Becker, et al., 1964). Relative to other elicitation approaches, such as binary choices, 
this mechanism collects more precise information about preferences. As this mechanism is 
unfamiliar to participants, we provide extensive training, as advocated by Plott and Zeiler (2005) 
and Cason and Plott (2014).  
Our results suggest that the vast majority of our participants display behavior consistent 
with the kinked specification. To be clear, using differences in valuations across tasks within six 
comparison sets, we find that 68% of participants adhere to the directional predictions of the kinked 
specification based on four or more comparison sets, in contrast to just 10% for the smooth 
specification. We also find supportive, but not universal, evidence that preferences for ambiguity 
are independent of the payoffs for a specific state, which is one of the most important assumptions 
 




underlying kinked ambiguity theories. With our experimental design, we have also uncovered 
interesting results that cannot be easily reconciled by existing theories. First, we find subjects 
might use a compound lottery as a prior, while the previous theories treat all priors as single 
lotteries. Second, by framing a subset of mathematically equivalent lotteries in two different ways, 
we find that elicited preferences differ based on the complexity of the decision task. In particular, 
participants tend to place higher values on simpler lotteries. Finally, our data analysis reveals that 
those with lower college GPAs are more likely to deviate from the prediction of the kinked 
specification, and further that those with higher GPAs are more likely to value mathematically 
equivalent lotteries equally. This suggests that the ability of a theory to predict behavior in settings 
characterized by ambiguity may be tied to critical thinking and learning skills. We further find 
statistical correlations that imply that those who are emotionally less stable, based on a Big-5 
personality instrument, are more likely to adhere to predictions from the smooth ambiguity 
specification.  
2.2   Experiment Design 
Table 2.1 presents the 14 lottery tasks in the experiment, representing six comparison sets. 
Tasks identified by the same number belong to the same comparison set. In each task, participants 
place bids to play a particular lottery, which here refers to the opportunity to randomly draw one 
ball from an urn, and receive an amount of money based on the color of the ball drawn. Values 
associated with lotteries are elicited using the BDM mechanism, which under mild assumptions is 
incentive compatible in the sense that bidding one’s true value for the lottery is a dominant strategy 
(Azrieli, Chambers, and Healy 2018).  
Though the BDM mechanism has been widely used in experiments to elicit valuations, 




provide evidence that the BDM mechanism can give rise to misconceptions, although there is 
suggestive evidence that experience and exposure to mistakes can help mitigate the effects of 
misconceptions.  As Baillon et al. (2015) point out, ambiguity averse subjects may be able to use 
the randomness of the BDM mechanism as a hedge against ambiguity, which in turn potentially 
violates incentive compatibility. To promote incentive compatibility, in our experiment the 
uncertainty over the outcome of the BDM is first resolved (i.e., whether the lottery is successfully 
purchased and if so at what price) before the lottery itself is played out. Further, although we ask 
participants to bid on several lotteries, only one task is randomly selected to be played out. Overall, 
we take the potential limitations BDM as given, and as discussed below we attempt to minimize 
the potential influence that the elicitation mechanism has on our findings through our experimental 
procedures.  
An experiment session proceeds as follows. The experiment is conducted using paper and 
pencil. Participants are provided with written instructions, an example of which is provided in 
Appendix B. The moderator reads the instructions aloud and answers any questions about the 
procedures. Prior to the lottery tasks, subjects complete a double multiple price list (DMPL) 
(Gneezy, Imas, and List 2015), which elicits risk and ambiguity preferences. This is followed by 
extensive training on the BDM mechanism. Participants then complete 14 lottery tasks.  
After all tasks are completed, earnings are determined for the DMPL and lottery tasks. It 
is common knowledge that after all lottery tasks are completed, just one of the tasks is binding in 
the sense that it will be played for real. For transparency, all relevant processes are determined by 
participant volunteers: selection of the binding task; the random BDM price; the draw of a card to 




processes associated with earnings for the DMPL are similarly determined by volunteer actions.  
The session ends with a questionnaire. 
2.2.1 Lottery value elicitation 
The BDM procedure for eliciting valuations (i.e. reservation prices) for lotteries works as 
follows. Participants place a bid for the right to play the lottery. Then, a price is randomly 
determined. If the bid is higher than the randomly determined price, the participant successfully 
makes a purchase (plays the lottery) and pays the random price; otherwise, no transaction takes 
place. During the experiment, there is no constraint on bidding – participants can bid any amount. 
To avoid anchoring associated with the upper bound of the price distribution (see Cason and Plott 
2014), participants are informed that the price distribution is a uniform distribution from $0.00 to 
a “maximum price”. We state that the maximum price can be as high as the payoff associated with 
the highest-valued ball. As rational valuations for any of the lotteries are between the minimum 
and (expected) maximum possible price, the BDM mechanism remains incentive compatible.  
2.2.2 BDM Training Procedures  
As the BDM is not a familiar elicitation procedure to most, we provide participants with 
extensive training, following the recommendations of Plott and Zeiler (2005) and Cason and Plott 
(2014). In particular, our instructions closely follow those of Butler and Vossler (2018). The 
training is divided into three steps. In the first, participants are provided with instructions that 
clearly describe the purchase procedure, provide examples, and include language to disassociate 
bidding in this context with bidding in auctions. In the second step, subjects are asked to work 
through a set of practice examples and one additional question that elicits whether people can 




answers. After all answers are checked, the moderator discusses each answer and highlights how 
misconceptions (deviations from the dominant strategy) can decrease earnings.  
In the last step, participants work through two training rounds. In the first, they bid on the 
opportunity to draw a ball from an urn containing three black balls (each worth $2 if drawn), which 
represents a simple version of the ambiguous lottery tasks. In the second, they bid on an urn that 
contains one black ball (worth $2 if drawn), one red ball ($3) and one white ball ($4). In each 
round, although only one bid is placed, the BDM procedure is played out multiple times, using a 
narrow price distribution that is unknown prior to bidding. This procedure thus motivates learning 
by giving rise to scenarios where over or underbidding leads to losses or foregone earnings. The 
instructions for the lottery tasks further emphasize the dominant strategy; i.e., the instructions state, 
“It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the highest price you are willing to pay”. 
Thus, even if the training procedures did not clarify the incentives of the BDM mechanism, simply 
believing that this advice is true may be sufficient to motivate truthful demand revelation. 
Importantly, as the elicitation mechanism does not change across tasks, it is reasonable to interpret 
differences in bids across tasks as a meaningful metric from which to test ambiguity theories.  
2.2.3 Lottery tasks 
Each task involves urn(s) containing at most three colors of balls: black, red and white. 
Across all tasks, the black ball is tied to the low prize, the red ball represents the medium prize, 
and the white ball is associated with the highest payoff. Most of our urns contain only three balls. 
We choose this structure because the number of priors increases rapidly as balls are added when 
there are three possible states. In the Halvey (2007) two-color setting, the author attempted to limit 
the maximum number of priors to be 11 to reduce task complexity. In our design, for the most 




For each valuation task, subjects are presented with both written and graphical depictions 
of the urn(s). The picture contains most of the valuable information, including the total number of 
balls, potential colors and some other information. The tasks are grouped into two parts based on 
procedural differences. Part I includes the first two comparison sets (six tasks), and each task 
therein involves one possible urn. Part II includes sets 3 to 6 (eight tasks), and each task therein 
involves several possible urns. To implement this, a card is first drawn from a deck to determine 
what urn a ball will be drawn from. The number of cards is known, but only limited information 
is provided in terms of the likely values on the cards (i.e., the probability of selecting a particular 
urn). Within each part, related tasks are encountered in pairs. Each task is individually labelled, 
and appears on a separate page of the instruction packet. To control for order effects, the order of 
the two parts is randomized across sessions. Moreover, the order of the task pairs, as well as which 
task within a pair is first seen, is randomized across participants within a session.  
The four tasks in the first comparison set allow us to identify the value of self-protection 
when the payoff of a state is altered. In particular, we implement self-protection by eliminating the 
possibility that the lowest-value (black) ball is drawn. We describe this process as follows:  
IF this urn contains one or more black balls, these balls will be replaced with red or 
white balls before a ball is drawn. 
To be clear, we do not ask participants to value self-protection directly, and instead infer this value 
based on the difference in bids across tasks. We prefer this approach, as it allows us to keep the 
endowment (i.e., owning nothing) and framing consistent across all tasks in the experiment. To 
alter the payoff of a state, we vary the value of the highest-value (white ball) across tasks. To help 





The second comparison set allows us to test the effects of adding a prior. Task 2A only has 
two priors (all black or all white balls), whereas Task 2B has three (all black, all red, or all white 
balls). Tasks in set 3 and 4 identify the effect of changing the distribution within priors, and tasks 
in set 5 and 6 identify the effect of changing the weight on a specific prior. To make ceteris paribus 
comparisons across tasks within each of these sets, participants are told that the same deck of cards 
will be used within each set; i.e., the chances that a particular urn is selected does not change across 
paired tasks.  
The lotteries in set 3 are identical to those in set 4, and the lotteries in set 5 are identical to 
those in 6. The main difference is how the identical lotteries are framed. In particular, for tasks in 
set 3 and 5, participants are told:  
IF a black ball is selected from the urn, you would repeat the procedure – draw a 
different card, and then draw a ball from the selected urn – until a red or white ball 
is chosen. 
In contrast, the lotteries in sets 4 and 6 eliminate any mention of black balls. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that any difference in valuations across identical (but differently framed) lotteries may 
be attributable to decision complexity.  
Our experimental tasks represent a new approach for implementing decisions involving 
ambiguity. Here, we briefly contrast this with the popular second-order probability method. With 
the second-order probability method, by changing the number of priors, researchers can easily 
modify the ambiguity level. In addition, employing a uniform distribution allows researchers to 
assume subjects place equal weight on each prior, which greatly simplifies the theoretical analysis. 
However, a shortcoming of this method is that it results in subjects valuing a compound lottery 




In our experiment, instead of using a uniform distribution, participants are told, e.g., “there 
are four different urns, numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4. You would first draw a card from a stack of 
TWELVE cards to select what urn is used.” This modification allows researchers to introduce 
unknown probabilities, and the ambiguity level can be altered by providing (incomplete) 
information on the distribution of card values. To make subsequent theoretical analysis tractable, 
we hold fixed the unknown probabilities within a comparison pair (i.e. participants are told that 
the same deck of cards would be used for either task). We then maintain the assumption that 
subjects place the same weights on the different priors within the task pair. 
2.2.4 Survey 
The experiment ends with a two-page questionnaire that elicits demographic information 
such as age and gender. Participants self-report their level of understanding regarding experiment 
procedures, and how well they were compensated using 5-point Likert scale questions. In addition, 
we include the 10-item Big-Five personality instrument of Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann (2003). 
Previous research suggests that there is considerable heterogeneity in ambiguity preferences, with 
respect to both the level of ambiguity aversion and what theories explain behavior. By collecting 
information about personality traits, we hope to provide insight on whether personality may 
explain some of this heterogeneity.  
2.2.5 Participants 
The experiment was conducted at a designated experimental laboratory at a large public 
university. One-hundred and seventeen undergraduate students, recruited from a variety of majors, 
participated in the experiment during July 2017 and January 2018. There are data from four 
sessions, each lasting approximately 90 minutes. Earnings for the experiment are determined by a 




from the BDM training procedures, and the randomly selected lottery task. Earnings were paid in 
private at the end of the experimental session. Participants earned between $15 and $32.75, with a 
mean of $21.91. 
2.3   Theoretical Predictions and Testable Hypotheses 
This section focuses on the theoretical predictions provided by the kinked and smooth 
specifications. The kinked specification can be derived from a variety of models, including MEU, 
CEU, contraction expected utility, and α-MEU (see Ahn et al. 2014). The smooth ambiguity model 
is developed by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), which is alternatively labeled as REU 
in Halevy (2007) and Ahn et al. (2014). Following Ahn et al. (2014), we chose the α-MEU as the 
representative model for the kinked specification. Below we provide a theoretical framework and 
derive testable hypotheses from the experiment.  
2.3.1 Kinked specification 
Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) derived α-MEU by relaxing the uncertainty 
aversion assumption of the standard MEU model (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989). As shown in Ahn 
et al. (2014), α-MEU can be derived from different classes of preferences, and in each setting the 
value of 𝛼 depends on the set of priors. Applying the theory to our experiment decision tasks, let 
𝑠 ∈ {𝐵, 𝑊, 𝑅} denote the possible ball colors in an urn (i.e., “states”), let 𝑝𝑠  denote the probability 
of each color, and let 𝑥𝑠 denote the payoff associated with the color. In the case that the 𝑝𝑠 are 
known, the expected utility from a lottery involving a single urn can be represented as 
(1) 𝑣 = ∑ 𝑝𝑠𝑢(𝑥𝑠)𝑠∈{𝐵,𝑊,𝑅} . 
In a setting characterized by ambiguity, an agent will not know the objective distribution of colors. 
Instead, she assigns subjective probabilities to the payoffs. In a multiple priors model, the decision 




subjective weight over prior probabilities. Denote 𝜌 as a subjective probability distribution (a prior) 
over payoffs in the subject’s mind and ∆ as the set of all possible priors. The utility of a person 
exhibiting α-MEU preferences becomes: 
(2) 𝑉 = 𝛼 min
𝜌𝜖∆
𝑣(𝜌) + [1 − 𝛼] max
𝜌𝜖∆
𝑣(𝜌), 
where 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1 , represents the level of ambiguity aversion. When 𝛼 = 1 , the subject is 
extremely ambiguity averse, while 𝛼 = 0 indicates the subject is ambiguity loving. As suggested 
by (2), α-MEU assumes that an agent’s utility is a weighted average of the expected utilities 
associated with the worst and best priors.  
2.3.2 Smooth specification 
The REU model assumes that people place a subjective weight on every prior. Define 𝑤𝜌 
as the subjective weight placed on a prior. Then, the expected utility for a person with smooth 
ambiguity with discrete priors can be expressed as 
(3) 𝑉 = ∑ 𝑤𝜌𝜑[𝑣(𝜌)]𝜌𝜖∆ , 
where, under ambiguity aversion, 𝜑(. ) is a concave function over the expected utility of a single 
prior. As pointed out by Halevy (2007), the concavity of 𝜑(. ) is equivalent to an aversion to the 
potential mean spreads. 
The smooth ambiguity model is motivated by a single model, and places less structure on 
preferences relative to alternative models. For example, compared with ROCL model by Segal 
(1988, 1990), REU allows a subjective probability weight (instead of an objective weight) on 
different priors, together with different preferences over the first and second stage of a lottery. One 
potential issue with REU is, when a flexible functional form is assumed for 𝜑(. ), ambiguity 
preferences are difficult to distinguish from the changes in the weights on different priors. Thus, 




make functional form assumptions to separately distinguish ambiguity aversion from weights on 
priors (Ahn et al. 2014). As stated previously, we do not impose uniform weights on priors. Instead, 
we frame related decision tasks in a way that holds fixed the weights within a set of tasks. This 
allows us to test hypotheses while maintaining ambiguity. 
2.3.3 Testable Hypotheses 
We formulate hypotheses based on four situations: changing the payoff for a specific state; 
adding a new prior; modifying the distribution within some given priors, and updating the weight 
on a specific prior. In all cases, by exploiting differences in valuations due to information updating, 
the theories lead to distinct predictions. In the case of updating the weight on a specific prior, it is 
not clear how best to derive predictions from the 𝛼-MEU model as this setting has not been 
previously considered. So we consider two cases, one where α is assumed not to vary across related 
tasks, and a second where the value of α varies when an agent believes the best (or the worst) 
outcome is more likely to occur. Last, embedded in our design are pairs of mathematically 
equivalent tasks that vary only in terms of framing, and we consider a fifth set of hypotheses based 
on decision complexity. Unless otherwise indicated, in the derivations below we assume that 
subjects are ambiguity averse, and the value of α is held fixed when making predictions based on 
a related set of tasks. 
2.3.3.1 The value of self-protection when the payoff of a state is altered 
The difference in valuations for tasks 1A and 1Aʹ connotes the value of self-protection. 
That is, the tasks are identical with the exception that, if the urn contains one or more (low paying) 
black balls, in 1Aʹ any black ball will be replaced with either a red or a white ball.  Tasks 1B and 
1Bʹ parallel 1A and 1Aʹ, with the exception that the value of the (high paying) white ball is 




As suggested by equation (2) and (3), the two models differ in how people value an 
ambiguous event. α-MEU assumes the agent's utility function can be expressed as a weighted 
average of the expected utility from the worst and best prior. This specification implies that when 
subjects have at least three priors with a strict preference ordering, any changes to the best prior 
should not influence the utility gain from trimming out the worst one. The intuition here is that 
with the additive functional form, changing the best prior cancels out when calculating the utility 
gain from self-protection. On the other hand, the value of self-protection can be easily influenced 
by a change in the prize level under REU, since it assumes people update their subjective weights 
after trimming out certain beliefs. The differences across specifications gives rise to the following 
hypothesis. Theory derivations for this and the other hypotheses are provided in Appendix A. 
Hypothesis 1: For an agent exhibiting α-MEU preferences, 𝑉1𝐴′ − 𝑉1𝐴 = 𝑉1𝐵′ − 𝑉1𝐵. For an agent 
exhibiting REU preferences, 𝑉1𝐴′ − 𝑉1𝐴 < 𝑉1𝐵′ − 𝑉1𝐵.   
2.3.3.2 Adding a new prior 
To distinguish between α-MEU and REU, Halevy (2007) studied whether a lower potential 
variance in expected payoff would increase subject valuations. Following the same logic, we 
design tasks 2A and 2B in such a way that the only difference is that 2B has an additional prior: 3 
red balls. However, to maintain ambiguity, we did not place any restriction on the weight of each 
prior. As mentioned in Halevy (2007), one of the testable differences is the additional concave 
functional form proposed in the smooth specification. We assume subjects update based on the re-
weightings of Bayes’ rule by Hanany and Klibanoff (2009). Based on the discussion by Halevy 
(2007), our second hypothesis could also be derived from second-order preferences, which means 




and Feltkamp 2005), or an issue preference, which means people might prefer one issue (risk) to 
the other (ambiguity) (Ergin and Gul 2009).  
Hypothesis 2: For an agent exhibiting α-MEU preferences, 𝑉2𝐴 = 𝑉2𝐵. For an agent exhibiting 
REU preferences, 𝑉2𝐴 < 𝑉2𝐵.   
2.3.3.3 Changing the distribution within priors 
All multi-prior ambiguity models have two components. The first one is a prior that maps 
potential outcomes with a probability distribution; the second one is the weights on the priors, 
which reflect the relative possibility for the occurrence of each prior. This structure provides an 
explicit theoretical representation; however, it can become complicated when one attempts to 
define the set of priors in a decision setting. Suppose a person faces 1A and for simplicity, she has 
three priors: all black, all red, and all white. Applying α-MEU, we can express her utility as 
𝑉 = 𝛼[𝑢(5)] + (1 − 𝛼)[𝑢(15)]. 
Now suppose she believes with certainty that the chance the urn contains all red balls or all black 
balls is the same. In this case there are two ways to express her utility. First, since the probabilities 
of the best and the worst priors are still unknown, we can express the utility as before. However, 
if she takes advantage of the new information and uses a compound lottery as one prior, then her 
utility becomes 
𝑉′ = 𝛼[𝑢(5)] + (1 − 𝛼)[𝑢((15 + 10)/2)]. 
In our experiment, the only difference between 3A and 3B is as follows. In 3A, Urn 2 
involves a two-thirds chance of drawing a white ball and a one-third chance of red ball, while Urn 
3 involves a one-third chance of a white ball and two-thirds chance of red ball. For 3B, both Urn 




of taking a draw from Urn 2 or Urn 3 is the same, and that both occur with probability greater than 
zero. As a result, 3A is a convex combination between priors relative to 3B. 
If an agent follows the α-MEU model and only uses a single lottery as prior, she prefers 
3A since the best prior has a higher expected payoff. For a person with α-MEU preferences, who 
uses a compound lottery as prior, she should be indifferent between lotteries 3A and 3B. In contrast, 
if the decision maker follows the REU model, she prefers the one with a lower mean spread, i.e., 
she should derive more utility from lottery 3B. The same hypotheses hold when comparing 4A 
and 4B. Indeed, when we trim out the black balls in tasks 3A and 3B, and recalculate the outcome 
distribution in each potential prior, these are precisely the same lotteries as 4A and 4B, respectively. 
Hypothesis 3: For an agent exhibiting REU preferences, (a) 𝑉3𝐴 < 𝑉3𝐵 and (b) 𝑉4𝐴 < 𝑉4𝐵. For an 
agent exhibiting α-MEU preferences, who uses a single lottery as a prior, (a) 𝑉3𝐴 > 𝑉3𝐵 and (b) 
𝑉4𝐴 > 𝑉4𝐵. For an agent exhibiting α-MEU preferences, who uses a compound lottery as a prior, 
(a) 𝑉3𝐴 = 𝑉3𝐵 and (b) 𝑉4𝐴 = 𝑉4𝐵.   
2.3.3.4 Changing the weight on a specific prior 
We now focus on a situation where two lotteries are equivalent except for the fact that the 
best prior is more likely to happen in one of them. The lotteries 5A (6A) and 5B (6B) have the 
same best and worst priors: drawing a white ball for sure and drawing a red ball for sure. In 6A 
and 6B, the lotteries are the same except that, in constructing the latter, two of the red balls in Urn 
2 are moved to Urn 3 in exchange for two white balls. A sophisticated bidder should notice that 
the best prior is more likely to occur in 6A since the only possible outcome of a draw from Urn 3 
or Urn 4 would be a white ball. Hence, what we label as an agent with “sophisticated 𝛼-MEU" 
preferences prefers 6A to 6B. We label an agent who does not update across the two lotteries as 




prefer 6B to 6A since the former task has a lower variance. The same hypotheses hold when 
comparing 5A and 5B. Indeed, when we trim out the black balls in tasks 5A and 5B, and recalculate 
the outcome distribution in each potential prior, these are precisely the same lotteries as 6A and 
6B, respectively. 
Hypothesis 4: For an agent exhibiting naïve α-MEU preferences, (a) 𝑉5𝐴 = 𝑉5𝐵 and (b) 𝑉6𝐴 = 𝑉6𝐵.  
For an agent exhibiting sophisticated α-MEU preferences, (a) 𝑉5𝐴 > 𝑉5𝐵 and (b) 𝑉6𝐴 > 𝑉6𝐵. For 
an agent exhibiting REU preferences, (a) 𝑉5𝐴 < 𝑉5𝐵 and (b) 𝑉6𝐴 < 𝑉6𝐵. 
2.3.3.5 Preferences and decision complexity 
One common assumption is that preferences are stable across decision settings. However, 
this assumption has been challenged by behavioral economists (e.g., Smith 2010). As lotteries 3A 
(5A) and 3B (5B) are equivalent to 4A (6A) and 4B (6B), respectively, aside from framing, our 
design provides the opportunity to examine whether people have the same preferences over 
identical lotteries. 
Hypothesis 5: Decision complexity has no effect on valuations. In particular, (a) 𝑉3𝐴 = 𝑉4𝐴, (b) 
𝑉3𝐵 = 𝑉4𝐵, (c) 𝑉5𝐴 = 𝑉6𝐴, and (d) 𝑉5𝐵 = 𝑉6𝐵. 
2.4   Results 
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics related to the participants, and Table 2.3 provides 
statistics associated with each of the lottery task valuations. Table 2.4 presents hypothesis test 
results, and Figures 1 and 2 provide histograms of participant-level differences related to the 
various hypotheses, using bin widths of 25¢. As relayed from Table 2.2, the average participant is 
approximately 21 years old, 42% of our sample is female, and 40% have either a part-time or a 




as risk-averse, while 88% of our subjects may be classified as ambiguity-averse.6 The correlation 
coefficient between risk and ambiguity attitudes is 0.15, which is close to the results of Dimmock 
et al. (2015a, 2015b).  
As one indication of comprehension of experimental procedures, 83% of participants 
correctly identified the dominant strategy of the BDM in the context of a numerical example. As 
a second indication, we compare bids from task 1A to 1B, and bids from task 1Aʹ to 1Bʹ. These 
tasks are identical except that the payoff associated with the white ball is increased from $15 to 
$30. Therefore, if any weight is placed on the best prior, valuations in the second of each pair of 
tasks should be higher. Valuations for task 1B and 1Bʹ are $2.72 (Std. Err. = 0.36) and $3.33 (0.41) 
higher than 1A and 1Aʹ, respectively. Less than 2% of decisions correspond with higher valuations 
for the objectively less favorable lotteries. Last, 86% of respondents rated their understanding of 
instructions as either a 4 or 5 on a 5-point Likert scale, where 5 indicates “I understood very well”. 
2.4.1 Hypothesis tests: kinked versus smooth specifications 
Panel (a) of Table 2.4 provides test statistics associated with the four hypotheses derived 
to distinguish between the kinked and smooth ambiguity models. We present both paired t-tests 
and nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests. Given how the hypotheses are formulated, the 
smooth model predicts that differences in bids should be negative in every case. The kinked 
specification is supported by differences of zero, and in some cases by a positive difference. To 
provide some basic information on heterogeneity, Figure 1 displays histograms of the individual-
level differences associated with each hypothesis test. Moreover, the last three columns of Table 
 
2 Unfortunately, the ambiguity MPL used in two sessions contained errors, and we are unable to characterize ambiguity 





2.4 present the percentage of respondents with negative, zero, and positive differences as they 
relate to the null hypotheses.  
As can be gleaned from Figure 1, the most frequent outcome associated with each 
comparison is a difference of zero. In fact, considering all comparisons, 53% of the differences are 
(exactly) zero. This evidence supports the notion that the kinked specification has good predictive 
power. Some observations close to zero may be attributable to decision errors. If we consider 
deviations of +/- 50¢, this figure of approximately zero differences increases to 64%.  
Hypothesis 1 exploits the difference in functional form between two ambiguity models. 1A 
and 1B are identical to 1A′ and 1B′, respectively, with the exception that latter set of tasks induces 
self-protection by trimming out the black balls. As stated before, here we treat the difference 
between the bid on 1A (1B) and 1A′ (1B′) as the value for self-protection and test whether it varies 
with the payoff associated with highest-value outcome (i.e. a white ball). Using paired t-tests we 
weakly reject (p=0.08) that the value for self-protection is the same regardless of the value of the 
white ball. The Wilcoxon test fails to reject equality with p = 0.26. The somewhat contrasting 
results can be explained by Figure 1(a). Although the frequency of positive and negative deviations 
is roughly the same, there are a few large and negative differences (i.e., one at -$15 and one at -
$20), thus triggering a slight difference in the mean. It is possible that the negative and significant 
difference in means is partially due to decision error. If we restrict the sample to those who stated 
they understood the instructions well, Hypothesis 1 is no longer rejected (t = -1.52, p = 0.16).  
Hypothesis 2 exploits differences that arise when a new prior is added. There are many 
more negative differences than positive ones, giving rise to a statistical difference in mean bids 




smooth specification. At the participant level, an approximately equal number of pairwise choices 
can be explained by the kinked (44%) and smooth (43%) specifications.  
For Hypothesis 3, our tests rely on changing the distribution within particular priors. The 
two pairwise comparisons reveal that the decisions of very few participants (less than 20%) can be 
explained by the smooth specification. At the aggregate level, there are no statistical differences 
when comparing 4A and 4B, but a positive and significant difference when comparing 3A and 3B. 
The high frequency of zero differences (59% and 62%) may support the conjecture that people use 
a compound lottery as a prior. Most of the multi-prior ambiguity models, including α-MEU and 
REU, are based on Ansombe and Aumann’s (1963) joint objective-subjective approach, where 
utility is derived from a distribution of subjective weights over objective lotteries. Even though 
this structure does not force the objective lotteries to be one-stage, the existence of a compound 
lottery would challenge the mapping between the subjective weight and associated objective priors, 
as the set of priors would be unclear. Our finding also provides an example that runs counter to 
Segal (1988, 1990), who showed that under the assumption of time neutrality and compound 
independence, ambiguity aversion could be modeled as a failure of the reduction of compound 
lotteries. That most participants reveal indifference between 3A and 3B, and likewise between 4A 
and 4B, provides suggestive evidence of the successful reduction of compound lotteries. 
The last hypothesis, which exploits differences due to changing the weight on a single prior, 
provides mixed support for either the kinked or the smooth specifications. At the participant level, 
the majority of outcomes adhere to the predictions of the kinked specification. However, there are 
a fair percentage of subjects (40%) that reveal a preference for 5B over 5A, leading to the null 
hypothesis to be rejected and providing aggregate support of the smooth specification. The smooth 




very few positive differences, this lends support of the naïve α-MEU model in contrast to the 
sophisticated α-MEU model.  
Examining within-subject behavior, 79 of 117 participants (68%) adhere to the directional 
predictions of the kinked specification in at least four of the six comparisons. Just 12 participants 
(10%) revealed negative differences in at least four of the comparison sets. The remaining 22% of 
people cannot be easily classified. Of these, ten participants (9%) exhibit preferences consistent 
with the kinked specification in three cases and the smooth specification in three cases.  
2.4.2 Hypothesis tests: task complexity 
Panel (b) of Table 2.4 provides test statistics associated with four pairwise comparisons 
corresponding to the null hypothesis that task complexity does not matter. Figure 2 contains 
histograms for each comparison using participant-level data. If we assume that the kinked 
specification approximately characterizes behavior, then the important maintained assumption in 
these comparisons is that the value of α is fixed. If we instead rely on the smooth specification, we 
need the maintained assumption that the weights are held fixed. Overall, the results suggest a 
revealed preference for the relatively simple lotteries. These differences are significant in the 
aggregate for three of the four pairwise comparisons. The most striking difference occurs when 
comparing 5A to 6A, where nearly half of participants reveal a preference of 6A over 5A. 
Moreover, the average person with this directional preference values the simpler task 6A by $2.18, 
which is a 23% increase relative to 5A. One possible explanation for the results is that respondents 
are more ambiguity averse (e.g., α increases) in more complex environments.  
2.4.3 Regression models 
Table 2.5 presents linear regressions, where the dependent variable is the difference in bids 




data set; i.e., the first outcome for a subject is the difference associated with H1, the second 
outcome is the difference associated with H2, etc. Included as control variables are the Big-5 
personality measures, gender, a measure of risk from the risk MPL, GPA, and an indicator for 
participants who are majoring in a STEM field. As those in a STEM field should have a higher 
aptitude for quantitative analysis, we hypothesize that this may explain heterogeneity in the data. 
Also included are controls for order effects, including whether Part I tasks were encountered first 
in the session, whether the #A task preceded the #B task in a comparison set in Part I, and whether 
the #A task preceded the #B task in a Part II comparison set. Finally, we include a full set of 
hypothesis indicators. All control variables are demeaned, which means that the coefficients on 
the hypothesis indicators are interpretable as measures of the mean differences associated with the 
various hypotheses. Standard errors are clustered by participant. 
Model 1 and Model 2 present results based on the set of theory model comparisons (i.e., 
H1-H4) and complexity comparisons (H5), respectively. The coefficients on the hypothesis 
indicators largely confirm the earlier results from paired t-tests: mean differences are statistically 
different from zero, at the 5% level, for H2, H3a, H4a, H5b, and H5c. Thus, this serves as a 
robustness check on our earlier results. Based on Model 1, the bid difference is decreasing in risk 
aversion, and is lower for those in a STEM major. Based on Model 2, mean differences due to 
complexity are increasing with GPA. Overall, the control variables do very little to explain the 
variation in the data.  
 Table 2.6 presents the results from multinomial probit models. The dependent variable, 
similar to that of the prior regressions, is based on bid differences. Here, we create a categorical 




The zero deviation category serves as the reference category. The control variables are the same 
as in the linear regressions.  
 Model 3 suggests that the probability of deviating from the zero difference prediction, in 
either direction, decreases with GPA and emotional stability. Deviating in the positive direction 
decreases with risk aversion and increases with extraversion. For Hypothesis 3 and 4, positive 
deviations may also be consistent with the kinked specification. As a robustness check, we 
estimated a binary probit model, where the dependent variable is whether the deviation is 
consistent with the kinked specification. The results tell a similar story: those with higher GPAs 
and a higher emotional stability are more likely to make decisions that adhere to the qualitative 
predictions of the kinked specification. Turning to Model 4, those with a higher GPA are less likely 
to alter valuations for mathematically identical lotteries based on task complexity. Those who are 
more extraverted are more likely to place a higher valuation on the less complex task, and those 
who are emotionally stable are less likely to bid in this manner.  
2.5   Discussion 
In this paper, we formulate new hypotheses that take advantage of information updating to 
distinguish between two major specifications of ambiguity models: “kinked” and “smooth”. To 
test these hypotheses, we introduce a novel experimental design that allows one precise control 
over important attributes of multi-prior ambiguity models. In particular, identification is achieved 
by varying the number of priors, the payoffs associated with states, the distribution of particular 
priors, or the weight over priors. Our identification strategies do not rely on comparisons between 
ambiguous and risky lotteries, nor sophisticated econometric methods.  
Our results show that most participants display behavior consistent with the kinked 




In addition, we further provide fodder for future theory development. We provide some evidence 
that participants may have priors in the form of a compound lottery. Most existing theoretical 
models only treat priors as simple lotteries. Our evidence also shows that, assuming participants 
follow the kinked specification, the degree of ambiguity aversion is independent of changing the 
value of one specific state, and is unaffected by changing the credibility (weight) of the best prior. 
Last, by framing mathematically equivalent, ambiguous lotteries in two different ways, we find 
evidence that valuations change due to complexity; in particular, participants tend to place higher 
values on more simply framed lotteries.  
Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) show that ambiguity attitudes depend on 
the relationship between states and outcomes. However, there is little discussion about how the 
mapping is structured and which factors influence the level of ambiguity. Our experimental 
evidence suggests that, consistent with the kinked theory prediction, people’s ambiguity attitudes 
will not change when the expected value of the lottery, together with the worst and best prior, stays 
constant. Our results further support the notion that the ambiguity level is independent of the 
outcome of the states. This is not necessarily a prediction of the kinked specification, but consistent 
with our evidence. To the extent that the ambiguity level is approximately constant across related 
settings, researchers can elicit the value of α in one setting and apply it to analyze another. 
Our results generally support the notion that the relatively simple ambiguity models are 
more likely to predict behavior, which is consistent with some prior experimental work. The 
identification strategy we use to test our second hypothesis is similar to Halevy (2007), although 
in our case we do not place any restrictions on subjective weights. Our results are fairly similar in 




However, results from other hypothesis tests suggests that the smooth specification is not a robust 
predictor.  
Some prior experimental evidence favors SEU theory, and so it is natural to ask whether 
this model predicts well the patterns in our data. For our first and second hypotheses, the SEU 
prediction coincides with that of the smooth specification, whereas the prediction for the third and 
fourth is a null effect. If we applied the same, simple rule for characterizing whether behavior is 
consistent with a particular theory at the individual level, we would classify 50 of 119 subjects 
(42%) as following SEU. The vast majority of these participants (41 of 50) can also be classified 
as following the kinked specification. Recalling that we can classify 68% with the kinked 
specification, we can conclude that – in our experiment – the kinked specification does better than 
both the smooth ambiguity and SEU models in predicting behavior. 
 There are nevertheless patterns in the data that are not easily explained by the theories we 
consider. One alternative explanation we explore here is motivated by observations from 
participant decision sheets. Decisions in our experiment were made with paper and pencil, and 
there is written evidence that some participants may have based valuations on the simple counting 
of the number of balls associated with each color. In our econometric analysis, we did uncover a 
negative correlation between GPA and deviations from the kinked specification prediction, which 
is suggestive evidence that some participants may be using simple heuristics to guide decisions. 
Tied to Hypothesis 3a, a simple count of the balls (noting that black balls are non-binding), yields 
6 red and 3 white balls for lottery 3A, versus 5 red balls and 2 white balls for 3B. If one assumes 
each of these balls has an equal chance of selection, people should value 3A over 3B. This is what 
we find based on average valuations, and moreover 31% of individuals valued 3A over 3B. Using 




do find average valuations in this direction and 40% of individuals value 5B over 5A. We note that 
in other tests of Hypotheses 3 and 4, the ratio of red to white balls is exactly the same. Interestingly, 
the aggregate results reveal no statistical difference in mean valuations. Moreover, unlike for H3a 
and H4a, for H3b and H4b the number of non-zero deviations is smaller, and there are similar 
fractions of negative versus positive deviations. Turning to tests of decision complexity, applying 
the heuristic predicts that 𝑉3𝐴 = 𝑉4𝐴, 𝑉3𝐵 < 𝑉4𝐵,  𝑉5𝐴 < 𝑉6𝐴, and 𝑉5𝐵 = 𝑉6𝐵. Interestingly, these 
predictions match the aggregate results well, and helps to explain why we find a high number of 
negative deviations at the participant-level for H5b and H5d relative to H5a and H5c. Whether 
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Climate change adaptation is receiving increased attention due to the growing acceptance 
that the impacts of climate change are now inevitable. Understanding and predicting adaptation 
behavior is important from the purview of formulating environmental policy; however, this 
presents challenges as the benefits of adaptation depend on individual expectations of climate 
change that are difficult to ascertain. In this paper, we model a setting where a firm makes an 
adaptation choice based on objective expectations of climate change (climate projections), and is 
influenced by both risk (climate variability) and ambiguity (inability to assign probabilities to 
various climate projections). We find that climate variability works to delay adaptation while 
ambiguity works to hasten adaptation. We then apply our model to the decision to invest in water-
saving irrigation technology in California’s Central Valley. Using sixty-four down-scaled climate 
projections for water availability in the Central Valley, we are able to quantify the amount of 
climate variability and ambiguity facing farmers and solve for the optimal adaptation strategy 
under different situations. Our results illustrate how downscaled climate projections can be used 
to generate theoretically-grounded predictions of climate change adaptation in other settings.    
 
JEL Classifications: C61, D81, Q25, Q54 







3.1   Introduction 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fifth assessment 
report, the annual average global mean surface temperature could be regularly 1.5°C higher than 
its preindustrial level within the next 40 years (Pachauri et al. 2014). The rapid change in 
temperature generates physical and economic impact, including substantial species extinction, 
global and regional food insecurity, and consequential constraints on common human activities. 
To limit the damage, a combination of mitigation policy and adaptation action is required. When 
a firm considers making an adaptation decision, it must predict the future effects of climate change 
to assess the benefits and costs of possible adaptation strategies. Unfortunately, the future effects 
of climate change are highly uncertain. As stated in the IPCC fifth assessment report, “there does 
not exist at present a single agreed on and robust formal methodology to deliver uncertainty 
quantification estimates of future changes in all climate variables” (Pachauri et al. 2014). 
Consequently, climate uncertainty creates a situation where adaptation investments must account 
for multiple climate projections with little or no ability to assign probabilities to these different 
projections. The traditional way to model this situation is to assign weights to these climate 
projections either by assuming the decision-maker applies an equal weight to each projection or 
updates weights according to Bayes rule. However, since the projections rely on different 
assumptions, are not independent, and are based on the same historical record, any weighting 
scheme that results in a single representative projection will ultimately be subjective (Tebaldi and 
Knutti 2007, Millner et al. 2013).  
In this research, we focus on how the uncertainty created by conflicting climate projections 
impacts the individual adaptation decision. In particular, we focus on a situation where a firm must 




risk, which is characterized by the weather variability inherent in a single projection. The second 
one is ambiguity, which appears when multiple climate projections are presented at the same time, 
making the decision-maker unsure about which one to trust. Both kinds of uncertainty create the 
possibility of climate adaptation investments that are harmful to the firm (i.e., maladaptation). 
However, since climate change implies differential effects on objective risk and ambiguity, it is 
important to understand whether they have the same type of impact on adaptation investments.  
To analyze this situation, we combine real options theory with ambiguity models, which 
focus on how the decision-maker makes a risky adaptation investment when multiple beliefs 
(climate projections) are valid at the same time. Our theoretical results show that updating 
expectations to account for climate change does not necessarily alter the timing of adaptation 
because the impact of risk and ambiguity offset each other. When the future climate becomes more 
variable, the investment in adaptation becomes riskier and a decision-maker will delay the 
adaptation process. Delaying allows the decision-maker to gather additional information on the 
damages avoided by investing in adaptation, and an increase in risk makes the delay more 
favorable as this increases the potential loss associated with maladaptation. On the other hand, as 
expectations over the future climate become more ambiguous, this speeds up adaptation. A more 
ambiguous future does not alter the potential loss associated with maladaptation, but decreases the 
chance of maladaptation as the agent believes a bad climate state is more likely to happen. 
Believing that the bad state is more likely to happen reinforces the value of the adaptation 
investment which creates an incentive to hasten adaptation. The counter-vailing effects of risk and 
ambiguity suggest that greater awareness of the damages created by climate change may not 
expedite adaptation investments. We apply the theory to an illustrative example of water 




directions, leaving the timing of water conservation investments largely unaffected by greater 
awareness of climate change.   
Ambiguity aversion theories have been applied to the climate change mitigation setting, 
although little research has focused on the effects of ambiguity on adaptation.  Given the potential 
rebound or complementary effect between adaptation and mitigation efforts, it is essential to 
understand how ambiguity preferences affect adaptation behavior to improve the efficiency of 
climate mitigation policy. Heal and Millner (2013) point out that there exist two kinds of ambiguity 
in climate analysis. One is scientific uncertainty, which arises from the inability to precisely predict 
climate change due to the current limited knowledge of climate change, while the other one is 
socio-economic ambiguity and arises from the inability to precisely predict the impacts of climate 
change due to a limited understanding of how people react to a changing climate. Here, the 
literature suggests that ambiguity has a modest and nuanced effect on climate mitigation policies. 
Lemoine and Traeger (2012) discuss the impact of uncertainty in the climate tipping point, a 
temperature threshold causing irreversible changes once passed, and conclude that ambiguity 
aversion can amplify or dampen the effect of tipping points on optimal mitigation policy. Millner, 
Dietz, and Heal (2013) combine the smooth ambiguity model (Klibanoff et al. 2005) and DICE 
models and find increasing ambiguity aversion favors greenhouse gas abatement, but the 
magnitude is limited. For self-protection behavior, Roux (2018) studies the case of climate 
insurance and shows the importance of the historical climate record. However, Chambers and 
Tigran (2017) show that the optimal response to climate change can be sensitive to the particular 
specification used to model ambiguity. 
Considering the effect of ambiguity on adaptation decisions introduces several additional 




investments in protective infrastructure like sea walls and reservoirs that require large sunk costs. 
These investment decisions are influenced by climate-dependent risk (e.g., annual variability in 
temperature and precipitation).  Such adaptation investments require a careful accounting of the 
effect of risk, ambiguity, and interactions between the two. An emerging theoretical literature 
addresses this type of investment by combining ambiguity theory with real options theory. Epstein 
and Chen (2002) provide the foundation of applying ambiguity theory in a dynamic, stochastic 
setting characterized by a Brownian motion. Nishimura and Ozaki (2004) show how the Epstein 
and Chen (2002) approach, paired with Choquet utility, can be applied to a job search problem 
(optimal stopping problem) to deal with ambiguity in expected salary. Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) 
use the Maxmin utility model (Gilboa and Schmeidler 2004) to show the influence of ambiguity 
on the value of an irreversible investment opportunity. Miao and Wang (2011) rely on the recursive 
multiple-priors utility model developed by Epstein and Wang (1994) and find that the effect of 
ambiguity differs for a firm’s decision to enter a market and exit a market.  Specifically, a higher 
ambiguity level will delay market entry while speeding up an exit.  
In this paper, we extend the theoretical model in Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) and apply it 
to the problem of climate change adaptation. We consider a setting where a firm is considering 
when to install an adaptation technology that protects it from the effects of future climate change. 
However, the benefits received by the firm upon the adoption of the technology are uncertain due 
to future climate variability and ambiguity.  Thus, our problem is comparable to Miao and Wang 
(2011), as the agent is paying a one-time fee to limit the impact of future uncertainty. Modern 
ambiguity theories can be classified into two groups (Ahn et al. 2014), the kinked specification 
and the smooth specification. Following Epstein and Ji (2013) and Miao and Wang (2011), our 




potential worst belief, and a more ambiguous environment will increase the relative weight on the 
worst belief (Epstein and Wang 1994). Although the smooth specification has been applied in other 
climate change contexts (Millner et al. 2013, Jensen and Traeger 2014), the kinked specification 
is more convenient and conveys its own advantages. To fully define the utility function, the kinked 
specification only requires the set of priors and the ambiguity attitude parameter. In contrast, the 
smooth specification requires one to place a weight on each particular prior. Further, the kinked 
specification setting has been applied in many other settings, including participation in financial 
markets (Easley and O’Hara 2009) and the uptake of insurance by African farmers (Bryan 2019).    
We apply our model to water conservation in California’s Central Valley to empirically 
investigate the degree to which the impact of risk and ambiguity offset one another. Our model 
considers a farmer who must decide when to incur a sunk cost to adopt a more efficient irrigation 
technology and has available information from sixty-four climate models. This adaptation 
investment is risky because annual variation in precipitation makes the benefit of the more efficient 
technology unpredictable. Thus, there is an opportunity cost of adaptation (a forgone option value) 
since irreversible investment in adaptation limits the ability to respond to new information and, in 
turn, generates an incentive to wait (Treasury 2009, Margulis et al. 2010, Chambwera et al. 2014). 
Ambiguity and risk interact in that several of the climate change projections imply more variable 
precipitation (i.e., extreme floods and droughts).  We solve for the optimal adoption time based on 
a measure of water availability that characterizes the farmer’s efficient adaptation strategy, and 
investigate the effects of an increase in risk and ambiguity. We find that an increase in risk delays 
adaptation while an increase in ambiguity hastens adaptation. In our particular example, a 5% 
increase in risk increases the optimal adoption timing by 23.2% while a 5% increase in ambiguity 




show that the technology adoption decision of an ambiguity neutral farmer is very similar to an 
extremely ambiguity averse farmer.  
  3.2  Objective Risk, Ambiguity, and Climate Change Adaptation 
To build the intuition underlying the countervailing effects of risk and ambiguity, we first 
present a simple two-period, two-state model. Consider a firm that uses water as an input to 
production.  Examples include farms that depend on water for irrigation and electric utilities that 
depend on water for cooling.  Period 1 conveys no uncertainty, while period 2 has two possible 
states, either wetter or drier than historical conditions. The firm must decide when to adopt new 
water-saving technology (adaptation) to mitigate potential profit losses due to limited access to 
water. The firm can either adopt the technology in period 1 or wait and adopt in period two if 
period 2 is characterized by a dry state. Adoption requires a one-time purchase and installation 
cost, which is a sunk cost. If the firm chooses to invest in the technology in period one, its expected 
profit can be written as  
(1) 𝐸(𝜋) = 𝜋1
𝑎 − 𝐼 + 𝛽(𝑝𝑤𝜋2,𝑤
𝑎 + (1 − 𝑝𝑤)𝜋2,𝑑
𝑎 ).                                    
where 𝜋  stands for the profit, 𝐼  is the cost of investment, and 𝛽 =
1
1+𝜌
 is the discount factor. 
Superscript a means the technology has been adopted, n means not adopted, 1 and 2 denote the 
time period, and w and d stand for whether the future state is wetter or drier than the current period. 
The parameter 𝑝𝑤 is the probability the future will be wetter than historical conditions. We assume 
the technology does not decrease period 2 profits regardless of future climate conditions: 𝜋2,𝑤
𝑛 ≤
𝜋2,𝑤
𝑎  and 𝜋2,𝑑
𝑛 ≤ 𝜋2,𝑑
𝑎 .  If the firm did not adopt in period 1, we assume the firm only adopts the 
new technology in period 2 if the realized state is dry: 𝜋2,𝑤
𝑎 − 𝜋2,𝑤
𝑛 < 𝐼 < 𝜋2,𝑑
𝑎 − 𝜋2,𝑑
𝑛 . The profit 




On the other hand, if the firm waits until the second period, the expected profit is  
(2) 𝐸(𝜋′) = 𝜋1
𝑛 + 𝛽[(1 − 𝑝𝑤)(𝜋2,𝑑
𝑎 − 𝐼) + 𝑝𝑤𝜋2,𝑤
𝑛 ] .                                 
which is the discounted weighted average of profits in the dry state (in which case the technology 
is purchased) and the wet state (no technology is purchased), plus the profit based on using the  
traditional technology in period 1. Delaying technology adoption (i.e., not adopting in period 1) 
will be optimal when 𝐸(𝜋′) > 𝐸(𝜋), which implies 
(3) 𝛽 𝑝𝑤(𝐼 + 𝜋2,𝑤
𝑛 − 𝜋2,𝑤
𝑎 ) > 𝜋1
𝑎 − 𝜋1
𝑛 − 𝐼.                                           
In other words, delaying will be optimal if the net benefit of adopting today (the right-hand side) 
is small enough.   
Here we define risk as a mean-preserving spread. Thus, an increase in risk means the wet 
state becomes wetter while the dry state becomes even drier. This change increases the difference 
in profits from adaptation in the dry state,  𝜋2,𝑑
𝑎 − 𝜋2,𝑑
𝑛 , and decreases this difference in the wet 
state, 𝜋2,𝑤
𝑎 − 𝜋2,𝑤
𝑛 . An increase in risk thus increasing the value of the left-hand side of (3), which 
makes it more favorable to delay the adaptation decision. Since the cost of maladaptation in the 
wet state is expressed as 𝐼 − (𝜋2,𝑤
𝑎 − 𝜋2,𝑤
𝑛 ), equation (3) has an intuitive explanation. The increase 
in risk leads to a wetter wet state, thus increasing the cost of maladaptation. As the possibility of 
the wet state hasn’t changed, the expected cost of maladaptation increases, and waiting becomes 
more favorable.    
However, it is unrealistic to assume the firm knows with certainty the probability of the 
future wet and dry states.  To relax this assumption, we assume the firm might hold multiple beliefs 
on 𝑝𝑤, which might come from different climate models. We define ∆ as the set of all possible 




here that the firm is extremely ambiguity averse and focuses only on the worst case. Then we 
represent his expected discounted profit from adopting in the first period as   
(4) 𝐸(𝜋) = 𝜋1
𝑎 − 𝐼 + 𝛽 min
𝑝𝑤∈∆
(𝑝𝑤𝜋2,𝑤
𝑎 + (1 − 𝑝𝑤)𝜋2,𝑑
𝑎 ),                     
where 𝜋2,𝑤
𝑎 > 𝜋2,𝑑
𝑎 .  If the firm postpones technology adoption, the discounted expected profit will 
be  
(5) 𝐸(𝜋) = 𝜋1
𝑛 + 𝛽 min
𝑝𝑤∈∆
𝑝𝑤 [(1 − 𝑝𝑤)(𝜋2,𝑑
𝑎 − 𝐼) + 𝑝𝑤𝜋2,𝑤
𝑛 ],                   
with 𝜋2,𝑤
𝑛 + 𝐼 > 𝜋2,𝑤
𝑎 > 𝜋2,𝑑
𝑎  given the assumptions above. With Knightian uncertainty, the 
condition for delayed adaptation to be optimal is 
(6) 𝛽 [(min
𝑝𝑤∈∆
𝑝𝑤) (𝐼 + 𝜋2,𝑤
𝑛 − 𝜋2,𝑤
𝑎 )] > 𝜋1
𝑎 − 𝜋1
𝑛 − 𝐼,                           
which will be lower than the case without Knightian uncertainty. 
When the situation becomes more ambiguous, we assume the possible range of priors 
increases. In other words, the lowest possible 𝑝𝑤 becomes even smaller and the highest potential 
𝑝𝑤 becomes larger. Since the ambiguity averse firm focuses on the lowest 𝑝𝑤 , the increase in 
ambiguity causes the left-hand side of equation (6) to decrease. Thus, the agent will speed up 
adaptation. Intuitively, the increase in ambiguity makes the possibility of mal-adaptation deceases 
while the difference in profits from adopting is not affected. As a result, the expected cost of 
maladaptation decreases and makes adopting in period 1 more favorable.  
While a two-period, two-state model is an over-simplification of the complex dynamics in 
play under climate change, this example does clearly highlight the countervailing effects of 
objective risk and ambiguity. We now extend the two-period model into a continuous-time 




supply is exogenously determined by weather at time t. The firm has an option to install a more 
efficient technology with a sunk cost of 𝑀. With the available water input, the firm earns a profit 
(7) 𝜋(𝑡) = 𝑎𝑖(𝑁(𝑡))
𝑏𝑖 .                                                   
with 𝑎𝑖 > 0 and 𝑏𝑖 < 0 to signal decreasing marginal returns from the water input.
7 The subscript 
𝑖 is an indicator that equals 1 if the firm has adopted the technology and otherwise equals 0.  The 
new technology increases profits, 𝑎1 > 𝑎0, and lessens the sensitivity of profit to changes in water 
supply, 𝑏1 < 𝑏0. To maximize long-run profit, the firm must decide the optimal time 𝑡
∗ to switch 
from the existing technology, 𝑎0 and 𝑏0, to the conservation technology, 𝑎1 and 𝑏1, to decrease 
the potential loss from decreasing water availability.  
To determine the optimal adoption time, the firm uses available climate projections to form 
expectations of future water availability and the benefits of adaptation. The firm’s expectation of 
future water availability follows geometric Brownian motion  
(8) 𝑑𝑁 = 𝛼𝑁(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑁(𝑡)𝑑𝐵                                               
where 𝛼 is the instantaneous drift rate of the water supply process, 𝜎2 is the instantaneous variance, 
and 𝑑𝐵  is the increment of a Brownian motion with respect to the probability measure 𝒫 .  
However, due to the variation across climate projects, the firm has a set of beliefs 𝑄 about future 
water supply 𝑁(𝑡) instead of a single probability measure. The set of beliefs is defined as a set of 
probability distributions, which assigns each possible state (amount of water supply) with a 
probability. To model Knightian uncertainty in continuous time, we follow Chen and Epstein 
(2002) and make two assumptions about the beliefs of the firm.  The first assumption is that the 
firm only considers a set of probability measures that have a perfect agreement with 𝒫 with respect 
 
1 It is possible this assumption may be violated when the firm holds a large water right and this water right can be 
leased to another firm via a water market.  In this case, increased water availability lowers the value of the water right.  
For exposition, we assume that any water rights held by the firm are sufficiently small so as to make the firm a net 




to zero probability events.  This assumption allows for the probability measures to be continuous 
with respect to one another and allows for a set of Ito processes to be generated via a density 
generator.8  We define the set of priors as follows: 
(9) 𝑄𝜃 = {𝒫𝜃|𝜃 ∈ Θ},                                                   
where 𝜃 stands for a single density generator, Θ is a set of density generators, 𝒫𝜃 is the probability 
measure generated by 𝜃, and 𝑄𝜃 is the set of all the alternative probability measures. According to 
the Giranov’s Theorem, for each 𝜃  we have 𝑑𝐵𝜃 = 𝑑𝐵 + 𝜃𝑑𝑡 . Combining this result with 
equation (8), we have for any 𝜃 ∈ Θ: 𝑑𝑁 = [𝛼𝑁(𝑡) − 𝜎𝑁(𝑡)𝜃]𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑁(𝑡)𝑑𝐵𝜃. Thus, when the 
firm is following a certain prior, it is equivalent to him following a single stochastic process.  Under 
this continuous time concept of Knightian uncertainty, the firm considers all stochastic differential 
equations with 𝜃 ∈ Θ varying.  In other words, there exists only a single stochastic process for 
𝑁(𝑡) but this process has many interpretations characterized by a set of stochastic differential 
equations.   
The second assumption about climate change beliefs is that the range of priors are bounded 
by the climate projections. Define 𝜃𝑤 and 𝜃𝑏 as the density generator that brings the worst and 
best expected profit: 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑤 , 𝜃𝑏]9 . With the boundary condition and a hypothetical 𝜃
∗  that 
generates the true stochastic process, in the rest of this section we follow Miao and Wang (2011) 
and use a weighted average between the worst (or best) boundary and 𝜃∗ to illustrate how the 
perceived ambiguity influences decision making.  
 
2 This continuous time version of Knightian uncertainty is a weaker version of the discrete time concept.  According 
to Girsanov’s Theorem, an equivalent probability measure can be generated by an original probability measure via a 
density generator.   
3 The specification of Knight uncertainty in Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) is a special case based on our setting, where 
𝜃𝑤 =  −𝑘, 𝜃𝑏 = 𝑘, together with 𝜃




These two assumptions allow us to define the set of priors directly over the drift and 
volatility terms and the geometric Brownian motion process: 
(8’) 𝑑𝑁 = 𝛼𝑞𝑁(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑞𝑁(𝑡)𝑑𝐵
𝑞 ,                                              
where 𝑞 ∈ 𝑄 indexes a single belief and 𝛼𝑞 and 𝜎𝑞 are the drift and volatility terms based on this 
belief. As shown in the appendix, firm profit also follows a geometric Brownian motion  
(9) 𝑑𝜋 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑞
𝑝 𝜋(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑖,𝑞
𝑝 𝜋(𝑡)𝑑𝐵𝑞                                         
where 𝛼𝑖,𝑞





𝑝 = 𝑏𝑖𝜎𝑞.  Because 𝑏𝑖 < 0, increased variability in 
water supply lowers 𝛼𝑖𝑞
𝑝
 and the expected rate of change in firm profits through Jensen’s Inequality. 




However, the conservation technology has an ambiguous effect on the drift rate in profits.   
Equation (9) implies that the firm has multiple beliefs about future profit due to multiple 
beliefs about future water availability.  When the firm is ambiguity averse, it cares more about the 
worst possible future, which we denote 𝑞𝑤. To maximize the present value of profits, the firm 
needs to choose the optimal time 𝑡∗ to switch to more efficient technology. At any point in time, 
the firm assesses the tradeoffs between buying and installing the technology now or waiting until 
𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡, and the optimal stopping time is when the firm is indifferent between the two options. 
Mathematically, the firm solves the optimal stopping problem defined as 










∗−𝜏)}|℘],          
             ℘ = {(1 − 𝜀)𝜇 + 𝜀𝑞𝑤: 𝑞𝑤 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑞𝜖𝑄
𝑉(𝜋𝑡)},                                      
subjects to equation (9) and where 𝜇 is any distribution over 𝜋(𝑡) (i.e., any of the set of stochastic 
differential equations in equation (9), and 𝜀 is a probability between zero and one. Here we define 




literature (Halvey 2007, Ahn et al. 2014), we assume an ambiguity neutral firm places equal weight 
on each climate projection.  
Following Miao and Wang (2011) and Epstein and Wang (1994), the ambiguity 
specification can be interpreted as follows: in a setting characterized by ambiguity, the decision 
maker has a probability of  𝜀 of taking the worst possible scenario as the realized pathway and 1-
 𝜀 of believing the ambiguity-neutral distribution. Thus  𝜀 stands as a measure of impact of the 
ambiguity, and an increase in 𝜀 is caused by either an increase in the perceived ambiguity or an 
increase in the ambiguity aversion level, or both. When 𝜀 = 0, the decision-maker acts as if he is 
making decisions under 𝜇 and using expected utility, when 𝜀 = 1, the decision maker is extremely 
ambiguity averse and bases the optimal stopping decision solely on the worst-case scenario. For 
any 𝜀 ∈ (0,1), the decision maker will generate a ℘ as the weighted average of the ambiguity-
neutral future and the worst-case future, and act as if  ℘ is his single belief. Based on this kinked 
specification of ambiguity, we have 𝛼𝑖,𝑞
𝑝 = 𝜀𝛼0,𝜔
𝑝 + (1 − 𝜀)𝛼0









2] . For convenience, here we make one additional assumption, 
𝜎0,𝑞
𝑝 = 𝑏0√𝜀 𝜎𝜔2 + (1 − 𝜀) ?̅?2. With the additional assumption, it is equivalent to assume either 
the firm is ambiguous about future water supply or future profit. 
Prior to adopting the conservation technology, the optimal value function, 𝑉0, must balance 
the required return from delaying adoption, 𝜌𝑉0, against the expected return which is the sum of 
today’s dividend, 𝜋(𝑡), and the expected appreciation/depreciation of the value function. Taking 
advantage of the geometric Brownian motion, mathematically this relationship can be expressed 
as:  
(11) 𝜌𝑉0 = 𝜋(𝑡) +
𝐸[𝑑𝑉0]
𝑑𝑡
























2]  and 𝜎0,𝑞
𝑝 =
𝑏0√𝜀 𝜎𝜔2 + (1 − 𝜀) ?̅?2 . To guarantee the existence of solution, we need two transversality 
(boundary) conditions between the region of the state space where the old technology is optimal 
(the continuation region) and the region of the state space where the new technology is preferred 









𝑝 − 𝑀.                                                  
The value matching condition basically states that at the switch point the firm is indifferent 
between adapting the technology or not. The left hand side of equation (12) is the sum of the 
expected net present value of firm profits with the old technology, 
𝜋∗
𝜌−𝛼0,𝑞
𝑝 , and the option value 
association with the investment in the conservation technology, 𝜂𝜋∗𝜅 .  Following Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994) 𝜂 is a unknown constant that needs to be solved later, and 𝜅 is the positive solution 




𝑝 2𝜅(𝜅 − 1) + 𝛼0,𝑞
𝑝 𝜅 − 𝜌 = 0. The term associated with 
the negative root of the fundamental quadratic is eliminated by the boundary condition 𝑉0(0) = 0, 
implying the value of investing in a new technology in an industry that generates zero profit is 0. 
The right hand side of equation (12) is the sum of the expected net present value of firm profits 
with the conservation technology, 
𝜋∗
𝜌−𝛼1,𝑞




expected benefit of adopting the conservation technology is positive and the technology will 
eventually be adopted.  If 𝛼1,𝑞
𝑝 < 𝛼0,𝑞
𝑝
, the expected benefit of the technology is negative, and a 
firm will never adopt it. We also make the standard assumption that 𝜌 > 𝛼𝑖,𝑞
𝑝
 to unsure the 




The second boundary condition is the smooth pasting condition which ensures the marginal 








𝑝  .                                              












𝑝 𝑀 = 𝜋∗.                                                 
When the current profit is smaller than the adaptation threshold, 𝜋(𝑡)  < 𝜋∗, the firm installs the 
technology immediately, while if the current profit is higher than the threshold then the firm will 
wait. This profit threshold can also be rewritten as the critical level of water supply that triggers 
adaptation:  





.                                                                   
To understand how the ambiguity attitude influences the adaptation decision, here we 
follow Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) and focus on the value of technology adaptation. Taking 
advantage of geometric Brownian motion, the value of the conservation technology is expressed 
as:  


















𝑝̅̅̅̅  corresponding to the drift term of geometric Brownian motion for worst and 
ambiguity neutral prior, 𝛼𝑖
𝑝̅̅̅̅ > 𝛼𝑖,𝜔
𝑝








             𝜆𝑖 = 𝜌 − 𝜀𝛼𝑖,𝜔
𝑝 − (1 − 𝜀)𝛼𝑖
𝑝̅̅̅̅ .                                                   
Equation (17) tells us that when the firm calculates the value of new technology, it will separately 








?̅?𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖,𝜔, which is always positive since by definition 𝛼𝑖,𝜔 is the lowest changing rate of future 






 since the new technology reduces the impact of water supply and 
limits the decrease in the drift gap between the worst prior and the average10. An increase in 𝜀 
leads to a decrease in profit both before and after technology adaptation, however, the decrease is 
larger under the old technology. Thus, the expected profit from technology adaptation, which is 
measured by the differences in the net present value before and after switching technology, 
increases as 𝜀 increases which favors adapting earlier. The intuition is that when people put a 
higher weight on the drier future, the value of the conservation technology will increase, leading 
to a faster adaptation.  
  3.3  An Illustrative Example: Irrigated Agriculture in California’s 
Central Valley 
 In this section, we apply our theoretical model to the decision to invest in more efficient 
irrigation technology in the northern portion of California’s Central Valley - the most productive 
agricultural region in the country.  All parameter values are presented in Table 1.  Agricultural 
production in the Sacramento Valley relies on irrigation and over 70 percent of the annual 
irrigation supply comes from surface water.  Surface water is annually replenished by melting 
snowpack in the Sierra Nevada Mountains and brought to agricultural producers in the valley via 
several rivers.  The predicted decrease in water availability in recent climate change scenarios 
downscaled to California is expected to decrease farmland values (Schlenker et al. 2007).  One 
potential response by farmers is to invest in more efficient irrigation technologies.  Between 1970 
 






2 , when 0.5 > 𝑏0 > 𝑏1 > 0 , the old 




and 2010, the irrigated area in California that uses inefficient surface irrigation methods such as 
furrow or flood irrigation has fallen by 44 percent (Tindula, et al. 2013). Whether this transition 
continues as farmers update their expectations of climate change depends on how expectations 
account for risk and ambiguity.  If climate change is expected to increase the variability in snowfall, 
investing in more efficient irrigation will become riskier and the shift to more efficient irrigation 
technologies will slow.  However, since climate change introduces ambiguity, it may also create 
an incentive to speed up the rate of transition to more efficient irrigation.   
3.3.1 Irrigated production and water markets 
Consider a risk-neutral farmer that uses physical capital, 𝑘, and irrigation water, 𝑛, to 
produce a single agricultural commodity 𝑦 = 𝑓0(𝑘, 𝑛)  with diminishing returns to scale 
technology 𝑓0. Let i = 0 denote production using the farmer’s current surface irrigation method 
(e.g, furrow or flood irrigation) and i = 1 correspond to production using a less water-intensive 
irrigation technology (e.g., center pivot or drip irrigation). Following Berck and Helfand (1990), 
Letey (1991), and Carey and Zilberman (2002), the farmer’s production follows a Von-Liebig type 
production function  
(18) 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖(𝑘, 𝑛𝑖) = {
𝛾𝑖𝑘𝑛𝑖  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑛𝑖 < 𝑛𝑖
∗ 
𝑦∗ 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑛𝑖 ≥ 𝑛𝑖
∗  
},                                     
where 𝑦∗ is the farmer’s optimal level of production per acre, 𝑛𝑖
∗ is the farmer’s optimal water 
demand under technology i (what he would require for optimal production if unconstrained by 
water supply), and 𝑛𝑖 is the amount of water employed in production.  The Von-Liebig (or plateau) 
model assumes that the production is first responding to the addition of water, and then limited by 
the capital input (Letey 1991). When 𝑛𝑖 < 𝑛𝑖




increases production by 𝛾𝑖𝑘, where 𝛾𝑖 is a scalar that reflects the efficiency of technology i with 
𝛾1 > 𝛾0. Another production input (e.g., soil quality or canal size) becomes limiting at 𝑛𝑖 ≥ 𝑛𝑖
∗. 
In each period, the farmer is endowed with some water rights 𝐴(𝑁(𝑡)), which allows him 
to access a certain level of water with zero cost:  
(19) 𝐴(𝑁) = {
𝜃?̃? 𝑖𝑓 𝑁(𝑡) ≥ ?̃?
𝜃𝑁(𝑡) 𝑖𝑓 𝑁(𝑡) < ?̃? 
}.                                            
Here, 𝑁(𝑡) is the exogenous supply of water at time 𝑡 proxied by the flow of a local river, ?̃? is a 
scarcity threshold which is exogenously determined, and 𝜃 is a ratio which implies the amount of 
cost-free water given the current stock level. When water is relatively abundant, the farmer is 
guaranteed an amount of water 𝜃?̃?. During periods of water scarcity, the farmer will be restricted 
to a fixed proportion of the total stock 𝜃𝑁(𝑡).  
The relationship between available water 𝐴(𝑁) and applied water 𝑛𝑖 is as follows;  
(20) 𝑛𝑖 = {
𝑛𝑖
∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝐴(𝑁) ≥ 𝑛𝑖
∗
 𝑛𝑖 <  𝑛𝑖
∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝐴(𝑁) <  𝑛𝑖
∗}.                                
Thus, 𝐴(𝑁) −  𝑛𝑖   is the difference between water the farmer has available for production and how 
much he actually employs in production. If positive (𝐴(𝑁) >  𝑛𝑖), this difference represents the 
total amount of water left over after production and available for sale by the farmer. If negative 
(𝐴(𝑁) <  𝑛𝑖) , this difference indicates how much water the farmer buys to supplement his 
available water for production. Investment in efficient irrigation technology helps tilt the 
difference of the two terms towards a surplus by reducing  𝑛𝑖. 
The farmer may buy and lease out water in a formal water market.  The demand for water 
is isoelastic: 











where e > 0 is the constant price elasticity of demand and  𝜑 is a positive demand parameter. To 
predict the future water price, we use data from the Water Transfer Level Dataset compiled by 
researchers at UC-Santa Barbara to recover the demand parameter 𝜑 and the elasticity of water 
demand in the water market. The Water Transfer Data Base is funded by the National Science 
Foundation and the California Water Resources Research Center and presented by the Bren School.  
The dataset includes the year of a water transfer, the acquirer of the water, the supplier, the amount 
of water transferred, the proposed use of the water, and the real price of the trade (in 1987 dollars).  
To generate a representative sample for the study area, we limit the transaction data to northern 
California and at least one of the engagement parties needs to be an agriculture user. This leaves 
us with 196 transactions from the year 1989 to 2009. Using an ordinary least squares regression, 
we estimate the elasticity of demand 𝑒 = 1.94 and 𝜑 = 899.11 
We assume the farmer knows the price 𝑃 for the final product and rent 𝑟 for capital and 
solves the following profit-maximization problem: 
(22)  𝜋𝑖(𝑁(𝑡)) = max
𝑘,𝑛
𝑃𝑓𝑖(𝑘, 𝑛) − 𝑝(𝑁(𝑡))(𝑛𝑖 − 𝐴(𝑁(𝑡))) − 𝑟𝑘.                   
where 𝜋𝑖 stands for the farmer’s profit, 𝑓𝑖 stands for the production technology.  Because farm 
profits are linear in the amount of water applied, the first-order condition arising from profit 
maximization problem suggests a bang-bang solution. When 𝑝(𝑁) ≤ 𝑃𝛾𝑖𝑘 the farmer optimally 
chooses to apply 𝑛𝑖
∗ . Whether a farmer is a buyer or seller of water depends on the relative 
magnitude of the farmer’s water right and optimal water demand.  If 𝐴(𝑁) < 𝑛𝑖
∗, the farmer will 
purchase water to produce 𝑦∗ given the von Liebig production function. The need to purchase 
water will arise when the famer’s water rights are lower than the optimal water demand (𝜃?̃? <
 





∗), or aggregate water supplies are sufficiently low.  If the farmer’s water right exceeds his 
optimal water demand (𝜃?̃? > 𝑛𝑖
∗), 𝑁(𝑡) must fall further than ?̃? to trigger water purchases.  The 
von Liebig production function also implies that the farmer will sell excess water when water 
supplies are relatively abundant 𝐴(𝑁) > 𝑛𝑖
∗ . Water sales arise when the farmer’s water right 
exceeds his optimal water demand (𝜃?̃? > 𝑛𝑖
∗). Otherwise, an investment in the more efficient 
technology is needed before the farmer will ever choose to sell water.      
But when 𝑝(𝑁) > 𝑃𝛾𝑖𝑘, the farmer will terminate production and lease all of his available 
water since the value marginal product of water in irrigated agriculture is lower than the price of 
water on the spot market. Since it would no longer be in use, the water conservation technology 
provides no value to the farmer. This suggests that the benefit of water conservation is greatest at 
intermediate water supply levels. In times of ample aggregate water supplies, the price of water 
and the benefits of the water conserved are low. In times of severe water scarcity, the price of 
water will be high, the farmer will lease all water rights and has no need for new irrigation 
technology.     
The profit-maximization problem detailed above implies a power function relationship 
between profit and water. To estimate the parameters 𝑎𝑖  and 𝑏𝑖 , we fit the profit function in 
equation (7) to the observed relationship between water supply and profits implied by the profit 
maximization problem.  We separately calculate the profit from 0.1 million acre-feet to 60 million 
acre-feet before and after the technology adaptation. The estimation results are included in Table 
1. Compared with the traditional technology, the new irrigation technology brings a larger scale 
coefficient together with a lower power term, which indicates an overall larger profit in the study 




the two profit functions decreases as the level of water increase. This result corresponds to our 
assumption in the theoretical section. 
3.3.2 Climate change beliefs 
We use historical data and climate projections of the Tuolumne River streamflow, a single 
basin in central California, to estimate streamflow trend, variability, and climate uncertainty. Our 
data includes the annual streamflow in the Tuolumne River at LaGrange from 1951 to 2000 to 
estimate historical streamflow trends and variability. Our climate projections come from Coupled 
Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) (U.S. Department of the Interior & Bureau of 
Reclamation 2013, U.S. Department of Interior & Bureau of Reclamation 2014). CMIP5 
projections are the most recently published data, and provide the latest set of global greenhouse 
emissions scenarios, called representative concentration pathways (RCPs). The data contains four 
pathways, namely RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6, and RCP8.5, which are labeled based on radiative 
forcing values in the year 2100 (2.6, 4.5, 6.0, and 8.5 W/m2, respectively). Our climate data (air 
temperature, precipitation, and relative humidity) are from 16 general circulation models (GCMs). 
Together with 4 RCPs, our data contains 64 different climate projections of N(t), which capture 
regional meteorology and a range of emissions and economic conditions from the year 2000 to the 
year 2100.  We treat these 64 climate projections as the set of possible climate beliefs possibly 
held by the farmer: 𝑄 = 64.  
Corresponding to the theoretical assumption, we assume water supply follows a geometric 
Brownian motion process. We estimate the parameters in equation (8) for each of the 64 climate 
projections. Each estimated stochastic process succinctly characterizes a single belief about future 
climate.  Figure 1 compares the estimated parameter values for the 64 climate projections (blue 




streamflow data (green color). As can be balanced from the Figure, first, compared with the 
historical streamflow, most projections convey a lower trend of water flow. In addition, almost all 
the projections predict lower volatility compared with the historical record. The results suggest 
that extreme weather events (droughts and floods) will be less likely in the future due to climate 
change, which makes this type of adaptation investment more favorable. 
Based on our theory specification (Appendix), we also calculate the drift rate and volatility 
of profit. Figure 2 compares the estimated parameter values estimated by the 64 climate projections 
and the historical data. Compared with the historical result, about half of the projections suggest a 
decrease in further profit while others suggest an increase. With the adaptation of technology, we 
notice a reduction in both the range of the drift term and volatility, which corresponds to our 
theoretical specification as the new technology reduces the impact of water supply. In addition, we 
find that a higher drift term or lower volatility in the water supply implies a smaller increase in 
profit. Based on our result, miroc5.1.rcp26 is selected as the worst projection since it provides the 
lowest drift rate of profit. Following previous experimental research on ambiguity, we define the 
64 projections as the set of priors, and each of them encompasses all the possible future states. We 
take the average of the 64 projections and treat it as the ambiguity neutral prior in the 
approximation. Figure 3 represents the comparison between the worst projections, the average 
across projections, and the projections based on historical data. From both the parameter values 
and the graph, the average projection brings a higher increase in profit, together with higher 
volatility.  
3.3.3 Results 
To investigate how the farmer’s ambiguity attitude might impact the adaptation decision, 




take advantage of the closed form solution and directly calculate the adaptation threshold for 
different scenarios. Based on our parameter values, our profit function has a relatively large 
constant term together with a relatively smaller value of power term. Together with our 
mathematical expression for the drift term of profit, our parameters of profit function make the 
adaptation time response slowly to the changes in the drift rate of water supply while responding 
sharply to the changes in the volatility of streamflow. 
We choose the flow level in the year 2002 as our initial condition to calculate the optimal 
switching time. Our empirical analysis provides the adaptation threshold and the trend of water 
supply. Those two results together provide us with the expected hitting time. Although our data 
based on the 100-years projections, with a lower threshold and slow changing speed of water 
supply, the optimal switching time could exceed 100 years. Since we chose the year 2002 as the 
initial point, our range of optimal adaption timing is from 2002 to infinity. As an example, if the 
optimal adoption year is 150 years later, it means switch technology at the year 2152. Table 2 
summarizes the optimal conservation technology adoption time when farmers do and do not update 
expectations of water availability to account for climate change. Compared with most projections, 
historical data leads to the highest average supply of water and the highest changing rate of profit. 
Based on our result, the framers will never adopt new technology if they only consider the 
historical data as the expected water supply keeps increasing. When an ambiguity neutral framer 
considers the climate projections and puts equal weight on each prior, he recognizes that the future 
is drier relative to the historical record and switches the technology in 241 years. On the other hand, 




become conservative and install the technology 193 years.  Regardless of ambiguity preferences, 
updating expectations to account for climate change will hasten adaptation.12 
Table 3 considers how changes in risk and ambiguity impact the adoption time for different 
combinations for the ambiguity and risk level. In the table, we have two levels of ambiguity, 
extremely averse (𝜀 = 1) and ambiguity neutral (𝜀 = 0), together with three levels of risk, low 
(95% of original volatility), benchmark, and high (105% of original volatility). Across different 
risk levels, an increase in the risk level delays the optimal adoption time, which means the farmer 
has less incentive to adapt, and prefers to wait until the water supply becomes even lower. This 
result fits with the prediction of Pindyck (1991), where the author claims an increase in risk leads 
to longer waiting. Across different volatility levels, an increase in ambiguity aversion leads to an 
earlier adaptation, as the framer becomes more concerned about the drier future and has a higher 
incentive to switch technology. This result fits with our theoretical prediction.  
In Table 4 we present results from a sensitivity analysis. In particular, we calculate how 
changes in the underlying parameter values alter the optimal timing decision. For brevity we focus 
on the adaptation time for the extremely ambiguity-averse farmer. In general, our results show that 
any parameter change that increases the additional profits generated by the conservation 
technology hastens adaptation, while any change that reduces the additional profits generated by 
the conservation technology delays the investment. Adoption times are incredibly sensitive to 
changes in 𝑎𝑖, which is a multiplicative parameter in the production function. The results suggest 
that seemingly subtle differences in this term between the adoption/no adoption states, i.e., 𝑎1 −
𝑎0, can dramatically alter the optimal decision from one of adopting immediately to not adopting 
in the foreseeable future. In contrast, the optimal timing of adaptation is relatively insensitive to 
 





the curvature of the profit function 𝑏𝑖. To understand this result, note that 𝑏𝑖 controls the relative 
influence of the expected rate and volatility in streamflow on the expected rate of change in profits: 
𝛼𝑖,𝑞




2]. When the drift rate and volatility rate of the water supply process 
are of similar magnitude, shifting the weight between these terms will have a minimal effect on 
the expected change in profit and the optimal timing of adaptation all else constant. The optimal 
timing of adaptation is also relatively insensitive to the expected rate of change in streamflow.  The 
extreme curvature of the profit function (low value of 𝑏𝑖) consistent by the profit maximization 
problem facing the farmer implies the expected rate of change in profits is relatively insensitive to 
changes in the expected rate of change in the water supply.  The greater the curvature in the profit 
function, the more the timing of adaptation is driven by the volatility in streamflow as opposed to 
the expected change in streamflow.     
  3.4  Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the impact of changing climate uncertainty on a firm’s adaptation 
decision. We separately consider two types of uncertainty. One is the objective risk as 
characterized by the volatility in a single climate projection, and the other one is the ambiguity, 
which depends on the number of climate projections considered. Using both theoretical analysis 
and numerical simulation, we find that when the volatility in one projection increases, the decision-
maker has a higher incentive to wait since the expected cost of maladaptation increases. On the 
other hand, when the firm’s degree of ambiguity aversion, or the number of projections increases, 
the decision-maker will accelerate the installment of technology as he believes that the natural 
resources are more likely to be scarce. 
A successful climate policy requires both mitigation and adaptation. Besides understanding 




predict an individual’s adaptation behavior is also essential. By considering ambiguity aversion, 
we emphasize how the information provided by the government is potentially important to the 
firm’s optimal response to climate change. Besides the information itself, how the information is 
provided also matters. When too much conflicting information is present at the same time, along 
with the information within each single projection, the complicated environment also affects the 
adaptation behavior. Thus, when the government has a clear individual adaptation target, our 
results provide another channel to help influence the adoption decision. 
Our research provides an illustration of how ambiguity theory can be applied to predict 
adaptation behavior in the climate change context. Further refinements to the modeling are of 
course possible, and may lead to additional insight. First, the ambiguity specification we consider, 
while typical to the closely related literature, does not distinguish the effects of ambiguity attitude 
(i.e., how adverse to ambiguity the decision-maker is) from the effects of a change in ambiguity 
(Billion et al. 2018). Second, we assumed the demand parameter in the model is non-stochastic. 
However, it may be more realistic to assume this follows another Ito process. Third, we do not 
consider both adaptation and mitigation. As stated by several previous papers, a systemic welfare 
analysis requires the consideration of both (Bosello, Carraro et al. 2010, Hashida and Lewis 2019, 
Li and Rus 2019, De Bruin, Dellink et al. 2009, Wang and McCarl 2013). Thus, our model would 
need to be combined with possible mitigation mechanisms to better understand the implications of 
ambiguity for optimal policy. The design of optimal policy would further need to specify 
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Appendix A: Certification in lemons market 
Appendix A1: Theory Derivation 
Proof of proposition 3: 
Given the cost function, under the seller certification, the seller solves the profit-
maximizing problem  
(1) 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒∈[0,1]
𝑒(𝑣ℎ − 𝑃𝑐) + (1 − 𝑒)𝐸(𝑣) − 𝑒
𝜆, 
and choses effort based on 
(2) 𝐹𝑂𝐶: 𝛥𝑣 − 𝑃𝑐 = 𝜆𝑒
𝜆−1, 
Which yields  






where ∆𝑞  stands for the quality gap between high- and low-quality item. Using backward 









which means the marginal benefit of additional effort in the seller certification equals to  
(6) 𝑀𝐵𝑏 = ?̃? − 𝑣𝑙. 
For the buyer certification (weakly), the certifier’s problem is  
(7) 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑃𝑐
[𝑒𝑏(𝑃𝑐) + (1 − 𝑒𝑏(𝑃𝑐))𝜎𝑙
∗(?̃?(𝑃𝑐))]𝜎
∗(𝑠ℎ(𝑃𝑐))𝑃𝑐. 























∗ back to the FOC condition for seller’s profit maximizing problem and compare 























 , the two certification mechanism cases will provide the same level of 
incentive. Clearly, since 𝑛 is a non-negative number, 𝜆2 is less than 1, which is outside of the range 
of 𝜆, while 𝜆3 is larger than 2. Since the above equation is continuous when 𝑛 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜆 > 1, thus 





































Thus, buyer-certification will provide more incentive to the seller for any 𝜆 ∈ (1, +∞] for any 
value of the low-quality item. Also, we observe that the difference will become larger as value of 
low-quality item increases.  
Proof for Extension 2  
Under seller certification, the seller’s profit maximization problem is  
(13) 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒∈[0,1]




(14) 𝐹𝑂𝐶:  𝜏(𝑃ℎ − 𝑣𝐿) − 𝑃𝑐 = 𝑐′(𝑒) , 
and optimal 𝑃𝑐 = 
(𝜆−1)(𝑃ℎ−𝑣𝐿)
𝜆
. At the same time, the problem needs to satisfy one participation 
constrain that makes sure the seller has no incentive to cheat: 
(15) 𝜋∗ ≥ (1 − 𝜏)𝑃ℎ + 𝜏𝑣𝑙 − 𝑃𝑐. 
If the constrain is satisfied, 𝑃ℎ = 𝜏∆𝑣 + 𝑣𝑙 and 𝑃𝐿 = 𝑒(1 − 𝜏)∆𝑣 + 𝑣𝑙 
On the other hand, for the buyer-certification, we keep all our assumptions in case 3 except 
changing the accuracy of certification. Thus, the seller still needs to send out a price signal to make 
buyer indifferent among  𝑠𝑏 , 𝑠ℎ and 𝑠𝑛. Receiving the price signal, the buyer will be indifferent 
among the three actions only if the following three equations hold: 
(16) 𝑃𝑐 = 𝜏𝜇(𝑃)(𝑣ℎ − 𝑃) + (1 − 𝜏)(1 − 𝜇)(𝑣𝑙 − 𝑃), 
(17) 𝑃𝑐 = 𝜏(1 − 𝜇)(𝑃 − 𝑣𝑙) + (1 − 𝜏)𝜇(𝑃 − 𝑣ℎ), 
(18) 𝑃 = 𝜇(𝑃)𝑣ℎ + (1 − 𝜇(𝑃))𝑣𝑙. 
Where 𝜏  means the probability that the certification indicates high-quality item while 1 − 𝜏 













which indicates a lower equilibrium price for the high-quality commodity and a smaller 
price range for certification. Following the same logic in case 3, the buyer chose the chance of 
using certification service  𝜎′∗(𝑠ℎ),to make the low type seller being indifferent between ask for 
?̃?′ or 𝑞𝑙, and 













Substituting all the terms back to seller’s problem, we have 
(22) 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒∈[0,1]
𝜏𝑒?̃? + (1 − 𝑒)𝑣𝑙 − 𝑐(𝑒), 
(23) 𝐹𝑂𝐶:  𝜏(?̃? − 𝑣𝑙) − (1 −  𝜏)𝑣𝑙 = 𝑐′(𝑒) . 
From the profit maximizing condition, we notice that when the accuracy rate decrease together 
value of low-quality item increase, the effort level in the buyer certification case will decrease even 
further compared with the seller certification case. This is because under the buyer certification, 
high type seller will be punished with an additional opportunity cost, which is not able to sell the 
item at any price, if the item is certified as low quality. From the comparisons, the seller 
certification could dominate buyer certification as the additional punishment increase. Based on 
our simulation result, when 𝑣ℎ = 2𝑣𝑙 and τ = 0.7 , the seller certification will lead to a higher 





Appendix A2: Experiment Instructions and Screenshots  
Instructions for seller imperfect certification treatment 
Thank you for participating in today’s study. Please follow the instructions carefully. At any time, 
please feel free to raise your hand if you have a question.  
 
You have been randomly assigned an ID number for this session. You will make decisions using 
a computer. You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone. Your name will never be 
associated with any of your decisions.  In order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal 
your choices or otherwise communicate with any other participant. Importantly, please refrain 
from verbally reacting to events that occur. 
 
Today’s session has three parts: Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and a short questionnaire. You will 
have the opportunity to earn money in both experiments based on your decisions. You will be paid 
your earnings privately, and in cash, at the end of the experiment session. We will proceed 
through the written materials together. Please do not enter any decisions on the computer 
until instructed to do so. 
 
 
Instructions for Experiment 1 
 
Please refer to your computer screen while we read the instructions.  
 
We would like you to make a decision for each of 10 scenarios. Each scenario involves a choice 
between playing a lottery that pays either $4 or $0 according to specified chances (Option A) or 
receiving $2 for sure (Option B). 
 
You will notice that the only differences across scenarios are the chances of receiving the high or 
low prize for the lottery. At the end of the today’s session, ONE of the 10 scenarios will be selected 
at random and you will be paid according to your decision for this selected scenario ONLY. Each 
scenario has an equal chance of being selected. 
 
Please consider your choice for each scenario carefully. Since you do not know which scenario 
will be played out, it is in your best interest to treat each scenario as if it will be the one used to 
determine your earnings. 
 
Before making decisions, are there any questions? 
 
Please proceed to entering decisions on your computer. Once you are ready to submit your 




Instructions for Experiment 2 
 
In this experiment, you will be randomly placed into a two-person group to form a trading market. 
One member of your group will be a seller and the other will be a buyer.  
 
There will be many decision rounds in the experiment. You will not know the number of rounds 
until the experiment has been completed. Each decision round is separate from the other rounds, 
in the sense that the decisions you make in one round will not affect the outcome or earnings of 
any other round. 
 
In this experiment, all money amounts are denominated in lab dollars, and will be exchanged at a 
rate of 200 lab dollars to 1 US dollar at the end of the experiment. There are five parts to each 
decision period: 
 
• The seller decides how much effort to put into “product” quality. Increasing effort 
improves the chance that the product is of “high” rather than “low” quality. 
• Product quality (high or low) is revealed to the seller. The seller then has the option to 
purchase a certification service. If a product is certified to be of high quality, this 
information is made known to the buyer. Otherwise, the buyer does not know product 
quality when making a purchase decision. 
• The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer to the buyer.  
• The buyer chooses whether to accept the offer. 
• The computer calculates earnings. 
 
We will now go through the details of the seller and buyer tasks in each decision round. 
 
Information for Sellers: 
 
The seller produces and offers to sell one unit of a “product”. The product may be of “low” or 
“high” quality. Buyers are willing to pay more for a high quality product, but producing a high 
quality product can be more costly.  
 
The seller first makes an effort choice. Production cost increases with effort, but higher effort 
increases the chance that the product is high quality. The relationship between effort, product 






Effort choice Chance of high product quality Production cost 
0 0% 0 
1 10% 1 
2 20% 4 
3 30% 9 
4 40% 16 
5 50% 25 
6 60% 36 
7 70% 49 
8 80% 64 
9 90% 81 
10 100% 100 
 
For example, if the seller selects an effort of 0, production cost will be 0 lab dollars and there will 
be a 0% chance that the product is high quality. As another example, if the seller selects an effort 
of 10, production cost will be 100 lab dollars and there will be a 100% chance the product is high 
quality. 
 
After the effort choice is made, product quality will be revealed to the seller, but it will not be 
known to the buyer. The seller can purchase a certification service at a known cost. However, the 
certification is error prone. If the service is purchased, and the actual quality is High, the service 
has a 70% chance of revealing to the buyer that the product quality is High; If the actual quality is 
Low, the service has a 30% chance of revealing to the buyer that the product is High. If the service 
is purchased, and the service determines the product is low quality, this information will not be 
revealed to the buyer.  
 
The seller next makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer to the buyer. This is the only opportunity to 
sell the product.  
 
In each round, the seller will receive 100 lab dollars in fixed income. This amount does not depend 
on any decisions made. If the buyer accepts the offer, seller earnings are equal to the fixed income 
plus price received, minus any production cost. If the buyer rejects the offer, seller earnings are 
equal to fixed income minus any production cost. To summarize,  
 
If the buyer accepts the offer:   
 
Seller earnings = Fixed income + Price received – Production cost – Certification Cost (if any) 
 
If the buyer rejects the offer:  
  






Information for Buyers: 
The value of the product to the buyer depends on whether it is high or low quality. If the buyer 
purchases a high-quality product, they will receive 500 lab dollars. If the buyer purchases a low-
quality product, the buyer will instead receive 250 lab dollars. If the seller purchases the 
certification service and the product is certified to be high quality, this information will be revealed 
to the buyer. Otherwise, the quality of product is not known to the buyer when making a purchase 
decision.  
 
The buyer can accept any price offer they choose. There is no budget constraining this purchase. 
 
In each round, the buyer will receive 100 lab dollars in fixed income. This amount does not depend 
on any decisions made. If the buyer accepts the seller’s offer, the buyer’s earnings are equal to the 
fixed income plus the value of the product (which depends on actual quality), minus the price paid. 
If the buyer rejects the offer, buyer earnings are equal to the fixed income. To summarize, 
 
If the buyer accepts the offer:   
Buyer earnings = Fixed Income + Value of product – Price Paid  
 
If the buyer rejects the offer:   
Buyer earnings = Fixed Income 
 
Proceeding through the experiment: 
 
Prior to each new decision round, you will be randomly matched with a different person in the 
room. The computer is programmed such that, when you are a seller, you will not be matched with 
the buyer from the previous round. Similarly, when you are a buyer, you will not be matched with 
the seller from the previous round. The decisions you made in prior rounds will not be known to 
your trading partner. 
 
Your role in the experiment (buyer or seller) and the cost of the certification service may change 
from one round to the next. Please look carefully at the information on your computer screen before 
making any decisions.   
 
We will begin with two training rounds to help you understand the procedures. In one training 
round you will play the role of a buyer and in the other you will be a seller.  
 
Aside from decisions in the training rounds, you will be paid based on the outcome of each decision 
round. This means that it is very important to consider each decision prior to making it. Before we 













































Appendix A3: Tables 






Control N/A N/A N/A 
SPA(60) Seller Perfect 60 (alternative) 
SPM(125) Seller Perfect 125 (monopolistic) 
BPA(125) Buyer Perfect 125 (alternative) 
BPM(60) Buyer Perfect 60 (monopolistic) 
SIA(20) Seller Imperfect 20 (alternative) 
SIM(90) Seller Imperfect 90 (monopolistic) 
BIA(90) Buyer Imperfect 90 (alternative) 
BIM(20) Buyer Imperfect 20 (monopolistic) 
Note: Under an imperfect certification process, there is a 70% chance that a high-quality item will be certified as high 
quality and a 30% chance that a low-quality item will be certified as high quality. Monopolistic prices are those derived 
directly from the theory. The alternative price for seller (buyer) certification is the monopolistic price from the 





Table 1.2.  Theoretical predictions  
Treatment 







Control 0 (0%) N/A 62.5% 
SPA(60) 10 (100%) 100% 100% 
SPM(125) 6 (60%) 60% 91% 
BPA(125) 0 (0%) 0% 62.5% 
BPM(60) 8 (80%) 33.86% 89.73% 
SIA(20) 6 (40%) 60% 91% 
SIM(90) 4 (40%) 40% 83.5% 
BIA(90) 0 (0%) 0% 62.5% 














Table 1.3.  Data Description 
Variable Name Description Mean S.D. 
Seller Effort Seller’s effort choice, 0 to 10 3.70 2.90 
Product Sold =1 if buyer purchased product 0.663 0.472 
Certification 
Purchased 
=1 if certification service purchased 
0.393 0.488 
Certification Price price of certification, in lab dollars 70.62 34.45 
Social Welfare actual social welfare divided by maximum possible 
social welfare, multiplied by 100% 
50.6 46.62 
Control =1 if control condition 0.102 0.303 
SPA(60) =1 if seller perfect certification with alternative price 
treatment 
0.096 0.295 
SPM(125) =1 if seller perfect certification with monopolistic price 
treatment 
0.097 0.296 
BPA(125) =1 if buyer perfect certification with alternative price 
treatment  
0.097 0.296 
BPM(60) =1 if buyer perfect certification with monopolistic price 
treatment 
0.096 0.295 
SIA(20) =1 if seller imperfect certification with alternative price 
treatment 
0.097 0.296 
SIM(90) =1 if seller imperfect certification with monopolistic 
price treatment 
0.096 0.295 
BIA(90) =1 if buyer imperfect certification with alternative price 
treatment 
0.097 0.296 
BIM(20) =1 if buyer imperfect certification with monopolistic 
price treatment 
0.096 0.295 
Risk Averse =1 if participant selected the safe option at least six 
times in the risk elicitation task 
0.675 0.469 
Employed =1 if participant employed full or part-time  0.602 0.489 
Female =1 if participant is female 0.419 0.494 
Preexp =1 if participated other experiment before 0.623 0.486 
Saleexp =1 if participant has sales experience before 0.390 0.489 
Extraversion measure of personality trait “extraversion”, 1 to 7 4.03 1.44 
Agreeableness measure of personality trait “agreeableness”, 1 to 7 4.13 1.24 
Conscientiousness measure of personality trait “extraversion”, 1 to 7 5.11 1.23 
Emotional Stability measure of personality trait “emotional stability”, 1 to 7 4.17 1.31 







Table 1.4.  Treatment effects regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Seller Effort Certification 
Purchased 
Product Sold Social Welfare Product 
market 
efficiency 
      
SPA(60) 2.969*** 0.582*** 0.196*** 27.60*** 18.87*** 
 (0.505) (0.0538) (0.0529) (4.341) (3.985) 
SPM(125) 2.027*** 0.476*** 0.237*** 29.56*** 14.67*** 
 (0.515) (0.0573) (0.0437) (3.890) (3.419) 
BPA(125) 0.563 0.147*** -0.0077 2.062 -2.534 
 (0.489) (0.0293) (0.0574) (4.199) (4.079) 
BPM(60) 2.180*** 0.447*** 0.0821 15.55*** 8.648* 
 (0.567) (0.0365) (0.0509) (4.972) (5.070) 
SIA(20) 1.016** 0.688*** 0.0840* 8.025** 4.584 
 (0.472) (0.0562) (0.0496) (3.808) (3.796) 
SIM(90) 0.569 0.371*** 0.0604 7.354 -0.984 
 (0.534) (0.0549) (0.046) (4.834) (4.712) 
BIA(90) 0.539 0.153*** 0.031 3.723 0.282 
 (0.540) (0.0290) (0.0563) (4.751) (4.725) 
BIM(20) 0.798 0.282*** 0.0546 7.035* 5.623 
 (0.561) (0.0346) (0.0543) (3.884) (3.854) 
Constant 2.673***  0.592*** 41.11*** 41.11*** 
 (0.340)  (0.0336) (2.172) (2.172) 
      
Observations 1,760 1,360 1,760 1,760 1,760 
R2 0.107 0.477 0.027 0.049 0.023 
Notes: *,**, and *** denote estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 







Table 1.5.  Selected hypothesis tests 
Hypothesis 
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Difference of 
means 
Seller versus buyer certification  
H2 Buyer Perfect Monopolistic Seller Perfect Monopolistic 0.152 
H3 Seller Imperfect Monopolistic Buyer Imperfect Monopolistic -0.229 
H4 Seller Perfect Monopolistic Buyer Perfect Alternative 1.465*** 
H4 Seller Perfect Alternative Buyer Perfect Monopolistic 0.758 
Perfect versus imperfect certification 
H5 Seller Perfect Monopolistic Seller Imperfect Monopolistic 1.459*** 
H5 Buyer Perfect Monopolistic Buyer Imperfect Monopolistic 1.382** 
Changes in certification prices 
 Seller Perfect Alternative Seller Perfect Monopolistic 0.941** 
Buyer Perfect Monopolistic Buyer Perfect Alternative 1.617*** 
Seller Imperfect Alternative Seller Imperfect Monopolistic 0.447 
Buyer Imperfect Monopolistic Buyer Imperfect Alternative 0.261 
Notes: *,**, and *** denote estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 






Table 1.6.  Conditional certification purchases 
Seller Certification Item Quality Certification Purchased (%) 
Perfect Monopolistic High 91.9 
Perfect Monopolistic Low 1.2 
Perfect Alternative High 97.9 
Perfect Alternative Low 6.7 
Imperfect Monopolistic High 74.1 
Imperfect Monopolistic Low 17.8 
Imperfect Alternative High 89.5 
Imperfect Alternative Low 58.4 
Buyer Certification Price Certification Purchased (%) 
Perfect Monopolistic >250 62.6 
Perfect Monopolistic ≤250 9.6 
Perfect Alternative >250 22.1 
Perfect Alternative ≤250 6.0 
Imperfect Monopolistic >250 36.7 
Imperfect Monopolistic ≤250 20.5 
Imperfect Alternative >250 18.5 





Table 1.7.  Dynamic specification 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Seller Effort Certification 
Purchased 
Product Sold 
    
SPA(60) 0.900 0.495*** -0.0114 
 (1.398) (0.152) (0.117) 
SPM(125) 0.855 0.359** 0.117 
 (1.413) (0.167) (0.105) 
BPA(125) 1.127 0.296** -0.256** 
 (1.388) (0.116) (0.128) 
BPM(60) 0.586 0.645*** -0.143 
 (1.390) (0.105) (0.124) 
SIA(20) 0.975 0.873*** -0.232** 
 (1.264) (0.147) (0.0998) 
SIM(90) -0.864 0.194 -0.220* 
 (1.361) (0.120) (0.113) 
BIA(90) 0.902 0.162* -0.245* 
 (1.361) (0.0971) (0.137) 
BIM(20) 1.303 0.617*** -0.154 
 (1.498) (0.116) (0.120) 
Lasthalf×Control -0.151  0.175* 
 (1.150)  (0.0928) 
Lasthalf×SPA -0.622 -0.0328 0.0412 
 (1.459) (0.187) (0.121) 
Lasthalf×SPM -0.289 -0.0361 -0.124 
 (1.469) (0.211) (0.123) 
Lasthalf×BPA 2.581** 0.0815 -0.159 
 (1.017) (0.0935) (0.171) 
Lasthalf×BPM -2.721* 0.0737 -0.327* 
 (1.481) (0.127) (0.177) 
Lasthalf×SPA 1.051 0.200 -0.00746 
 (1.240) (0.200) (0.150) 
Lasthalf×SPM -0.237 0.146 0.0651 
 (1.443) (0.204) (0.191) 
Lasthalf×BPA 2.118 0.0960 0.00511 
 (1.456) (0.104) (0.188) 
Lasthalf×BPM -0.508 0.198* -0.290* 
 (1.210) (0.106) (0.162) 
Period×Control -0.133  -0.0159** 
 (0.108)  (0.00782) 
Period×SPA 0.0757 0.00848 0.00515 
 (0.124) (0.0167) (0.0116) 
Period×SPM -0.00988 0.0113 0.00480 
 (0.120) (0.0174) (0.0111) 




Table 1.7.   Continued 
 (0.101) (0.0109) (0.0146) 
Period×BPM 0.0984 -0.0176 0.0228 
 (0.134) (0.0131) (0.0140) 
Period×SIA -0.177* -0.0237 0.0158 
 (0.101) (0.0174) (0.0113) 
Period×SIM -0.0120 0.00697 0.00939 
 (0.117) (0.0164) (0.0137) 
Period×BIA -0.230* -0.00405 0.0121 
 (0.121) (0.0106) (0.0149) 
Period×BIM -0.132 -0.0340*** 0.0185 
 (0.119) (0.0112) (0.0128) 
Risk Averse -0.115 0.00196 0.0127 
 (0.0906) (0.00817) (0.00823) 
Female 0.136 0.0547* 0.0263 
 (0.320) (0.0293) (0.0307) 
Preexp -0.860*** -0.0336 0.0194 
 (0.312) (0.0274) (0.0296) 
Saleexp -0.605* 0.0160 0.00149 
 (0.326) (0.0298) (0.0280) 
Extraversion -0.0612 0.00199 -0.00385 
 (0.108) (0.0103) (0.00970) 
Agreeableness -0.132 0.0127 -0.00601 
 (0.131) (0.0131) (0.0111) 
Conscientiousness -0.111 -0.00844 0.0130 
 (0.137) (0.0109) (0.0129) 
Emotional stability -0.0718 -0.0153 -0.0140 
 (0.123) (0.0135) (0.0110) 
Openness 0.254 0.0239 -0.00392 
 (0.162) (0.0175) (0.0126) 
Constant 6.148*** -0.0977 0.650*** 
 (1.672) (0.0880) (0.116) 
    
Observations 1,740 1,740 1,740 
R-squared 0.206 0.274 0.053 
Notes: *,**, and *** denote estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 






Table 1.8.  Quality misrepresentation 






Control 43.0 320.20 283.95 
Seller Perfect Monopolistic 3.5 420.05 211.83 
Seller Perfect Alternative 5.3 418.45 224.08 
Buyer Perfect Monopolistic 22.3 382.35 276.16 
Buyer Perfect Alternative 24.7 389.09 268.63 
Seller Imperfect Monopolistic 22.3 365.29 251.07 
Seller Imperfect Alternative 31.1 353.56 271.70 
Buyer Imperfect Monopolistic 15.0 369.04 246.78 
Buyer Imperfect Alternative 27.0 345.67 278.03 
Notes: product quality misrepresentation is defined as a case where the actual product quality is low, and the seller 
offers a price that is higher than the buyer’s reservation price for a low-quality item. The last two columns provide 





Appendix B: Updating under ambiguity 
Appendix B1: Theory Derivations 
Support for Hypothesis 1: 
We first start with the 𝛼-MEU model. For task 1A, a player’s utility can be described as  
𝑉1𝐴 = 𝛼𝑢(5) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑢(15), 
as the best (worst) prior is drawing a white (black) ball for sure. After trimming out the black ball, 
utility is: 
𝑉1𝐴′ = 𝛼𝑢(10) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑢(15), 
as the worst prior becomes getting a red ball for sure. The value of self-protection in this case is: 
𝑉1𝐴
𝑃 = 𝑉1𝐴′ − 𝑉1𝐴 = 𝛼[𝑢(10) − 𝑢(5)], 
which is independent of the utility of the best prior. The value of self-protection based on tasks 1B 
and 1Bʹ is: 
𝑉1𝐵
𝑃 = 𝑉1𝐵′ − 𝑉1𝐵 = 𝑉1𝐴
𝑃 = 𝛼[𝑢(10) − 𝑢(5)]. 
Thus, changing the payoff from the white ball has no effect on the value of self-protection.  
On the other hand, using the re-weighting Bayesian rule, the value for lottery 1A and 1Aʹ 
are, respectively, 








The value of self-protection is then 
𝑉1𝐴,𝑅𝐸𝑈






𝜑[𝑢(15)] − 𝑤1𝜑[𝑢(5)]. 


















{𝜑[𝑢(30)] − 𝜑[𝑢(15)]} > 0, 
given both 𝜑 and 𝑢 are monotonically increasing. This result implies that regardless the ambiguity 
averse level, for a subject with REU, the value self-protection is higher when the value of highest 
prize increases. 
Support for Hypothesis 2: 
Since the best and worst priors have not changed, the 𝛼-MEU model predicts the same valuations 
for both lotteries, assuming 𝛼 is held fixed. For REU, an agent’s utility for lottery 2A is 
𝑉2𝐴 = 𝑤1𝜑[𝑢(5)] + 𝑤3𝜑[𝑢(15)], 
where 𝑤1 is the weight on the prior of all black balls and 𝑤3 is the weight on the prior of all white 
balls. With Bayesian updating on the weights, when adding a third prior, 𝑤2 (all red balls), we 
have 
𝑉2𝐵 = 𝑤1(1 − 𝑤2)𝜑[𝑢(5)] + 𝑤2𝜑[𝑢(10)] + 𝑤3(1 − 𝑤2)𝜑[𝑢(15)]. 
Given the concavity of 𝜑(. ), it follows that   
2𝜑[𝑢(10)] > 𝜑[𝑢(5)] + 𝜑[𝑢(15)]. 
If 𝑤1 = 𝑤3, 𝑤1 + 𝑤3 = 1 then we have  
𝑉2𝐴 − 𝑉2𝐵 = 𝑤2{(𝑤1𝜑[𝑢(5)] + 𝑤3𝜑[𝑢(15)]) − 𝜑[𝑢(10)]} < 0. 
If 𝑤1 > 𝑤3, it follows that  
𝑉2𝐴 − 𝑉2𝐵 = 𝑤2{(𝑤1𝜑[𝑢(5)] + 𝑤3𝜑[𝑢(15)]) − 𝜑[𝑢(10)]} 
                                 < 𝑤2{(0.5𝜑[𝑢(5)] + 0.5𝜑[𝑢(15)]) − 𝜑[𝑢(10)]} < 0 
We do not consider the case where 𝑤1 < 𝑤3, as putting a higher weight on the best prior potentially 





Support for Hypothesis 3: 
For α-MEU with a compound lottery as a prior, we have 
𝑉3𝐴





















It follows that 𝑉3𝐴
𝑟 = 𝑉3𝐵
𝑟 . For α-MEU with a single lottery as a prior, we have  
𝑉3𝐴


















Under REU we have:  




















It follows that 𝑉3𝐴 < 𝑉3𝐵 as 𝑤2 = 𝑤3 and 𝜑(. ) is a concave function. 
 
Support for Hypothesis 4: 
For sophisticated 𝛼-MEU it follows that 
𝑉5A
𝑠 = 𝛼′𝑢(10) + (1 − 𝛼′)𝑢(15), and 
𝑉5B
𝑠 = 𝛼𝑢(10) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑢(15). 
As a “sophisticated” bidder will have 𝛼′ < 𝛼, since the prior with only white balls is more likely 
to happen for task 5A, it follows that 𝑉5A
𝑠 > 𝑉5B
𝑠  .  
For naïve 𝛼-MEU preferences we have  
𝑉5A
𝑛 = 𝑉5B




For the REU model, 






𝑢(15)] + (𝑤3 + 𝑤4)𝜑[𝑢(15)], and 






𝑢(15)] + 𝑤4𝜑[𝑢(15)]. 






Appendix B2: Experiment Instructions  
(Note: Instructions are unaltered, with the exception of changing the task labels to reflect those 
used in the manuscript) 
 
Thank you for participating in today’s study. If you have a question at any time, please raise your 
hand. We ask that you do not communicate with other study participants, unless instructed to do 
so. Your decisions will not be associated with your name or other identifying information. Your 
name will not be linked in any way to the results of the study.  
 
The session is divided into three experiments. You will have the opportunity to earn money in each 
experiment based on your decisions. You will also receive $10 for completing all three 
experiments, along with a post-experiment questionnaire. You will be paid your earnings privately, 
and in cash, at the end of the experiment session. We will proceed through the written materials 





Instructions for Experiment 1 
 
Please refer to the Decision Sheet for Experiment 1 as we read the instructions.  
 
We would like you to make a decision for each of 10 scenarios. Each scenario involves a choice 
between receiving $2 for sure (Option A) or playing a lottery that pays $3.85 or $0.10 with the 
stated chances (Option B). 
 
You will notice that the only differences across scenarios are the chances of receiving the high or 
low prize for the lottery. 
 
At the end of the session, ONE of the 10 scenarios will be selected at random and you will be paid 
according to your decision for this selected scenario ONLY. Each scenario has an equal chance of 
being selected. 
 
Please consider your choice for each scenario carefully. Since you do not know which scenario 
will be played out, it is in your best interest to treat each scenario as if it will be the one used to 
determine your earnings.  
 





Decision Sheet for Experiment 1 
This is your Decision Sheet. Please indicate which option you prefer by circling the letter in the 
“choice” column.   
 
No. Option A Option B Choice 
1 receive $2 for sure 10% chance of $3.85 
90% chance of $0.10  
A  
B 
2 receive $2 for sure 20% chance of $3.85 
80% chance of $0.10 
A  
B 
3 receive $2 for sure 30% chance of $3.85 
70% chance of $0.10 
A  
B 
4 receive $2 for sure 40% chance of $3.85 
60% chance of $0.10 
A  
B 
5 receive $2 for sure 50% chance of $3.85 
50% chance of $0.10 
A  
B 
6 receive $2 for sure 60% chance of $3.85 
40% chance of $0.10 
A  
B 
7 receive $2 for sure 70% chance of $3.85 
30% chance of $0.10 
A  
B 
8 receive $2 for sure 80% chance of $3.85 
20% chance of $0.10 
A  
B 
9 receive $2 for sure 90% chance of $3.85 
10% chance of $0.10 
A  
B 
10 receive $2 for sure 100% chance of $3.85 





At the end of the session, after a scenario is played out, please fill-in the information below: 
The selected scenario: _______.  
The option you selected for this scenario: _______. 
Your earnings from the selected scenario: _________. 





Instructions for Experiment 2 
 
Please refer to the Decision Sheet for Experiment 2 as we read the instructions.  
 
The Decision Sheet contains 20 separate Decisions numbering 1 through 20. Each of these 
Decisions is a choice between drawing a ball from “Urn A” or “Urn B”. You will select a color, 
White or Black, and this will be your Success Color. Your earnings will be determined by whether 
the ball drawn from the Urn matches your Success Color. 
 
In each of the 20 decisions, Urn A has 50 White balls and 50 Black balls, and pays 4 dollars if the 
ball drawn from Urn A matches your Success Color, and 0 if it does not match. Since each color 
has a 50% chance of being drawn, this means that drawing from Urn A pays 2 dollars with a chance 
of 50%, and pays 0 with a chance of 50%. 
 
Urn B, on the other hand, has an unknown number of white and Black balls (with a total of 100 
balls). It pays a positive amount if the ball drawn from Urn B matches your Success Color, and 0 
if it does not match. Since the chance of each color being drawn is unknown, the chance of Urn B 
paying a positive amount is unknown as well.  
 
You will notice that the only differences across scenarios is the amount paid when a ball matching 
your Success Color is drawn from Urn B. 
 
At the end of the session, ONE of the 20 scenarios will be selected at random and you will be paid 
according to your decision for this selected scenario ONLY. Each scenario has an equal chance of 
being selected. 
 
Please consider your choice for each scenario carefully. Since you do not know which scenario 
will be played out, it is in your best interest to treat each scenario as if it will be the one used to 
determine your earnings.  
 




Decision Sheet for Experiment 2 
 
My Success Color is (please circle one):   White     Black 
. 
 Urn A Urn B  
Choice No. 50 White balls, 50 Black balls ? White balls, ? Black balls 
1 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $3.28 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
2 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $3.44 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
3 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $3.60 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
4 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $3.76 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
5 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $3.92 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
6 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $4.08 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
7 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $4.24 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
8 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $4.40 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
9 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $4.56 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
10 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $4.72 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
11 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $4.88 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
12 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $5.04 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
13 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $5.20 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
14 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $5.36 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
15 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $5.52 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
16 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $5.68 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
17 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $5.84 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
18 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $6.00 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
19 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $6.16 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
20 $4 if Success Color, 0 if not $6.32 if Success Color,0 if not A      B 
 
At the end of the session, after a scenario is played out, please fill-in the information below: 
The selected scenario: _______.  
The urn you selected for this scenario: _______. 
Your earnings from the selected scenario: _________. 




Instructions for Experiment 3 
 
This experiment involves many decision “rounds”. In each, the moderator will offer an item for 
sale. Your task will be to place a bid to buy the item for sale. As the purchase procedure will be 
new to you, we will first go through training rounds.  
 
We will use the following purchase procedure in all rounds: 
 
1. You will place a bid on the item. You will not know the price prior to bidding. 
2. The price of the item will be randomly drawn. A volunteer will be asked to roll dice to 
determine this price. The random price will be the same for all participants. 
3. If your bid is equal to or higher than the random price, you buy the item and pay the 
random price (not your bid!). If your bid is lower than the random price, you do not 
buy the item. 
 
Here are some possible scenarios based on the purchase procedure: 
⎯ You bid $2. The random price is drawn to be $1.50. Since your bid is equal to or higher 
than the random price, you buy the item at a price of $1.50. 
⎯ You bid $5. The random price is drawn to be $5. Since your bid is equal to or higher than 
the random price, you buy the item at a price of $5. 
⎯ You bid $3. The random price is drawn to be $3.50. Since your bid is lower than the random 
price, you do not buy the item. 
 
It is important to point out some aspects of the procedure. First, different from auctions, you are 
not bidding against other players. The bids of other players do not impact whether you buy an item. 
If, for example, everyone bids an amount higher than the random price, each person will pay the 
random price and each person will receive the item. Second, different from some auctions, if you 
buy something, the price is not equal to your bid. Instead, you pay the randomly selected price. 
 
Third, your bid sets the highest price for which you agree to buy the good.  For example, if 
you bid $6.25, this means that you agree to buy the item as long as the price is something less than 
or equal to $6.25. Your bid of $6.25 guarantees that you do not buy the item at prices above $6.25. 
 
Before bidding you should ask yourself “what is the highest price I am willing to pay for the 




“What If” Scenarios 
To help you understand the procedures, we ask that you consider a number of “what if” scenarios. 
Here is the good news: you will be paid 25 cents for each scenario you answer correctly. There is 
a bonus question, and you will be paid 50 cents for a correct answer to this. 
The item for sale in these scenarios is a $5 bill. Remember: If your bid is equal to or higher than 
the random price, you buy the item and pay the random price (not your bid!). If your bid is lower 
than the random price, you do not buy. 
1. Suppose you bid $2.50. Then, a volunteer draws a random price of $4.00. 
Based on the procedure we described would you purchase the $5 bill?  Yes No 
If you answered “Yes”, what price would you pay?     $  _____________ 
 
2. Suppose you bid $3.12. Then, a volunteer draws a random price of $6.37. 
Based on the procedure we described would you purchase the $5 bill?  Yes No 
If you answered “Yes”, what price would you pay?     $  _____________ 
 
3. Suppose you bid $5.00. Then, a volunteer draws a random price of $4.25. 
Based on the procedure we described would you purchase the $5 bill?  Yes No 
If you answered “Yes”, what price would you pay?     $  _____________ 
 
4. Suppose you bid $5.00. Then, a volunteer draws a random price of $6.56. 
Based on the procedure we described would you purchase the $5 bill?  Yes No 
If you answered “Yes”, what price would you pay?     $  _____________ 
 
5. Suppose you bid $7.16. Then, a volunteer draws a random price of $4.12. 
Based on the procedure we described would you purchase the $5 bill?  Yes No 
If you answered “Yes”, what price would you pay?     $  _____________ 
 
6. Suppose you bid $8.00. Then, a volunteer draws a random price of $6.50. 
Based on the procedure we described would you purchase the $5 bill?  Yes No 
If you answered “Yes”, what price would you pay?     $  _____________ 
 
Bonus question. Given the purchase procedure, how much should you bid for the $5 bill? Keep in 
mind that it is in your best interest to place a bid equal to the highest price you are willing to pay. 
      You should bid: $ _________ . _________ 
 




Training Round 1 
 
In this training round you will have the opportunity to earn money. 
 
Your task in this round is to place a bid to buy a ticket to draw ONE ball from an urn containing 
three balls. If you successfully buy a ticket, you will receive an amount of money based on the 
color of the ONE ball drawn. All three balls are black. Drawing a black ball pays $2. 
 
After everyone has placed a bid, a volunteer will roll dice to determine the random price. Although 
you will not know the price range before you bid, know that three dice will be rolled. The first will 
determine the dollars and the other two will determine the cents. 
If your bid is equal to or higher than the random price, you will receive the amount of money for 
the ball drawn and pay the random price. If you make a purchase at a price that is higher than the 
value of the ball drawn you will in fact have negative earnings (lose money). 
If your bid is less than the random price, you will not buy a ticket. You will not pay the random 
price. You will earn $0. 
For training purposes, we will play out the procedures several times. However, you will only bid 
once. You will not be able to change your bid after the random prices are determined. 
 
Your bid (in dollars and cents): $ _________ . _________  
 
Trial 1 
Random price: $_________ . _________ 
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price?  (check the box below) 
 Yes.  You bought a ticket.   
       Your earnings are equal to: $___________  – _____________ = $ _________ . _________ 
                                                          (value of ball)     (random price) 
 
 No.  You did not buy a ticket. Your earnings for this trial are $0. 






Training Round 1—Continued 
 
Trial 2 
Random price: $_________ . _________ 
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price?  (check the box below) 
 Yes.  You bought a ticket.   
       Your earnings are equal to: $___________  – _____________ = $ _________ . _________ 
                                                          (value of ball)     (random price) 
 
 No.  You did not buy a ticket. Your earnings for this trial are $0. 
Record your earnings on your Record Sheet.  
 
Trial 3 
Random price: $_________ . _________ 
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price?  (check the box below) 
 Yes.  You bought a ticket.   
       Your earnings are equal to: $___________  – _____________ = $ _________ . _________ 
                                                          (value of ball)     (random price) 
 
 No.  You did not buy a ticket. Your earnings for this trial are $0. 
Record your earnings on your Record Sheet.  
 
Trial 4 
Random price: $_________ . _________ 
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price?  (check the box below) 
 Yes.  You bought a ticket.   
       Your earnings are equal to: $___________  – _____________ = $ _________ . _________ 
                                                          (value of ball)     (random price) 
 
 No.  You did not buy a ticket. Your earnings for this trial are $0. 




Training Round 2 
 
In this training round you will have the opportunity to earn money. 
 
Your task in this round is to place a bid to buy a ticket to draw ONE ball from an urn containing 
three balls: one black ball, one red ball and one white ball. If you successfully buy a ticket, you 
will receive an amount of money based on the color of the ONE ball drawn. The black ball pays 2 
dollars, the red ball pays 3 dollars and the white ball pays 4 dollars if drawn.  
 
After everyone has indicated their bid, a volunteer will roll dice to determine the random price. 
Although you will not know the price range before you bid, know that three dice will be rolled. 
The first will determine the dollars and the other two will determine the cents. 
If your bid is equal to or higher than the random price, you will receive the amount of money for 
the ball drawn and pay the random price. If you make a purchase at a price that is higher than the 
value of the ball drawn you will in fact have negative earnings (lose money). 
If your bid is less than the random price, you will not buy a ticket. You will not pay the random 
price. You will earn $0. 
We will play out the procedures several times. However, you will only bid once. You will not be 
able to change your bid after the random prices are determined. 
 
Your bid (in dollars and cents): $ _________ . _________  
 
Trial 1 
Random price: $_________ . _________ 
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price?  (check the box below) 
 Yes.  You bought a ticket.   
       Your earnings are equal to: $___________  – _____________ = $ _________ . _________ 
                                                          (value of ball)     (random price) 
 
 No.  You did not buy a ticket. Your earnings for this trial are $0. 






Training Round 2—Continued 
 
Trial 2 
Random price: $_________ . _________ 
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price?  (check the box below) 
 Yes.  You bought a ticket.   
       Your earnings are equal to: $___________  – _____________ = $ _________ . _________ 
                                                          (value of ball)     (random price) 
 
 No.  You did not buy a ticket. Your earnings for this trial are $0. 
Record your earnings on your Record Sheet.  
 
Trial 3 
Random price: $_________ . _________ 
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price?  (check the box below) 
 Yes.  You bought a ticket.   
       Your earnings are equal to: $___________  – _____________ = $ _________ . _________ 
                                                          (value of ball)     (random price) 
 
 No.  You did not buy a ticket. Your earnings for this trial are $0. 
Record your earnings on your Record Sheet.  
 
Trial 4 
Random price: $_________ . _________ 
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price?  (check the box below) 
 Yes.  You bought a ticket.   
       Your earnings are equal to: $___________  – _____________ = $ _________ . _________ 
                                                          (value of ball)     (random price) 
 
 No.  You did not buy a ticket. Your earnings for this trial are $0. 





Experiment 3 Decision Rounds – Part A 
The decision rounds in Experiment 3 are divided into two parts – Part A and Part B. There are six 
decision rounds in this part.  
 
Your task in each round is to place a bid to buy a ticket to draw ONE ball from an urn. You will 
be told the possible colors of the balls in the urn, and the payoffs for each color. 
 
In this part, may not know exactly how many balls of a particular color there are. As an example, 
you might know there are three balls in the urn, and that the possible ball colors are black, red and 
white. This could mean that all three balls are the same color, or that there are two of one color 








The purchase procedure is the same as before. Your bid will be compared to a random price. You 
will purchase the ticket only if your bid is equal to or higher than the random price. The random 
price will be a randomly drawn number between $0.00 and a maximum price. The maximum price 
will an amount equal to or lower than the payoff associated with the highest-valued ball in the urn. 
For example, if the highest-valued ball is $15, the maximum possible price may be as high as $15. 
Any price within this range is equally likely to be chosen. 
 
As before, it is in your best interest to place a bid equal to the highest price you are willing to pay 
for the ticket. By doing so, you will only purchase the ticket at prices you are willing to pay. You 
will not purchase the ticket at prices you are not willing to pay.  
If you instead bid lower than the highest price you are willing to pay, you risk not purchasing the 
ticket at prices favorable to you. If you instead bid more than the highest price you are willing to 
pay, you risk purchasing the ticket at prices that are not favorable to you. 
Only one decision round, which may be from Part A or Part B, will be implemented for real. After 
all decision rounds are completed, we will have a volunteer roll dice to determine which round this 
is. Since you will not know which round will be selected prior to making any decisions, it is in 
your best interest to take each decision seriously as if it will determine an actual purchase.  
 
After this paid round is selected, a volunteer will roll dice to determine the random price. Another 










In the next FOUR rounds, the same urn will be used. The urn contains three 
balls of unknown colors.  
 




Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 







Payoff if drawn Black - $5 Red - $10  White - $15 















Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 







Payoff if drawn Black - $5 Red - $10  White - $30 















Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 
There is one urn containing three balls. The possible ball colors are black, red and white. IF this 
urn contains one or more black balls, these balls will be replaced with red or white balls before a 







Payoff if drawn   Red - $10  White - $15 












Task 1Bʹ  
148 
 
Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 
There is one urn containing three balls. The possible ball colors are black, red and white. IF this 
urn contains one or more black balls, these balls will be replaced with red or white balls before a 







Payoff if drawn   Red - $10  White - $30 
















Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 
There is one urn containing three balls. Either all balls in the urn are black or all balls in the urn 












Payoff if drawn Black - $5    White - $15 


























Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 
There is one urn containing three balls. Either all balls in the urn are black, all balls in the urn are 















Payoff if drawn Black - $5 Red - $10  White - $15 






























Experiment 3 Decision Rounds – Part B 
The decision rounds in Experiment 3 are divided into two parts – Part A and Part B. There are 
eight decision rounds in this part.  
 
Your task in each round is to place a bid to buy a ticket to draw ONE ball from an urn. You will 
be told the possible colors of the balls in the urn, and the payoffs for each color. 
 
In this part, a ball may be drawn from one of several possible urns. If you buy a ticket to draw a 
ball from an urn, you will first draw a card to determine what urn is in play, and then draw a ball 












In this example, there are two different urns, numbered 1 and 2. Urn 1 contains one black ball, one 
red ball and one white ball. Urn 2 contains one black ball and two white balls. If you purchased a 
ticket in this situation, you would first draw a card from a stack of TWELVE cards. You know for 
sure that one of the cards is for Urn 1 and one is for Urn 2. You do not know the number on the 
other cards – they can all be 1s or all be 2s or any combination of 1s and 2s. The number on the 
card drawn identifies the urn in play, and then a ball is selected from this urn. As before, each ball 
will be worth a particular amount of money based on its color. 
 
The purchase procedure is the same as before. Your bid will be compared to a random price. You 
will purchase the ticket only if your bid is equal to or higher than the random price. The random 
price will be a randomly drawn number between $0.00 and a maximum price. The maximum price 
will an amount equal to or lower than the payoff associated with the highest-valued ball in the urn. 
For example, if the highest-valued ball is $15, the maximum possible price may be as high as $15. 
































1 2 ? ? ? ? 




As before, it is in your best interest to place a bid equal to the highest price you are willing to pay 
for the ticket. By doing so, you will only purchase the ticket at prices you are willing to pay. You 
will not purchase the ticket at prices you are not willing to pay.  
If you instead bid lower than the highest price you are willing to pay, you risk not purchasing the 
ticket at prices favorable to you. If you instead bid more than the highest price you are willing to 
pay, you risk purchasing the ticket at prices that are not favorable to you. 
Only one decision round, which may be from Part A or Part B, will be implemented for real. After 
all decision rounds are completed, we will have a volunteer roll dice to determine which round this 
is. Since you will not know which round will be selected prior to making any decisions, it is in 
your best interest to take each decision seriously as if it will determine an actual purchase.  
 
After this paid round is selected, a volunteer will roll dice to determine the random price. Another 
volunteer will select a ball from the urn. 
 




In the next two rounds, the same stack of cards will be used to determine the 
number of the urn selected.    
 




Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the selected urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 
There are four different urns, numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4. The ball colors in each are illustrated in the 
figure below. If you purchase a ticket, you would first draw a card from a stack of TWELVE cards 
to select what urn is used. There are an equal number of #3 and #4 cards. IF a black ball is selected 
from the urn, you would repeat the procedure – draw a different card, and then draw a ball from 

















Payoff if drawn  Red - $10  White - $15 
Total number of balls in an urn 3 
Total number of cards 12 
 
Your bid (in dollars and cents): $_________ . _________
1 2 3 4 ? ? 







































Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the selected urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 
There are four different urns, numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4. The ball colors in each are illustrated in the 
figure below. If you purchase a ticket, you would first draw a card from a stack of TWELVE cards 
to select what urn is used. There are an equal number of #3 and #4 cards. IF a black ball is selected 
from the urn, you would repeat the procedure – draw a different card, and then draw a ball from 














Payoff if drawn  Red - $10  White - $15 
Total number of balls in an urn 3 
Total number of cards 12 
 
 
Your bid (in dollars and cents): $_________ . _________
1 2 3 4 ? ? 








































In the next two rounds, the same stack of cards will be used to determine the 
number of the urn selected.    
 




Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the selected urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 
There are three different urns, numbered 1, 2 and 3. The ball colors in each are illustrated in the 
figure below. If you purchase a ticket, you would first draw a card from a stack of TWELVE cards 













Payoff if drawn  Red - $10  White - $15 
Total number of balls in an urn 6 




Your bid (in dollars and cents): $_________ . _________
1 2 3 ? ? ? 
































































Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the selected urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 
There are three different urns, numbered 1, 2 and 3. The ball colors in each are illustrated in the 
figure below. If you purchase a ticket, you would first draw a card from a stack of TWELVE cards 














Payoff if drawn  Red - $10  White - $15 
Total number of balls in an urn 6 




Your bid (in dollars and cents): $_________ . _________
1 2 3 ? ? ? 























































































In the next two rounds, the same stack of cards will be used to determine the 
number of the urn selected.    
 




Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the selected urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 
There are five different urns, numbered 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The ball colors in each are illustrated in 
the figure below. If you purchase a ticket, you would first draw a card from a stack of TWELVE 
cards to select what urn is used. There are an equal number of #3 and #4 cards. IF a black ball is 
selected from the urn, you would repeat the procedure – draw a different card, and then draw a ball 













Payoff if drawn  Red - $10  White - $15 
Total number of balls in an urn 3 




Your bid (in dollars and cents): $_________ . _________
1 2 3 4 5 ? 




















































Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the selected urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 
There are five different urns, numbered 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The ball colors in each are illustrated in 
the figure below. If you purchase a ticket, you would first draw a card from a stack of TWELVE 
cards to select what urn is used. There are an equal number of #3 and #4 cards. IF a black ball is 
selected from the urn, you would repeat the procedure – draw a different card, and then draw a ball 














Payoff if drawn  Red - $10  White - $15 
Total number of balls in an urn 3 
Total number of cards 12 
 
 
Your bid (in dollars and cents): $_________ . _________
1 2 3 4 5 ? 













































In the next two rounds, the same stack of cards will be used to determine the 
number of the urn selected.    
 




Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the selected urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 
There are four different urns, numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4. The ball colors in each are illustrated in the 
figure below. If you purchase a ticket, you would first draw a card from a stack of TWELVE cards 














Payoff if drawn  Red - $10  White - $15 
Total number of balls in an urn 6 




Your bid (in dollars and cents): $_________ . _________
1 2 3 4 ? ? 



























































































































































Please read the description carefully. It will be in your best interest to place a bid equal to the 
highest price you are willing to pay. If you buy a ticket, you will receive the payoff associated with 
the color of the ONE ball drawn from the selected urn, and pay the random price.  
 
Description: 
There are four different urns, numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4. The ball colors in each are illustrated in the 
figure below. If you purchase a ticket, you would first draw a card from a stack of TWELVE cards 














Payoff if drawn  Red - $10  White - $15 
Total number of balls in an urn 6 




Your bid (in dollars and cents): $_________ . _________
1 2 3 4 ? ? 






















































































































































Earnings Record Sheet 
 
Payment for completing all experiments and the questionnaire $10.00 
Earnings from Experiment 1  
Earnings from Experiment 2  
 
Practice calculations  
Training round 1 – trial 1  
Training round 1 – trial 2  
Training round 1 – trial 3  
Training round 1 – trial 4  
Training round 2 – trial 1  
Training round 2 – trial 2  
Training round 2 – trial 3  
Training round 2 – trial 4  
Paid Decision Round 
 
Is your bid equal to or higher than the random price?   
 Yes.  You bought a ticket.   
          Your earnings are equal to: $___________  – _____________  
                                                               (value of ball)      (random price) 




Total earnings (add up all amounts above): $________.________ 
 
Round up your total earnings to the next highest quarter, and record 










We would now like for you to complete a short survey. Please note that all answers are strictly 
confidential and will be used for statistical purposes only.  
 
1. Have you previously participated in an economics experiment?  
(circle one)     YES   NO 
2.Did you understand the instructions for the experiment today? Please rate your understanding on a scale 
from 1 to 5. (Circle one number.) 
 
I understood 
very poorly  
 
   I understood 
very well 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
3.Did you feel that you were well-compensated for your participation in this experiment? Please rate your 




very poorly  
 
   I was 
compensated 
very well 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
4. What is your age? __________ 
5. What is your gender? (circle one)       Male        Female 
6. What is your major? (be specific) 
______________________________________ 
7. What is your classification for the spring 2017 semester? (circle one)  
Freshman           Sophomore         Junior         Senior 
Master’s Student     Law Student     Doctoral Student 
Other ____________ 




Full-time student     Part-time student (taking fewer than 12 hours/sem) 
Not a student              Other (please specify) 
9. How many economic courses have you taken at the university level? (include this semester) 
___________ 
10. How would you best describe your current employment situation? (circle one) 
Full-time employment outside of the university 
Part-time employment outside of the university 
Student only 
Work at the university/research assistantship 
11.In what range is your GPA? (circle one) 
 
0 to 2.0 / 2.1 to 2.5 / 2.6 to 3.0 / 3.1 to 3.5 / 3.6 to 4.0 
 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a number next to 
each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate 

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I see myself as: 
1. _____ Extraverted, enthusiastic. 
2. _____ Critical, quarrelsome. 
3. _____ Dependable, self-disciplined. 
4. _____ Anxious, easily upset. 
5. _____ Open to new experiences, complex. 
6. _____ Reserved, quiet. 
7. _____ Sympathetic, warm. 
8. _____ Disorganized, careless. 
9. _____ Calm, emotionally stable. 
10. _____ Conventional, uncreative. 
 





Appendix B3: Tables 





1 1A 5/10/15 One urn, containing three balls. The possible ball colors are black, red and 
white. 
1 1Aʹ  trimmed/10/15 Same as 1A, except that IF this urn contains one or more black balls, these balls 
are replaced with red or white balls before a ball is drawn. 
1 1B 5/10/30 Same as 1A, except payoff of white ball increased to 30. 
1 1Bʹ trimmed/10/30 Same as 1Aʹ, except payoff of white ball increased to 30. 
2 2A 5/–/15 One urn, containing three balls. Either all are black or all are white. 
2 2B 5/10/15 Same as 2A, except that it is now also possible that all balls are red. 
3 3A trimmed/10/15 Four urns, each containing three balls. The possible ball colors are black, red 
and white. Urn 1: all are black. Urn 2: all are red. Urn 3: two red and one white. 
Urn 4: one red and two white.  
An urn is selected by drawing a card from a stack of 12 cards, numbered 1 to 4. 
All that is known is that there is an equal chance of selecting Urn 3 or Urn 4. IF 
a black ball is selected from the urn, the urn selection procedure is repeated 
until a red or white ball is drawn. 
3 3B trimmed/10/15 Same as 3A, except that Urn 3 and Urn 4 now contain one ball of each color. 
4 4A 
 
–/10/15 Three urns, each containing six balls. The possible ball colors are red and white. 
Urn 1: all are red. Urn 2: four white and two red. Urn 3: four red and two white. 
 
An urn is selected by drawing a card from a stack of 12 cards, numbered 1 to 3. 
All that is known is that there is an equal chance of selecting Urn 2 or Urn 3. 
4 4B –/10/15 Same as 4A, except Urn 2 and Urn 3 now each contain three red and three 
white balls. 
5 5A trimmed/10/15 Five urns, each containing three balls. The possible ball colors are black, red 
and white. Urn 1: all are black. Urn 2: all are red. Urn 3: two red and one white. 
Urn 4: two black and one white. Urn 5: all are white. 
An urn is selected by drawing a card from a stack of 12 cards, numbered 1 to 5. 
All that is known is that there is an equal chance of selecting Urn 3 or Urn 4.IF 
a black ball is selected from the urn, the urn selection procedure is repeated 
until a red or white ball is drawn. 
5 5B trimmed/10/15 Same as 5A, except that Urn 3 and Urn 4 now each contain one red and two 
white balls. 
6 6A –/10/15 Four earns, each containing six balls. The possible ball colors are black, red and 
white. Urn 1: all are red. Urn 2: four white and two red. Urn 3: all are white. 
Urn 4: all are white. 
An urn is selected by drawing a card from a stack of 12 cards, numbered 1 to 4. 
All that is known is that there is an equal chance of selecting Urn 2 or Urn 3. 





Table 2.2 . Variables and descriptive statistics  
Variable name Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Female =1 if identified gender is female 0.42 0.49 
Employed =1 if participant has a part time or full time job 0.40 0.49 
Age age, in years 20.71 1.74 
GPA cumulative GPA; midpoint of selected range 3.37 0.43 
STEM =1 if majoring in a STEM field 0.42 0.49 
Extraversion measure of personality trait “extraversion”, 1 to 7 4.54 1.51 
Agreeableness measure of personality trait “agreeableness”, 1 to 7 4.75 1.27 
Conscientiousness measure of personality trait “conscientiousness”, 1 to 7 5.49 0.96 
Emotional 
Stability 
measure of personality trait “emotional stability”, 1 to 7 4.90 1.35 
Openness measure of personality trait “openness to experience”, 1 to 7 5.31 1.17 
Risk number of Lottery A (safe) choices selected in risk MPL 6.26 1.50 
Risk Averse =1 if number of Lottery A (safe) choices >5 in risk MPL 0.71 0.45 
Ambiguity Averse =1 if number of Urn A choices >5 in ambiguity MPL 0.89 0.31 
Comprehension 
 
stated understanding of the experiment; Likert-scale with 1 




stated satisfaction about experiment compensation; Likert-
scale with 1 “very poorly” and 5 “very well” 
4.46 0.70 






Table 2.3.  Lottery valuations, by task (in $) 
 
Task Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1A 7.70 2.79 4.00 15.00 
1Aʹ  10.65 2.01 5.00 15.00 
1B 10.41 5.76 4.99 30.00 
1Bʹ 13.98 5.44 5.00 30.00 
2A 7.52 3.33 1.37 20.00 
2B 8.30 3.29 2.25 25.00 
3A 10.26 2.09 4.19 19.99 
3B 9.91 1.86 4.00 15.00 
4A 10.47 1.90 2.21 15.00 
4B 10.34 2.01 3.75 15.00 
5A 10.30 2.32 2.00 15.00 
5B 11.05 2.33 3.00 15.00 
6A 11.26 2.15 5.25 15.00 

















(a) Tests of kinked versus smooth specifications 
H1: 𝑉1𝐴′ − 𝑉1𝐴 =
        𝑉1𝐵′ − 𝑉1𝐵 
-1.79 (0.08) -1.12 (0.26) 32% 42% 26% 
H2: 𝑉2𝐴 = 𝑉2𝐵 -3.63 ( <0.01) -4.12 (<0.01) 43% 44% 14% 
H3a: 𝑉3𝐴 = 𝑉3𝐵 2.08 (0.04) 3.30 (0.01) 10% 59% 31% 
H3b: 𝑉4𝐴 = 𝑉4𝐵 1.24 (0.21) 0.95 (0.34) 17% 62% 21% 
H4a: 𝑉5𝐴 = 𝑉5𝐵 -3.91 (<0.01) -4.29 (<0.01) 40% 48% 12% 
H4b: 𝑉6𝐴 = 𝑉6𝐵 1.74 (0.09) 1.34 (0.18) 15% 63% 21% 
(b) Tests of task complexity 
H5a: 𝑉3𝐴 = 𝑉4𝐴 -1.40 (0.16) -1.77 (0.08) 26% 57% 16% 
H5b: 𝑉3𝐵 = 𝑉4𝐵 -2.64 (<0.01) -2.42 (0.02) 34% 48% 18% 
H5c: 𝑉5𝐴 = 𝑉6𝐴 -5.79 (<0.01) -5.98 (<0.01) 49% 44% 8% 
H5d: 𝑉5𝐵 = 𝑉6𝐵 -0.25 (0.80) 0.16 (0.87) 21% 56% 23% 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. The last three columns indicate the percentage of participants with negative, zero, or 
positive differences when evaluating the null hypothesis; e.g., for H2, 43% of respondents placed higher bids for 











Female 0.102 (0.195) -0.141 (0.226) 
Risk -0.128** (0.052) -0.032 (0.054) 
GPA -0.141 (0.217) 0.933** (0.330) 
STEM -0.455** (0.208) -0.007 (0.207) 
Extraversion 0.054 (0.065) 0.047 (0.062) 
Agreeableness -0.082 (0.079) 0.022 (0.079) 
Conscientiousness -0.010 (0.099) 0.007 (0.096) 
Emotional Stability -0.020 (0.057) -0.129 (0.089) 
Openness 0.083 (0.074) 0.028 (0.110) 
H1 -0.586 (0.356)  
H2 -0.797** (0.223)  
H3a 0.382** (0.176)  
H3b 0.088 (0.107)  
H4a -0.746** (0.202)  
H4b 0.165 (0.108)  
H5a  -0.135 (0.150) 
H5b  -0.428** (0.162) 
H5c  -0.954** (0.162) 
H5d  -0.043 (0.173) 
Controls for task order? Yes Yes 
R2 0.079 0.166 
F-stat 3.83** 3.66** 
Number of observations 666 444 
Notes: cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * and * indicate estimate is statistically significant at the 10% 






































































































Hypothesis indicators? Yes Yes 
Controls for task order? Yes Yes 
     
Log-likelihood -604.276 -383.463 
Wald-stat 130.65** 112.17** 
Number of observations 666 444 
Notes: cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * and * indicate estimate is statistically significant at the 10% 







Table 2.7.  Hypothesis test results, excluding participants who poorly understood instructions  
Null hypothesis Paired t-test (p-value) 
Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test (p-value) 
H1: 𝑉1𝐴′ − 𝑉1𝐴 = 𝑉1𝐵′ − 𝑉1𝐵 -1.52 (0.16) -0.89 (0.38) 
H2: 𝑉2𝐴 = 𝑉2𝐵 -3.38 (<0.01) -3.81 (<0.01) 
H3: 𝑉3𝐴 = 𝑉3𝐵  2.03 (0.05) 3.25 (<0.01) 
H3: 𝑉4𝐴 = 𝑉4𝐵 0.77 (0.44) 0.49 (0.62) 
H4: 𝑉5𝐴 = 𝑉5𝐵 -4.12 (<0.01) -4.39 (<0.01) 
H4: 𝑉6𝐴 = 𝑉6𝐵 0.84 (0.40) 0.26 (0.80) 
H5: 𝑉3𝐴 = 𝑉4𝐴 -1.38 (0.18) -1.87 (0.06) 
H5: 𝑉3𝐵 = 𝑉4𝐵 -2.9 (<0.01) -2.86 (<0.01) 
H5: 𝑉5𝐴 = 𝑉6𝐴 -5.96 (<0.01) -5.87 (<0.01) 







Appendix B4: Figures 
  
(a) H1, 𝑉1𝐴′ − 𝑉1𝐴 − (𝑉1𝐵′ − 𝑉1𝐵)   (b) H2, 𝑉2𝐴 − 𝑉2𝐵 
  




(e) H4a, 𝑉5𝐴 − 𝑉5𝐵     (f) H4b, 𝑉6𝐴 − 𝑉6𝐵 




































































































(a) H5a, 𝑉3𝐴 − 𝑉4𝐴      (b) H5b, 𝑉3𝐵 − 𝑉4𝐵 
  
(c) H5c, 𝑉5𝐴 − 𝑉6𝐴      (d) H5d, 𝑉5B − 𝑉6𝐵 
 





































































Appendix C: Climate adaptation under deep uncertainty 
Appendix C1: Theory Derivations 
Assume streamflow, 𝑁(𝑡), is a stochastic variable and follows a geometric Brownian 
motion: 
(1) 𝑑𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼𝑁𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑁𝑡𝑑𝐵.                                                            
For an initial value of streamflow, 𝑁0, the stochastic differential equation above has the analytic 
solution 





.                                                   
Equation (A2) implies that 𝑁(𝑡) is a log-normally distributed random variable with expected 
value 𝐸[𝑁] = 𝑁0𝑒
𝜇𝑡 and variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑁] = 𝑁0
2𝑒2𝜇𝑡(𝑒𝜎
2𝑡 − 1). Now assume profits are a 
concave function of water supply 
(3) 𝜋(𝑡) = 𝛼𝑁(𝑡)𝛽 .                                                             












(𝑑𝑁)2,                                           



























𝜎𝑁𝑑𝐵.                     


















= 𝛼𝛽(𝛽 − 1)𝑁(𝑡)𝛽−2 =
𝛽(𝛽−1)
𝑁2
𝜋.                                           
Substituting (A6), (A7) and (A8) into (A5), we have  












             𝑑𝜋 = [𝛽𝜇 +
1
2
𝛽(𝛽 − 1)𝜎2] 𝜋𝑑𝑡 + 𝑏𝜎𝜋𝑑𝐵 
             𝑑𝜋 = 𝛼𝑝𝜋𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑝𝜋𝑑𝐵.                                                        
where 
𝛼𝑝 = [𝛽𝜇 +
1
2
𝛽(𝛽 − 1)𝜎2] 





Appendix C2: Tables 
Table 3.1.  Parameter values based on a farm producing alfalfa that is considering switching 
from flood to center pivot irrigation  
Parameter Value Source 
𝑃 $197/ton 2013 Yuba County Crop Report 
𝑦 5 tons per acre annually USDA 2013 Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey 
𝛾0 1.1 USDA 2013 Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey 
𝛾1 2 Brown, 2008 
𝑀 $1,000/acre Natural Resources Conservation Service 
𝜃 0.000006  
?̃? 855,150 annual acre feet  
𝜌 0.09  
e 1.94 estimated from Water Strategist data 
𝜑 899 estimated from Water Strategist data 
𝜀 0.8  
𝑎0 1031  
𝑏0 0.01448  
𝑎1 1094  
𝑏1 0.0008122  
 
Table 3.2.  Optimal adoption time (t*, in years) 
Expectations of water availability based on historical weather Never adopt 
Expectations of water availability based on 
climate projections 
Ambiguity averse (𝜺 = 𝟏) 193.1 
Ambiguity neutral(𝜺 = 𝟎) 241.1 
 
Table 3.3.  Effect of changing risk and ambiguity on the expected adoption time (t*, in years) 
  Risk  
 Low Benchmark High 
Ambiguity averse  
(𝜺 = 𝟏) 
190.3 193.1 257.4 
Ambiguity neutral 
(𝜺 = 𝟎) 





Table 3.4.  Sensitivity of results to parameter changes (t*, in years) 
  5% Decrease 5% Increase 
𝑎0 Profit scalar under old technology Immediately Never 
𝑏0 Sensitivity of profits to water supply under old 
technology 
196.9 189.9 
𝑎1 Profit scalar under conservation technology 938.2 Immediately 
𝑏1 Sensitivity of profits to water supply under 
conservation technology 
192.0 194.3 




Table 3.5.  Effect of changing risk and ambiguity on the critical adaptation threshold (N*, 
million acre feet) 
  Risk  
 Low Benchmark High 
Ambiguity averse  
(𝜺 = 𝟏) 
5.387 5.283 4.489 
Ambiguity neutral 
(𝜺 = 𝟎) 
4.639 3.491 2.544 
Farmer will switch technology once the streamflow went below the threshold. Thus, a higher 

























Appendix C3: Figures 
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Figure 3.3.  Comparison over expected profit trend   
 𝛼𝑝 𝜎𝑝 
Worst-case prior ( miroc5.1.rcp26 ) ── -0.000083 0.011181 
Ambiguity neutral prior (average of all 
projections) 
── 0.000041 0.012665 
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